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Zusammenfassung
In dieser kumulativen Dissertation werden qualitative und quantitative Analysemethoden 
angewendet um zu einem besseren Verständnis der grundlegenden Prozesse und 
Auswirkungen von großflächigen Landinvestitionen beizutragen. Die empirische Arbeit 
basiert auf der Auswertung rechtlicher Dokumente, 58 Experteninterviews und 20 
Fokusgruppendiskussionen, die in Ghana und Kenia durchgeführt wurden, sowie einem 
Haushaltsdatensatz, der 436 Vertragsbauern und 388 unabhängige Ölpalmbauern im Umfeld 
einer großflächigen Ölpalminvestition in Ghana umfasst.
Im ersten Artikel wird das Zusammenspiel zwischen Landgovernancesystemen und 
großflächigen Investitionen in Agrarland dargelegt. Ein eingebettetes Fallstudiendesign 
ermöglicht eine Gegenüberstellung der Länder Ghana und Kenia, sowie jeweils einer 
Agrarinvestition pro Land. Die Frage, wie großflächige Landtransaktionen implementiert 
werden, steht dabei im Zentrum der qualitativen Untersuchung, die sich methodisch an 
Williamsons vier Ebenen der sozialwissenschaftlichen Analyse anlehnt.
In einem ersten Schritt wird die Entstehung des Bodenordnungssystems angesichts der 
zugrundeliegenden informellen und formellen Institutionen erläutert. Während erstere 
gesellschaftlich tiefverwurzelte Normen und Traditionen berücksichtigen, beinhalten letztere
staatliche de jure Regulierungen der Landbesitzverhältnisse (Williamsons erste und zweite 
Ebene). Das Bodenordnungssystem bildet die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen für den 
Prozess des Landerwerbs. Dieser wird zunächst allgemein für Ghana und Kenia 
herausgearbeitet und anschließend anhand der beiden Investitionsbeispiele konkretisiert 
(Williamsons dritte Ebene). Darauf folgt eine Zusammenfassung von unmittelbaren, sowie 
mittel- und langfristigen Auswirkungen der beiden Landtransaktionen aus der Perspektive der 
lokalen Bevölkerung (Williamsons vierte Ebene). Anhand der komparativen Analyse werden 
schließlich Zusammenhänge identifiziert, die über Williamsons Institutionenhierarchie 
hinausragen.
Eine Synthese ergibt, dass die Landgovernancesysteme nicht in der Lage sind, angemessen 
auf die gestiegene Nachfrage nach Land zu reagieren. Aus einem Kanon von überlappenden 
und sich teilweise widersprechenden traditionellen Praktiken, kolonialen Rechtsvorschriften 
sowie nach der Unabhängigkeit modifizierten Gesetzestexten ist ungeachtet jüngerer 
Reformanstrengungen bisher noch kein umfassend konsistenter Rechtsrahmen entstanden. 
Demnach basiert der Prozess des Landerwerbs in Ghana und Kenia eher auf intransparenten 
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und teilweise illegalen Handlungen als auf eindeutigen gesetzlichen Vorgaben. In solch einem 
arbiträren System, indem Verwaltungsorgane oft nur über geringe finanzielle und fachliche 
Kapazitäten verfügen, hängt es deshalb stark vom individuellen Verhalten eines Investors ab,
ob großflächige Landinvestitionen gewinnbringend für die lokale Bevölkerung ausgestaltet 
werden.
Dies führt letztlich dazu, dass die Handlungen von Investoren Rückwirkungen auf das 
Landgovernancesystem des Gastlandes haben. Da Investoren schwache Governancestrukturen 
zunehmend auf Kosten der lokalen Bevölkerung ausnutzen, ist die Kritik der Zivilgesellschaft 
am Prozess des Landerwerbs und des zugrundeliegenden Bodenordnungssystems so stark 
gestiegen, dass das Landgovernancesystem sowohl in Ghana als auch in Kenia gegenwärtig 
reformiert wird. Zusammenfassend lässt sich also festhalten, dass nicht nur das 
Landgovernancesystem großflächige Landinvestitionen beeinflusst, sondern dass großflächige 
Landinvestitionen auch Auswirkungen auf das Landgovernancesystem haben.
Im zweiten Artikel wird der komparative Blickwinkel hin zu einer institutionenökonomischen 
Analyse des Fallstudienlandes Ghana verengt. Mit Hilfe des institutionellen Analyserahmens 
(institutional analysis and development framework) von Ostrom wird der Frage 
nachgegangen, warum großflächige Landinvestitionen unterschiedliche Auswirkungen auf die 
lokale Bevölkerung haben und wie solche Auswirkungen in einem konkreten Fall aussehen.
Ein erster Analyseschritt zeigt, dass die Durchführung großflächiger Landinvestitionen nicht 
isoliert von unterschiedlichen Kontextfaktoren zu betrachten ist, sondern jeweils durch die 
vorherrschende Ressourcenausstattung im Gastland, durch konstitutionelle und kulturelle 
Rahmenbedingungen sowie durch deren konkrete Auslegung in formalen Landrechts-
gesetzen, aber auch in informellen Landrechtstraditionen, geprägt sind. Dementsprechend 
kanalisieren Kontextfaktoren nach Ostrom die Handlungen von verschiedenen Akteuren, wie 
beispielsweise von Investoren, staatlichen Institutionen, traditionellen Autoritäten oder der 
Zivilgesellschaft, die innerhalb der Ostrom’schen Aktionsarena Land nachfragen oder 
anbieten, Flächen enteignen, Verhandlungen führen, Transaktionen umsetzen oder den 
Prozess der Landnahme regulieren und überwachen.
In dieser qualitativen Analyse stellt sich heraus, dass Auswirkungen von großflächigen 
Landinvestitionen aus drei Gründen für die lokale Bevölkerung stark variieren. Erstens 
mangelt es an einem effektiven und vollständig implementierten Landgovernancesystem mit 
eindeutigen Handlungsanweisungen für die Akteure, zweitens fehlt eine Harmonisierung 
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zwischen der formalen Landrechtsgesetzgebung und den informellen Regeln und drittens 
existieren asymmetrische Machtverhältnisse zwischen den einzelnen Akteuren. Demzufolge 
bestehen Kontextfaktoren, die erstens den Akteuren das opportunistische Abschöpfen von 
Renten ermöglichen, die zweitens dazu beitragen, dass durch die Rhetorik einzelner Akteure 
unrealistische Erwartungen geweckt werden, und die drittens den Akteuren erlauben gezielt 
für sich selbst oder ausgewählte Teile der lokalen Bevölkerung Lobbyarbeit zu betreiben.
Dies führt dazu, dass die Auswirkungen für die lokale Bevölkerung stark variieren und 
größtenteils von den Handlungen der Akteure in der Aktionsarena abhängen.
Die Auswertung von Fokusgruppendiskussionen für eine Ölpalminvestition in Ghana zeigt 
außerdem, dass weitere Faktoren wie die Distanz eines Haushalts zum operationellen Zentrum 
einer Investition, seine Chance eine permanente, eine saisonale oder gar keine Beschäftigung
zu erhalten, die Möglichkeit in die Vertragslandwirtschaft einzusteigen oder die Größe des an 
den Investor verlorenen Nutzlandes, zusätzlich unterschiedliche Auswirkungen von 
großflächigen Landinvestition bedingen. Zusammenfassend lässt sich demnach festhalten, 
dass zum Einen schon bestehende soziale Differenzierung durch eine großflächige 
Landinvestition verstärkt werden kann, wenn zum Beispiel traditionelle Eliten als Akteure in 
der Aktionsarena vermehrt für Bevölkerungsgruppen mit höherem Wohlstand Lobbyarbeit 
betreiben. Zum Anderen kann jedoch auch durch die geographische Lage der Investition oder 
deren Rekrutierungspolitik eine neue Form von sozialer Differenzierung entstehen.
An die beiden qualitativen Analysen schließt sich mit dem dritten Artikel eine quantitative 
Untersuchung der Ölpalminvestition in Ghana an. Diese geht der Frage nach, ob 
Vertragslandwirtschaft und sichere Landbesitzrechte im Umfeld von großflächigen 
Landinvestitionen die Ländliche Entwicklung begünstigen.
Ein Überblick über die einschlägige Fachliteratur zeigt zunächst, dass großflächige 
Landinvestitionen zwar mit großen Hoffnungen verbunden sind, jedoch oft nicht die 
gewünschte Kommerzialisierung von Kleinbauern erzielen. Ebenso sind die Auswirkungen 
von Vertragslandwirtschaft unter Forschern heftig umstritten. Der kleinste gemeinsame 
Nenner besteht darin, dass Auswirkungen per se nicht verallgemeinerbar sind, sondern stark 
vom vertraglich angebauten Erzeugnis und der Vertragsausgestaltung durch den Investor 
abhängen. Dementsprechend begrenzt sich diese Arbeit auf die Analyse eines Fallbeispiels 
von Vertragsanbau in einem kompetitiven Umfeld, in dem ein Investor mit 
Nachfrageüberhang Kleinbauern einen langfristigen Vertrag für die Produktion von 
Ölpalmfrüchten anbietet und dabei deren Landrechte unangetastet lässt.
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Die Tatsache, dass die Vertragsvergabe durch den Ölpalminvestor als quasi-natürliches 
Experiment betrachtet werden kann (und Landwirte demnach keinen Einfluss hatten, ob sie 
einen Vertrag erhielten oder nicht), ermöglicht die Identifikation von Kausalzusammenhängen 
ohne potenzielle Verzerrungen durch nicht beobachtbare Unterschiede zwischen 
Behandlungs- und Kontrollgruppe. Somit ist die Analyse im Gegensatz zu vielen früheren 
Studien frei von Selektionsverzerrungen, die durch unterschiedliche Grundhaltungen der 
Landwirte, die geografische Lage ihrer Felder oder durch Auswahlkriterien des Investors 
entstehen können. Um die Auswirkungen möglichst breit zu erfassen, werden Regressionen
mit einer Reihe von monetären und nicht-monetären abhängigen Variablen auf 
Haushaltsebene und parzellenweise als OLS-Modelle geschätzt.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Vertragsanbau einen positiven Effekt auf die Vermögenswerte 
von Haushalten hat und sich günstig auf die subjektiv wahrgenommene zukünftige Sicherheit 
der Befragten auswirkt. Im Gegensatz dazu haben Haushalte, die unter Vertrag produzieren 
weniger Einkommen aus landwirtschaftlichen Tätigkeiten und einen geringeren Ölpalmprofit 
pro Parzelle als Haushalte die Ölpalmen ohne Vertrag anbauen. Weiterführende Analysen 
zeigen, dass Vertragsbauern von der vertraglichen Bindung zum Investor insofern profitieren, 
dass sie im Rahmen des Vertrages Zugang zu Produktionsmitteln und Krediten erhalten, 
welche ihnen eine Risikodiversifizierung ermöglichen. Dementsprechend haben Haushalte,
die im Vertragsanbau tätig sind, eine höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit Einkommen durch 
Tätigkeiten außerhalb des Agrarsektors zu generieren. Die Analyse auf Parzellenebene zeigt, 
dass Vertragsbauern auf solchen Parzellen auf denen Ölpalmen nicht unter Vertrag angebaut 
werden genauso hohe Profite erwirtschaften wie Haushalte, die nicht am Vertragsanbau 
teilnehmen. Daher ist es naheliegend, dass Prinzipal-Agenten-Probleme, sprich das 
Abzweigen von Produktionsmitteln und Arbeitsressourcen für andere Tätigkeiten, eine 
plausible Erklärung für den niedrigeren Profit von Vertragsbauern bieten.
Darüber hinaus haben sichere Landbesitzrechte einen positiven Effekt auf die 
wahrgenommene zukünftige Sicherheit, das Haushaltseinkommen und den Profit pro Parzelle. 
Eine Vielzahl von Robustheitstests, wie beispielsweise die separate Schätzung von Modellen 
für Landbesitzer und Landlose oder die Umkodierung der binären Variable Vertrags-
landwirtschaft gemäß Größen- und Zeiteffekten, bestätigen diese Ergebnisse. 
Dementsprechend können großflächige Landinvestitionen zur Ländlichen Entwicklung 
beitragen, wenn sie bestehende Landbesitzrechte berücksichtigen und die lokale Bevölkerung 
durch den Vertragsanbau integrieren. Es darf jedoch nicht vergessen werden, dass diese 
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Maßnahmen nicht den ärmsten Bevölkerungsschichten zugutekommen, da diese oft per se 
von Vertragslandwirtschaft ausgeschlossen sind.
Im vierten und letzten Artikel wird an die vorangehende quantitative Analyse angeknüpft. 
Hierbei liegt der Fokus auf der Frage, ob sich Vertragslandwirtschaft und sichere 
Landbesitzrechte im Rahmen von großflächigen Landinvestitionen über ähnliche 
Wirkungskanäle günstig auf die Ölpalmbauern auswirken.
Anhand der Fachliteratur wird in einem ersten Schritt herausgearbeitet, dass sowohl 
Vertragslandwirtschaft als auch sichere Landbesitzrechte eine Reihe von Unsicherheiten 
reduzieren können, denen Haushalte in ländlichen Gebieten mit unvollständigen Absatz-,
Input-, Kredit- und Versicherungsmärkten ausgesetzt sind. So mindern Verträge 
beispielsweise das Absatzrisiko durch die garantierte Abnahme seitens des Vertragspartners 
und senken Produktionsrisiken, indem sie Zugang zu Produktionsmitteln und Krediten 
ermöglichen. Werden Landbesitzrechte als Sicherheit eingesetzt, bieten sie ebenfalls 
Kreditzugang, der sich beispielsweise in Krisenzeiten bewährt, um Nahrungsmittel-
unsicherheiten, gesundheitliche Risiken oder die Verwundbarkeit im Falle von 
Umweltkatastrophen zu reduzieren. Darüber hinaus werden Vertragslandwirtschaft und 
sichere Landbesitzrechte auch mit positiven Einkommens- und Produktivitätseffekten oder 
mit einer besseren gesellschaftlichen Stellung assoziiert.
Um diesen weitreichenden Auswirkungen Rechnung zu tragen und objektiv schwer messbare 
Sicherheitsaspekte angemessen zu berücksichtigen, wird in verschiedenen OLS-Regressionen
die subjektive Zufriedenheit der Befragten mit ihrer gesamten Lebenssituation geschätzt. 
Dabei stellt sich zunächst heraus, dass sowohl die Teilnahme am Vertragsanbau als auch 
sichere Landbesitzrechte einen positiven Effekt auf die Lebenszufriedenheit der Befragten 
haben. Da in den Modellen neben den gängigen Kontrollvariablen auch für monetäre 
Einkommenseffekte kontrolliert wird, liegt der Schluss nahe, dass sich Vertragslandwirtschaft 
und sichere Landbesitzrechte in einem multidimensionalen Konstrukt von Gesamtlebens-
zufriedenheit vor allem positiv auf die Sicherheitsdimension auswirken.
Wird dem ökonometrischen Modell in einem weiteren Schritt ein Interaktionsterm 
hinzugefügt, zeigt sich, dass sichere Landbesitzrechte zwar weiterhin zu einer höheren 
Lebenszufriedenheit der nicht am Vertragsanbau teilnehmen Befragten führen, jedoch keinen
Effekt für Vertragsbauern haben. Dies ist insofern plausibel, da andere Studien zeigen, dass
ein zusätzlicher Anstieg in einer bestimmten Dimension der Lebenszufriedenheit gemäß der 
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Argumentation des abnehmenden Grenznutzens, kaum einen Zuwachs in der 
Gesamtlebenszufriedenheit mit sich zieht, wenn bereits ein gewisses Level an Lebens-
zufriedenheit in dieser Dimension erreicht ist. Weitreichende Robustheitsanalysen, wie 
beispielsweise die Schätzung der Modelle als geordnete logistische Regressionen, bestätigen 
diese Ergebnisse.
Zusammenfassend lässt sich also festhalten, dass Vertragslandwirtschaft und sichere 
Landbesitzrechte primär Sicherheitsaspekte ansprechen und zu einem bestimmten Grad in 
einem substituierbaren Verhältnis zueinander stehen. Während Vertragsbauern ihre 
Sicherheitsbedürfnisse durch den Vertrag befriedigen, fehlt Nicht-Vertragsbauern dieser 
Möglichkeit der Absicherung, sodass sie auf sichere Landbesitzrechte angewiesen sind, um 
grundlegende Sicherheitsbedürfnisse zu erfüllen. Die Analyse zeigt jedoch nicht, dass
Vertragsanbau sichere Landbesitzrechte ersetzen kann, sondern dass Vertragslandwirtschaft 
die Gesamtlebenszufriedenheit der Befragten insbesondere dadurch steigert, dass sie 
Unsicherheiten reduziert, die auch dann existieren, wenn großflächige Landinvestitionen 
bestehende lokale Landrechte respektieren.
Diese kumulative Dissertation sensibilisiert den Leser für die Rückwirkungen, die 
großflächige Landinvestitionen auf das vorherrschende Landgovernancesystem haben. 
Darüber hinaus wird ein komplexes Zusammenspiel zwischen dem institutionellen Kontext 
und den Handlungen von Investoren sowie staatlichen und traditionellen Akteuren 
herausgearbeitet, welches unterschiedliche Auswirkungen auf verschiedene Bevölkerungs-
gruppen maßgeblich bestimmt und soziale Differenzierung beeinflusst. Ein Vergleich von 
Vertragsbauern und unabhängigen Ölpalmbauern zeigt, dass Teile der ländlichen 
Bevölkerung von Vertragslandwirtschaft im Umfeld von großflächigen Landinvestitionen 
profitieren, weil diese ihnen die Akkumulation von Vermögenswerten, eine größere 
wahrgenommene zukünftige Sicherheit, sowie eine höhere Einkommensdiversifizierung 
durch eine Beschäftigung außerhalb des Agrarsektors ermöglicht. Dies spiegelt sich auch in 
einer höheren subjektiven Gesamtlebenszufriedenheit von Vertragsbauern wider, welche
allerdings überwiegend auf den risikomindernden Effekt von Vertragslandwirtschaft 
zurückgeführt werden kann, da sich sichere Landbesitzrechte, die ebenfalls mit reduziertem 
Risiko in Verbindung stehen, nur für Nicht-Vertragsbauern positiv auf die Gesamtlebens-
zufriedenheit auswirken, jedoch für Vertragsbauern keinerlei zusätzliche Effekte besitzen.
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Problem statement, structure and contribution of the dissertation
The latest food, fuel, and financial crises raised tremendously the interest in global farmland. 
By January 2014, the Land Matrix Global Observatory counted 936 large-scale acquisitions 
amounting to a total of 35.7 million hectares of agricultural land (Land Matrix, 2014). After 
decades of neglecting the agricultural sector, this investment is urgently needed to close the 
yield gap in developing countries (OECD and FAO, 2013; UNCTAD, 2013; World Bank 
2008). While drivers for investors and host countries have been discussed in a broad body of 
literature (Cotula et al., 2009; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Görgen et al., 2009; 
Zoomers, 2010, Deininger and Byerlee, 2012), insights on underlying processes and 
associated impacts are still incomplete.
Many studies isolate important aspects of the acquisition process. For example, Burnod et al. 
(2013) and Wolford et al. (2013) focus on the role of the state, Cotula and Vermeulen (2011) 
and Nolte and Voget-Kleschin (2013) stress on the consultation process, and Schoneveld et al. 
(2011) and Amanor (2012) analyse the role of traditional authorities. Furthermore, different 
aspects of the land governance system are examined in conjunction with large-scale land 
acquisitions. For example, German et al. (2013) point to the customary rights system and 
Alden Wily (2012) takes the development of the legal framework into consideration. 
Although these studies provide a better understanding on how land transactions are 
implemented, they offer only limited evidence on the interplay of the land governance system 
and large-scale agricultural investment.
Another strand of the literature analyses impacts of large-scale land acquisitions on the local 
population. In line with anecdotal evidence based on media reports and work by non-
governmental organisations, most authors report negative outcomes like Li (2011) and Borras 
and Franco (2012), who emphasise the exploitation of wage labourers, German et al. (2013) 
and Borras and Franco (2012), who point to the loss of local land use rights, or White and 
Dasgupta (2010) and Yaro and Tsikata (2013), who highlight environmental damages. In 
contrast, some researchers find positive outcomes. For example, Mujenja and Wonani (2012) 
and Baumgartner et al. (2012) refer to employment creation, Herrmann et al. (2012) point to 
benefits of outgrower schemes, and Boamah (2011) emphasises indirect livelihood 
opportunities. Cotula (2013) concludes that the negative outcomes tend to outweigh the 
positive ones. However, the reasons for varying outcomes and rural social differentiation in 
the light of large-scale investment in land are not yet fully captured. Moreover, quantitative 
impact assessments often lack analytical rigour as studies identifying casual effects are scarce. 
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Thus, despite a growing body of literature on large-scale investment in land (e.g. special 
issues in Development, Vol. 54(1), 2011; Globalizations, Vol. 10(1), 2013; Development and 
Change, Vol. 44(2), 2013), gaps in the literature persist.
This dissertation therefore aims to address how the surrounding institutional environment 
shapes the implementation of an investment and how this in turn produces varying outcomes. 
It further aims to conduct a rigorous impact assessment with a focus on contract farming. 
Even though the literature reveals mixed outcomes on contract farming, many researchers 
point to positive effects (Bellemare, 2012; Michelson et al., 2012; Minten et al., 2009; Key 
and Runsten, 1999). Thus, contract farming may be a tool to commercialise the agricultural 
production of farmers in the vicinity of a large-scale investment in land.
The empirical analysis is based on field research in Ghana and Kenya carried out in 2010 and 
2011. To inform qualitative analyses, I used legal documents, semi-structured interviews with 
stakeholders at national and local levels (26 in Kenya and 33 in Ghana), focus group 
discussions with different sub-groups of the local population who are variously affected by 
large-scale investment (e.g. contract farmers, casual workers, permanent staff, the vulnerable, 
the better-off, and so on; 8 in Kenya and 12 in Ghana) and 49 interviews with community 
representatives in Ghana. For a quantitative impact assessment, I conducted a household 
survey with 436 contract farmers and 388 independently farming households who were 
scattered around a large-scale oil palm investment in Ghana.
The four essays of this cumulative dissertation follow a general-to-specific order. The first 
essay (Nolte and Väth, 2013) analyses the land tenure systems in Ghana and Kenya, the 
process of acquiring land as well as the outcomes of this system for one specific investment 
project. Thereby, the application of Williamson’s (1998) four levels of social analysis 
structures the comparative study. 
We found that the present land governance systems in Ghana and Kenya are incapable to cope 
with the increasing pressure on land resources. In both countries they evolved through the 
recognition of pre-colonial customary rules and statutory laws which were introduced by the 
colonial powers, and partly amended and adjusted for by post-independence rulers and reform 
efforts since the 1990s. In line with work by Alden Wily (2012), we found that this led rather 
to a set of rules with overlaps and loopholes than a development of a consistent framework. 
As government agencies, which lack financial and personnel capacities, are not effective in
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rule enforcement, the general process of acquiring land does often not conform to the 
procedures laid down by the de jure legislation.
Hence, in the absence of well-defined rules and proper enforcement, investors determine to a 
large extent how their specific project affects the host country. This in turn leads to 
repercussions for the land governance system. As investors often misuse the ‘institutional 
self-service shop’ to their own benefit, they provoke resistance by the local population, civil 
society organisations, and the international community. Our analysis therefore reveals that 
large-scale land acquisitions can trigger institutional reform of the land governance system, 
and thereby goes beyond the current scientific debate.
In the second essay (Väth, 2013), I constrict the analysis and focus only on the case country 
Ghana. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study which uses Ostrom’s ‘institutional 
analysis and development framework’ as theoretical approach to shed light on the 
mechanisms that guide the land acquisition process and that produce outcomes of large-scale 
investment in land.
I find that large-scale land acquisitions produce varying outcomes. These are caused by a lack 
of an effective and fully enforced land governance system with poorly harmonised formal 
regulations and customary rules, as well as asymmetric power relations between investors, 
state agents and traditional authorities. Apart from rent-seeking activities, such an institutional 
environment allows actors to rise unrealistic expectations about outcomes, to lobby for 
particular sub-groups of the local population and to convert outcomes of large-scale land 
acquisitions into own benefits.
While other studies also highlight the importance of the institutional environment to 
understand the underlying processes which shape the implementation and outcomes of large-
scale investment in agricultural land (Alden Willy, 2012; German et al. 2013; Nolte and Väth, 
2013), this case study further sensitises to rural social differentiation in the vicinity of a large-
scale oil palm company. The analysis of focus group discussions reveals that investment 
neither meets a homogenous local population nor yields to equally outcomes, but rather 
produces negative and positive effects depending on households’ distance to the company’s 
centre of operation, the amount of land a household loses, its possibility to gain permanent or
casual employment or its chance to farm under contract. In this regard, the essay discloses that 
large-scale investment in agricultural land is often neither completely detrimental nor fully 
beneficial, but requires accompanying measures to mitigate increasing inequality.
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The third essay (Väth and Kirk, 2014) is inspired by von Braun and Meinzen-Dick (2009) 
who highlight that contract farming, if it respects local land rights, could foster the 
commercialisation of local agricultural production while at the same time enabling an investor 
to profit from local land resources. Following Narayanan (2014), who shows that the effects 
of contract farming vary among contracted commodities and the contract conditions offered 
by the company, the essay refrains from generalisation. It rather focuses on the analysis of a 
potentially beneficial outgrower scheme in a competitive setting in Ghana, where an investor 
faces excess demand due to large production capacities and offers long-term contracts for oil 
palm farming to rural households whose property rights remain untouched.
Due to a unique setting, where contract allocation occurred as a quasi-natural experiment, we 
are able to estimate causal effects while avoiding possible selection bias with regard to 
farmers’ attitudes, geographical placement, and selection criteria applied by the company 
(Barrett et al., 2012). Thus, we go beyond the difficulties of weak instruments that are faced 
by those using instrumental variables and go beyond those who can only control for time-
invariant unobserved factors when using panel data. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study which assesses impacts of contract farming by exploiting a quasi-natural 
experiment.
We provide robust evidence that contract farming enhances participants’ asset endowment 
and perceived future security, which offers long-term security and thus, enables rural 
households to invest in non-farm activities. At the same time, we find that farmers earn higher 
agricultural income and profit per acre when they cultivate oil palm independently. This essay 
therefore offers guidance to decision makers. We suggest that economic integration of the 
local population in the vicinity of a large-scale investment seems to be most beneficial if 
investors aim at a mix of outgrower schemes and buying from independently managed plots.
However, given the fact that the poorest people do not benefit from contract farming as they 
are often excluded from participation, it would be misleading to interpret large-scale 
investment in agricultural land per se as an instrument to reduce poverty.
The fourth essay (Väth et al., 2014) can be understood as a specification of Väth and Kirk 
(2014). It focuses on overall subjective well-being as outcome variable to jointly capture 
monetary and non-monetary aspects of contract farming and goes beyond more traditional 
approaches which dominate the literature. In line with Dedehouanou et al. (2013), who were 
the first to link subjective well-being to contract farming, we find a highly significant and 
positive effect of contract farming on subjective well-being.
xiv 
Apart from income and productivity gains (Warning and Key, 2002; Bolwig et al., 2009; 
Bellemare, 2012), contract farming may help farmers to overcome rural market imperfections 
(Key and Runsten, 1999; Deininger, 2011) and reduce their vulnerability to shocks by 
mitigating production and marketing risks (Masakure and Hanson, 2005). Thus, by 
controlling for income effects, the subjective well-being approach enables us to focus on 
security-related aspects and risk-reducing mechanisms which comprise the security domain in 
a multi-dimensional concept of overall life satisfaction (Cummins, 1996; Oishi et al., 1999). 
We find that outgrower schemes mainly enhance subjective well-being by fulfilling security 
needs, as property rights for land – which are also associated with increased security 
(Deininger, 2003) – play an important role for non-contract farmers but not for contract 
farmers. In line with Rojas (2006), who shows that additional gains in life satisfaction from 
increases in one domain tend to perish with enhanced satisfaction in this domain, we identify 
a partially substitutive relationship between contract farming and secure property rights to 
land. However, we do not suggest that contracts can replace secure property rights to land; we 
rather claim that outgrower schemes can enhance subjective well-being, especially through 
security gains in a setting where existing local land rights are respected. Hence, this essay 
reveals that contract farming in the vicinity of a large-scale investment in land has a beneficial 
effect as it helps to overcome lacks of security.
To sum up, this dissertation consists of two qualitative and two quantitative essays, which 
refer to processes and impacts of large-scale investment in agricultural land. While the first 
essay takes a comparative perspective with insights from Ghana and Kenya, and is thus more 
general when analysing the influence of the institutional framework on the implementation of 
large-scale land acquisitions, the second essay focuses solely on Ghana and is thus rather 
specific with regard to process-related aspects. However, it also offers a very broad qualitative 
analysis of impacts for different subgroups of the local population. The same general-to-
specific order holds true for the two quantitative essays. While the third essay is more general 
when analysing effects of contract farming and secure property rights on a wide range of 
different outcome variables, the fourth essay focuses on the link between contract farming and 
secure property rights as well as their relation to subjective well-being, allowing further 
reasoning on underlying transmission channels. As all four essays concentrate on the case 
country Ghana and on one specific investment case, we claim that the process-related part 
(essays one and two) analyses the setting which produces the outcomes that are to some extent 
assessed by the impact-related part (essays two, three and four).
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Overall, this dissertation contributes to a better understanding of underlying processes and 
impacts of large-scale investment in agricultural land. In particular, it discloses feedback 
effects between large-scale land acquisitions and the land governance system. Moreover, an 
analysis of complex linkages between the institutional environment and actions of investors,
officials of state agencies and traditional authorities shows how large-scale investment in 
agricultural land produces varying outcomes for different sub-groups of the local population 
and thus, influences rural social differentiation. The impact assessment reveals that contract 
farming under favourable conditions can forge a sustainable link between an investor and 
parts of the local population and thereby mainly addresses security needs of farmers who face 
rural market imperfections.
However, results must be treated with caution as the case study design of the four essays has 
inherent limitations with regard to generalisation. The case countries Ghana and Kenya 
represent rising African economies which claim leadership in their respective regional 
economic communities and are characterised by a reasonable degree of macro-economic 
stability. As former British colonies, they inherited a comparable institutional setting where 
statutory and customary laws coexist in a land governance system that is undergoing 
institutional change. Thus, conclusions do not necessarily hold for countries with a different 
setting. Nevertheless, the conceptual frameworks developed in the first and the second essay 
can be applied to guide the analysis of countries whose contextual conditions differ.
With regard to the impact assessment, the third and the fourth essay focus on contract farming 
in a rather favourable setting where farmers’ bargaining position is strong due to excess 
demand for the contracted crop, a lack of specified quality standards and the high monitoring 
costs for the investor. It would therefore be misleading to interpret the positive effects as 
prove for the sustainability of large-scale investment in agricultural land. However, it has 
been shown that under certain conditions, benefits from investments are possible. Moreover, 
the quantitative impact assessment is limited to one investment case, and therefore cannot be 
generalised. It also focuses on only two aspects – contract farming and secure property rights 
to land – out of a wide range of different possible impacts of land investments on the local 
population. Consequently the need for more rigorous studies which shed light on the 
outcomes of large-scale investment in agricultural land remains.
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ABSTRACT
Recognising the increased demand for agricultural land, this comparative analysis 
examines the effect of large-scale land acquisitions on their surrounding institutional 
environment. An embedded case study design allows us to analyse two specific land 
deals in Ghana and Kenya. We find that insufficiencies in these countries’ land 
governance systems are partly caused by discrepancies between de jure and de facto 
procedures; and that weak legal frameworks, coupled with poor enforcement, 
produce outcomes that depend to a large extent on the investors. We also find that 
large-scale land acquisitions have a feedback effect on the land governance system, 
which suggests that large-scale land acquisitions can be drivers of institutional 
change.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, an increased demand for agricultural land has fuelled fears of a neo-
colonial land rush. This is associated with various risks to rural households’ 
livelihoods, such as the loss of access to land, the exploitation of wage labourers or 
the damage of environmental buffer zones (German et al. 2013; Borras & Franco 
2012; White et al. 2012; Vermeulen & Cotula 2010; White & Dasgupta 2010). At the 
same time, these demands often meet seemingly abundant resources in developing 
countries and governments who aim, for example, to promote rural development, 
create employment, or bring in tax income (Deininger & Byerlee 2012; Görgen et al.
2009). The increased demand for land has thereby raised hopes for a renewed interest 
in developing countries’ chronically underinvested agricultural sectors (OECD & 
FAO 2013, UNCTAD 2013; World Bank 2008). These opposing views illustrate a 
vibrant and continuous debate on “land grab or development opportunity” as coined
by Cotula et al. (2009).1
Since 2009 a broad research community has focused on different aspects of large-
scale land acquisitions.2 Studies by Deininger et al. (2011), Cotula et al. (2011,
2009), Zoomers (2010), and von Braun and Meinzen-Dick (2009) have revealed 
several drivers of the phenomenon: rapid population growth, a strong trend towards 
urbanisation, changing dietary preferences, and environmental concerns such as 
severe land degradation, desertification, and water shortages. Added to these are the 
increasing global and local demands for food, raw materials, forest products, 
renewable energy sources, ecosystem services, eco-tourism, and investment. 
In-depth case studies elucidate processes of land acquisition, in particular the role 
played by different actors at different stages in the acquisition process; e.g. Burnod et 
al. (2013) and Wolford et al. (2013) on the role of the state; Nolte & Voget-Kleschin 
(2013), Wisborg (2012), Cotula & Vermeulen (2011) and Vermeulen & Cotula 
(2010) with a focus on local populations and consultation; Nolte (2013) on actors and 
institutions in Zambia and German et al. (2013) from a comparative perspective 
based on several cases in five African countries.
Evidence on impacts is still scarce. This is partly due to the temporal scope: while 
local populations are affected by land deals immediately, outcomes can only be 
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judged in the long run. Nonetheless, evidence on impacts is growing. Civil society 
organisations have voiced cautions about possible negative impacts for host countries 
and the local population, such as displacements, destruction of livelihoods, tax 
evasion, or increasing dependency through labour contracts (for Ghana: FIAN 
International 2010b; for Kenya: FIAN International 2010a). Also, first academic 
studies on impacts are published. For instance, German et al. (2013) find one 
common feature in a great number of cases: customary rights to vast areas of land are 
lost for many generations or even permanently with limited or no compensation. 
Mujenja & Wonani (2012) find rather positive impacts for two Zambian investment 
cases dating back to the 1970s and 1980s: local land users benefit from job creation 
and indirect livelihood opportunities. This is in line with findings from Boamah 
(2011) for a more recent investment in Ghana. Whereas Väth and Kirk (2012) find 
positive impacts on contract farming in the sphere of an oil palm investment, Tsikata 
and Yaro (2013) point to the failure of a mango outgrower scheme where the project 
ignored the political ecology in Ghana. Väth (2013) and Cotula (2013: pp. 125) find 
evidence of both positive and negative effects. However, Cotula (2013) concludes 
that the negative aspects tend to outweigh positive ones.
Despite this growing evidence on impacts, there remains a lack of understanding on 
how these impacts are shaped by the institutional setting. To fill this gap, we 
emphasise the interplay of large-scale land acquisitions and the surrounding 
institutional environment. Our analysis focuses on the question ‘How are land deals 
implemented?’ To structure our study, we apply Williamson’s (1998) four levels of 
social analysis. We work our way from general to specific factors, analysing the 
implementation of a land transaction against the background of three aspects of the 
land governance system: the land tenure system, the process of acquiring land, and 
the outcomes of this system.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. We explain our methodology and 
present the data, introduce our conceptual framework, and analyse, for Ghana and 
Kenya, the evolution of the land tenure system, the process of acquiring land, and the 
outcomes. We base this on a comparative analysis that aligns our empirical findings 
with our conceptual framework. In concluding we offer some policy 
recommendations.
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METHODOLOGY AND DATA
We use a comparative case study design (Dion 1998; Levy 2008; Gerring 2008; 
Gerring et al. 2011), with two African countries as the case studies.3 For each 
country we concentrate on one investment project initiated by a Western investor in a 
neglected rural area, which gives us an embedded case study, following Yin (2002: 
42–43). Comparing the two projects in the context of their respective countries 
allows us to examine the mechanisms guiding acquisition processes more 
comprehensively than a single case would. According to Gerring (2004) and 
Seawright & Gerring (2008), an intensive study of a single unit (or a smaller class of 
units) also provides better grounded insights into the functioning of the land 
governance systems in general and interactions between its stakeholders in particular.
In this regard, we consider our study to be in line with Gerring’s pathway case 
(2007), which studies a crucial case to clarify a hypothesis. Similarly, our study 
offers an elucidation of the causal mechanisms that underlie large-scale land 
acquisitions.
Our empirical analysis draws on legal documents and on primary data gathered 
during field research in Ghana and Kenya in 2010 and 2011. We cannot expect to 
understand the practices involved in land acquisitions just by looking at the de jure 
legal framework as laid out in formal documents; we also require an in-depth 
analysis of de facto processes. We therefore conducted semi-structured interviews 
with a wide range of stakeholders at the national and local level. In addition, we 
facilitated focus group discussions with farmers in the region directly affected by the 
particular investment project, and with employees of the investors.
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Land deals are implemented within a complex land governance system. To explain 
the mechanisms that drive implementation of large-scale land acquisition, we apply 
Williamson’s (1998) four levels of social analysis as a conceptual framework to 
structure our study. 
The first level comprises norms, customs and traditions that can be summarised as 
informal institutions. These are persistent, so changes at the first level usually take 
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the form of very slow stepwise modifications of values over time. At the second 
level, which consists of formal institutions (i.e. the de jure legislation), changes can 
occur relatively fast: formal rules on paper can theoretically change overnight, 
though a far-reaching institutional reform process in a parliamentary system will be 
slower, requiring several rounds of technical and political validation. The informal
and formal institutions are interconnected and they determine the ‘rules of the game’
– the governance system at the third level. We deviate from Williamson (1998) on 
the fourth level4 in that we concentrate on the outcomes of the ‘game’. Evaluating 
outcomes of land acquisitions requires some clarifications. First, on the scale of 
outcomes: are we interested in outcomes on the international, the national or the local 
level? Second, we need to specify the target group: outcomes for whom, for 
investors, government officials or local populations? And third, we have to 
distinguish immediate outcomes of the acquisition process, such as displacements,
and medium and long-term outcomes that set in once the project is operational.
Our study focuses on the immediate effects of the acquisition process for the
population on the local level, i.e. compensations. We further provide some insights 
into how the population perceives medium- to long-term impacts. We apply this 
analytical framework to the land governance systems of our case study countries and 
the respective investment cases. 
While Williamson (1998) limits his analysis to feedback between two levels, we take 
into account feedback across all four levels. We thus assume – in line with 
Williamson – that first and second level institutions have reciprocal feedback and 
that they determine the third level, the governing institutions. Moreover, we believe 
that the third level lays the groundwork for outcomes at the fourth level. However, 
going beyond Williamson, we further assume that these outcomes in turn send 
feedback to the first and second levels about formal and informal rules or 
institutions. As Figure 1 shows, our analysis is based on a conceptualisation of a 
system that encompasses these feedback mechanisms. 
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FIGURE 1
Conceptual Framework*
 
* Own display, based on Williamson, 1998.
To sum up, in order to examine how land deals are implemented, we first analyse the 
evolution of the land tenure system, looking at the first and the second levels of our 
proposed framework. We then analyse the land game on the third level, taking into 
account the general acquisition process and one example for each country. After this 
we analyse the socio-economic outcomes of this system on the fourth level. Finally, 
we synthesise the findings from these four levels by looking at changes in the land 
governance system induced by investment projects. 
 
ANALYSIS
While the aim of our analysis was to compare the implementation of land deals in the 
two countries, our two case studies yielded different findings: the Ghanaian case was 
particularly revealing on aspects of compensation, whereas the Kenyan case 
produced more information on entrance of the investor.
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The evolution of the land tenure system
Ghana
Given the clear north-south differentiation, and the differences between the 
matrilineal and patrilineal landholding systems, land tenure in Ghana is a highly 
emotive and sensitive issue (Ubink & Amanor 2008; Aryeetey et al. 2007a). The 
formation of the centralised Akan states in the 17th and 18th centuries laid the 
foundations for social differentiation and consequently different ‘interests in land’5
according to a person’s position in the hierarchy (Kwadwo 2004; Aryeetey et al.
2007a). Up to today, the allodial title is the strongest interest in land in Ghana. It is 
associated with ‘overall ownership’ and held by the chiefs in trust for their people as 
communal interest (Kasanga & Kotey 2001; Aryeetey et al. 2007b). The strongest 
individual interest in land is the customary freehold title. Its holders possess usufruct 
rights and are allowed to transfer and inherit the land, but the superior interest of the 
allodial right holder has to be recognised (Kasanga & Kotey 2001; Lund 2013). 
Hence, unlike present-day Western-style property rights systems, overlapping 
interests in land are common in the customary system.
Members of the clan have access to customary freehold because land as a source of 
livelihood traditionally belongs to the living, the dead, and the yet to be born (Osei 
1998; Larbi et al. 1998; Mends 2006). This fact has been recognised by the 1992 
Constitution, which prohibits the outright sale of what are called ‘stool’ (or ‘skin’)
lands6 (Republic of Ghana 1992: Art. 267 (6)). Consequently, investors can only 
enter into lease arrangements.
Before the colonial days, customary law and Islamic Sharia law coexisted. The 
chieftaincy system was legally recognised by Britain as an instance of ‘native 
administration’ through which to implement ‘indirect rule’ (Kirk 1999) and at the 
same time additional interests in land were introduced under common law. Legal 
pluralism therefore expanded under colonial rule (Aryeetey et al. 2007a).
After independence, state land was maintained by post-independence rulers and 
governed by the State Lands Act (No. 125 of 1962) for public lands (Republic of 
Ghana 1962b) and the Administration of Lands Act (No. 123 of 1962) for vested 
lands (Republic of Ghana 1962a). Vested land is land where the state acquired the 
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management functions by law, while the ownership emanating from custom, i.e. the 
allodial title, stays with the chief and entitles him to receive ground rents. In general, 
leaseholds under common law, of both state and customary land, can be granted for 
up to 99 years for Ghanaians and 50 years for foreigners (Republic of Ghana, 1992:
Art. 266 (4)).
Currently, state land in Ghana accounts for roughly 20% of the land surface, while 
the remaining 80% falls under customary land held by stools (in southern Ghana), 
skins (in northern Ghana) or families (for instance in the Volta Region) (Kasanga & 
Kotey 2001; Aryeetey et al. 2007b).7 Although these figures are rough estimates, 
they underline the strong role of the customary system to date (Anyidoho et al. 2008; 
Ubink & Amanor 2008) and indicate that investors often have to negotiate with 
chiefs to acquire large land tracts. However, the fact that common law interests in 
land, like leasehold, can be allocated on a plot that falls under customary land points 
to the possible tensions arising from the dual system in modern times.
A multitude of 166 Acts and their ambiguity have been hampering an efficient 
formal land rights system and proper enforcement for decades (Quaye 2006), so 
people have become used to acting in legal grey areas (Interviews G15, G21). In 
1999, this shortcomings were recognised by the National Land Policy (Republic of 
Ghana 1999) and led to the initiation of a Land Administration Project (LAP) with 
World Bank support in the year 2000 (Aryeetey et al. 2007a; Bugri 2012). A 
comprehensive legal framework is currently being developed. While the Office of 
the Administrator of Stool Lands Act (No. 481 of 1994) (Republic of Ghana 1994a) 
and the Lands Commission Act (No. 483 of 1994) (Republic of Ghana 2008a) have 
contributed to institutional clarity, the Land Use Planning Bill (Republic of Ghana
2011) is under review and the Land Bill is in a third draft stage (Republic of Ghana
2010). The Land Bill is expected to reconcile the customary and statutory systems 
and to improve land registration and the transparency of land transactions in order to 
reduce conflicts arising from overlapping claims, as well as fraud in the form of 
double registration and corruption (Interviews G15, G20, G21). 
Given the population growth (from 20.6 million in 2003 to 25 million in 2011: World 
Bank 2013) and the growing number of land deals (Republic of Ghana 2012), the 
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increasing demand for land is putting pressure on the present land governance system 
(Interviews G15, G21, G32; Berry 2009; Tsikata & Yaro 2011). 
Kenya
Up to today, Kenya has a dual system of land tenure – consisting of statutory and 
customary tenure with a multitude of (sometimes contradictory) statutes (Republic of 
Kenya 2009a) – that evolved over history. Before colonialism, several systems of 
land tenure existed in Kenya, most importantly the communal system of the Masai, 
the combined individual and familial system of the Kikuyu, and the feudal system of 
the Mumia kingdom (Alila et al. 1993).8
During colonial rule, a dual system of land administration was introduced: Statutory 
tenure for the most fertile land (mainly in the Rift Valley) that became known as the 
‘white highlands’, vested in the Crown and occupied by the British, and customary 
tenure for ‘native reserves’ occupied by local people. Africans, especially Kikuyus, 
soon began to migrate to the Rift Valley in search of wage labour. This migration 
was further increased by population pressure in the reserves. Unrest in the reserves, 
especially the Mau Mau rebellion from the 1940s onwards, forced colonial 
authorities to open up the highlands to a re-Africanisation. This led to severe ethnic 
tensions that persist until today as settlement schemes, such as the ‘million-acre’ 
settlement scheme (Leo 1978), and land purchase programmes gave preference to 
Kikuyus over other tribes (Kanyinga 2009).
After independence the dual system of land tenure was maintained. Land remained a 
source of conflict, particularly in the case of ‘elite land grabbing’; that is, fraudulent 
allocation of public land to economically or politically influential people (Republic 
of Kenya 2004; O’Brien 2011; Manji 2012), or the 2007/2008 post-election violence 
that is thought to have been fuelled by land issues (Kanyinga 2009).
Today, there are three categories of land: public land (about 13% of the total land 
surface), private land (about 18%), and community land (about 67%) (Republic of 
Kenya 2004b).9 There are approximately six million titles on private land (stemming 
from both public and community land) (Interview K15) and a great deal of fraud 
surrounding them: often, there are numerous titles for one piece of land. 
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At the time of writing, Kenya is in the middle of a land law reform process (Manji
2012b). The policy road map is outlined in the National Land Policy of 2009 
(Republic of Kenya 2009a) and in the new Constitution of 2010 (Republic of Kenya
2010a: Art. 60 (2); Glinz 2011) – high hopes are placed on both. However, this only 
partly enacted constitution adds to the confusion about land management, as old and 
new constitutions coexist.
The land governance that is called for in the new constitution and the National Land 
Policy has not yet been fully implemented. So far, three Acts concerning land have 
been revised and adopted since the new constitution was approved: The Land 
Registration Act (No. 3 of 2012),10 the National Land Commission Act (No. 5 of 
2012),11 and the Land Act (No. 6 of 2012)12 (Republic of Kenya 2012a,b,c). 
However, the process has been hasty, engagement of legislators and citizens has been 
lacking, and the content falls short of expectations (Manji 2012b). 
Even though pressure on land in Kenya is enormous, for example through population 
growth (from 33.8 million in 2003 to 41.6 million in 2011) (World Bank 2013) and 
elite land grabbing, little land is accessible to investors and thus land acquisitions by 
foreign investors play only a minor role and are concentrated in specific areas, such 
as the Tana River Delta, the Yala Swamp (like our example, Dominion Farms), and 
traditionally the area around Naivasha (for flowers) and Kericho (for tea).
The process of acquiring large tracts of land
Ghana
The first step is to identify available land. For this task, it is usual to engage local 
professionals with a wide-ranging network (Interviews G17, G19). Another 
possibility for foreigners is to approach the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, 
which is currently improving a database capturing stool land offered for investment 
projects (Interviews G17, G19, G20; GIPC 2013). 
As the majority of land in Ghana is customary land, potential investors have to 
negotiate in most cases with chiefs and paramount chiefs (Interviews G15, G17, 
G19; for examples: Schoneveld et al. 2011; Amanor 2012; Wisborg 2012; Berry 
2013). By custom, the traditional council and the elders need to agree to negotiations 
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in order to guarantee checks and balances (Interviews G15, G29; Kasanga & Kotey
2001). 
In the second step, the investor receives the site plan from the chief and must initiate 
a comprehensive search at the archives of the Lands Commission, to check that the 
negotiating party is the legal owner and that there are not multiple claims on the land 
(Interviews G20, G21, G27; Republic of Ghana 2008a). Further checks with the 
Town and Country Planning Department are necessary to ascertain whether the land 
is available for the intended economic activity (Interviews G20, G30; Republic of 
Ghana 1993). However, this is a rather fuzzy and not entirely clear procedure.
A licensed surveyor is then engaged to map the land (Interviews G16, G27; Republic 
of Ghana 1986). According to custom, negotiations are concluded with the payment 
of ‘drink money’ (Interviews G15, G20, G29; Ubink & Quan 2008). This term 
originally meant a physical drink but now is converted into financial terms and 
symbolises asking permission to approach the chief in good will (Interviews G3, 
G29; Amanor 2010). With growing pressure on land the amount of the ‘drink
money’ is increasing and translates to a substantial part of the acquisition costs 
(Interviews G15, G20, G29; Ubink & Quan 2008). 
Once details have been agreed upon, the documents have to be handed in to the
Regional Lands Commission to process the registration. If the land is located around 
Accra or Kumasi a title can be issued; in other parts of Ghana only deed registration 
is available (Interviews G16, G20; Kasanga & Kotey 2001). Title registration is 
therefore conditional on announcing the transaction details at the site itself, at the 
respective district assembly and at the Regional Lands Commission. When 21 days 
have passed without any objection being raised, the registration process can be 
completed (Interview G16; Republic of Ghana 1986).
The annual rent, which is confirmed by the Lands Commission in the leasehold, will 
be paid to the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (Interviews G12, G23; 
Republic of Ghana 1994a). This authority charges a 10% administrative fee. The rent 
is disbursed as follows: 55% to the district assembly, 25% to the chief and 20% to 
the traditional council (Interviews G12, G21, G23; Republic of Ghana 1994a). 
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After a land lease has finally been issued, an Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) is mandatory. Actors such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the 
Water Resource Commission thus have a say in regulating future land use 
(Interviews G15, G31; Republic of Ghana 1994b, 1996). 
This is the typical procedure for acquiring customary land. When it comes to state 
land, the Lands Commission takes the position of the chief as it is mandated to 
manage public and vested lands; it also collects the rents (Interviews G16, G20; 
Kasanga & Kotey 2001). Investors therefore often favour state land as fewer actors 
are involved in the process and as this land is thought to offer higher tenure security 
(Interviews G15, G20). However, apart from land belonging to some divested state-
owned companies, there is usually no state land available for investors (Interviews 
G19, G28).
In principle, the acquisition process is straightforward but in practice there are 
several weaknesses. First and foremost, there is no guarantee that investors will 
follow this procedure before they start operations. Schoneveld et al. (2011), for 
instance, find that most bio-fuel related investments in the Brong Ahafo Region 
started operations without having an issued lease. There are two reasons for this: on 
the one hand, land administration is slow and cumbersome (Interviews G13, G15, 
G18; Kasanga & Kotey 2001); on the other, if chiefs and investors agree on a deal 
they do not see the need to bring in state institutions and rather prefer to save costs 
(Interview G13). This is especially attractive for chiefs as they can collect the rents 
directly without sharing them. 
Since transactions of customary land are private transactions under civil law, several 
problems arise (Interviews G15, G20; Republic of Ghana 1992; Ubink & Quan
2008). The state has (given the present legislation) no power to interfere and design 
contracts (Interviews G20, G21). It is up to the chiefs and the traditional councils 
(and the investors) to decide whether they will seek free, prior and informed consent, 
so the local population is at risk of hearing about a deal only after the negotiation has 
been concluded (Interviews G15, G21). In addition, information about sustainable 
land prices (‘drink money’), land rents and other negotiable benefits, such as local 
employment quotas, contract farming schemes, equity shares, or corporate social 
responsibility, are usually not available to negotiating chiefs (Interview G15). 
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Moreover, de facto accountability can be weak, so it is up to the chiefs whether they 
disclose the amount and the intended use of the ‘drink money’ (Interviews G15, G20; 
Berry 2013).
Regardless of whether customary or state land is in question, another weakness can 
be identified at the administrative level. Since computerisation is underdeveloped in 
Ghana, processing documents is time intensive (Interviews G16, G18, G21; World 
Bank 2003). In addition, monitoring and sanctioning of regulations remains a 
challenge due to a lack of personal and financial resources (Interview G33; 
Environmental Protection Agency 2010; for the mining sector see Domfeh 2003). 
Therefore suitable grounds exist for offers of ‘speed money’, and rent-seeking exists 
at various levels, fostering fraud such as multiple sales of land or incomplete 
registration. 
How these potential weaknesses translate into acquisition practice can be 
exemplified by the case of the Ghana Oil Palm Development Company (GOPDC). 
This leading palm oil producer is the biggest company in Kwaebibirem District, a 
remote area in the Eastern Region of Ghana. It was established as a state-owned 
company in 1976 on an area of 8,953 hectares, known as the Kwae Concession 
(Registered Leasehold No. 1258/1976).13 In the wave of liberalisation, GOPDC was 
privatised in 1995 and the 50 years leasehold (Republic of Ghana 1976) was divested 
to the Belgian investor Société d’Investissement pour l’Agriculture Tropicale, which 
took over the majority of shares (SIAT 2013; GOPDC 2013).14 In 2000, GOPDC 
acquired a second concession, the Okumaning Concession, covering 5,205 hectares 
of vested land which were leased for 50 years. The original acquisition by the 
government (also in 1976) took place under the Administration of Lands Act (No. 
123 of 1962) from Okumaning, Takworase, and Kusi stools (Registered Deed RE 
2538/2008). 
The difficulty with acquisitions of vested land under Act No. 123 of 1962 is the 
creation of overlapping interests in land, as mentioned earlier. The allodial titles 
remain in the hands of the chiefs, while management functions are acquired by the 
state and in this case were leased out to GOPDC. In this regard, GOPDC took over 
the assets and liabilities and thus the duty to compensate everybody who lived and 
farmed at the concession.
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People living in this sparsely populated area were predominantly migrants. As they 
were not bound to the land by social ties, they rejected a resettlement plan suggested 
by GOPDC and favoured cash compensation (AY & A Consult 2007; Interview G3; 
FGD G4). Consequently, the Land Valuation Board surveyed crops and housing 
structures but not the land itself (Interviews G1–G3, G7, G14; FGDs G4–G10). This 
was because GOPDC already possessed a land lease contract and because the 
migrants had neither statutory nor ancestral rights to use the land (Kobo, 2010). The 
whole process, beginning with information and sensitisation, was characterised by an 
absence of transparency, and many irregularities and delays. 
Our focus group discussions revealed a lack of free, prior, and informed consent. 
While some people had been informed in a meeting with GOPDC (FGD G1), others 
only became aware of the acquisition due to the valuation activities of the Land 
Valuation Board (FGD G9) or only heard about the investment project from their 
chiefs (FGD G8). Altogether, the role of chiefs is very complex: they negotiate 
corporate social responsibility activities with GOPDC (Interviews G1, G2, G14) and 
are highly appreciated (Interview G15). Nevertheless, considering that some chiefs 
have misused their position to bargain for personal benefits, and that they collect 
rents for the same land (the Okumaning Concession) from different actors (GOPDC 
and migrants), criticism has been widely expressed (Interview G7; FGDs G4, G5, 
G7, G9).
Other mandatory legal procedures were followed overall by GOPDC, although there 
may have been a few exceptions where they did not comply. For example, quarterly 
reports are sent to the Environmental Protection Agency on issues such as the 
treatment of the mill’s effluent according to the Environmental Management Plan 
(Interviews G31, G33) and according to the Agency the Company was fined once, 
several years ago (Interviews G31, G33). The Company acquires the necessary water 
permits on a regular basis, but the Water Resource Commission stated that there had 
once been a few months delay in the renewal of the permit (Interview G31).
Kenya
The ongoing land reform process in Kenya is expected to effect changes in the 
process of acquiring land. While it still follows the old legislation (prior to the new 
Constitution of 2010), major changes in this process will be effected once the new 
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constitution is fully implemented. For instance, the following key issues are 
addressed in the new constitution (but at the time of writing had not been acted 
upon): (i) foreigners are no longer allowed to own land but can only take leases and 
the time period of a lease is limited to 99 years (Republic of Kenya 2010a: Art. 65
(1); Glinz 2011), and (ii) a ceiling for the amount of land one can hold is to be 
discussed (Republic of Kenya 2010a: Art. 68c). We concentrate on the old process, 
which was still in place at the time of writing, but give a foretaste of intended 
changes.
The government encourages investors in agriculture and facilitates the process 
through the Kenya Investment Authority (Interviews K8, K23). Investors usually 
take long-term leases to secure access to land for up to 99 years (Interview K3). Who 
the investor will negotiate with depends on the type of land targeted. 
For public land, the government allocates land according to the Government Lands 
Act (Cap 280 of 2010) and the Trust Lands Act (Cap 288 of 2009). However, these 
procedures have been widely ignored in practice, thus irregular and illegal 
allocations of public land are common (Republic of Kenya 2004a, 2009a,b, 2010b;
O’Brien 2011). Acquisitions of public land will change according to the National 
Land Commission Act (Republic of Kenya 2012b), which stipulates the creation of a 
National Land Commission. This Commission will be in charge of administering 
public land. The former President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga have nominated 
members (Ndegwa 2012) and – under pressure – have officially announced the 
Commission (allAfrica.com 2013; Limo 2013). 
For community land, the county council or another mandated institution negotiates 
with the investor. These local authorities are also entrusted with informing the 
involved local population. However, whether the population is informed about an 
investment largely depends on individuals in these institutions (Interview K23), as 
the National Land Policy states: ‘In addition, it [the institutional framework] does not 
adequately involve the public in decision making with respect to land administration 
and management, and is thus unaccountable’ (Republic of Kenya 2009a). Until 2015, 
the new constitution stipulates that the Community Land Bill – which is available in 
a zero draft version – must be enacted (Republic of Kenya 2011). Administration of 
community land is then to be handled by community land boards. 
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For private land the case is – in comparison – unproblematic, as negotiations are held 
with the former owner (Interview K3); leaving aside fraudulent land titles, the former 
ownership of private land is clear-cut. Investor and former owner (i.e. government, 
private owner, or communal authority) have to agree on a price, the ‘stand premium’,
to be paid to the former owner. This price should reflect the value of the land but is 
negotiable. In addition, the investor has to pay an annual ground rent that is based on 
an official evaluation of the land, done by the Ministry of Lands. In the case of 
public land, an annual ground rent has to be paid to the government and in the case 
of community land to local authorities. On top of this, numerous statutory fees accrue 
in the process (Interviews K18, K19). 
In all cases of investment in land – public, community, or private – the Ministry of 
Lands has to approve the transaction, register the land, and issue a lease certificate. 
Once the lease has been taken and before the project actually starts, the investor has 
to undertake an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) with the National 
Environment Management Authority (Interview K5). The EIA includes social 
aspects, and involves the adjacent population. It has to make a clear statement of 
expected impacts and mitigation measures. The Water Resources Management 
Authority handles water usage rights and water licenses (Interview K21). 
This system has many caveats and loopholes: enforcement of formal registration and 
contract fixing procedures is poor and even official documents recognise corruption 
in land allocation (Republic of Kenya 2009a). In particular, acquisitions are prone to 
cause conflict if public or community land is targeted. Acquisitions of public land 
have a historical legacy in Kenya due to illegal allocations of such land (Interview 
K15; O’Brien 2011). Community land is handled by mandated institutions that have 
often neglected their duty of informing local land users about land acquisitions. In 
both cases problems have been identified and addressed by the National Land 
Commission Act (Republic of Kenya 2012b) and the – still to be enacted –
Community Land Bill (Republic of Kenya 2011). Moreover, enforcement of control 
mechanisms, such as the EIA, is weak due to a lack of financial and personal 
resources (Interviews K13, K17, K19).
As a result of the tedious official process and a confusing legal situation, many 
investments skip official procedures and come into the country through high-level 
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personal contacts (Interviews K15, K23). For instance, there is the case of a Qatari 
investment that was negotiated on the government level. Public pressure caused this 
deal to fail (Interviews K4, K15, K23). 
Similarly, the large-scale rice farm Dominion Farms, is ‘an investor who came in 
through the back door’ (Interview K15) and exhibited a rather unusual way of 
entering the country. Dominion Farms is located in the area of Siaya and Bondo 
District in Nyanza Province. The community land is held in trust by the respective 
county councils. Formerly, seasonal flooding meant that the swampland adjacent to 
Lake Victoria could only be used seasonally and few people were living on the land. 
The community used the land for grazing animals, fishing, and agriculture in the dry 
season. 
Local authorities have had plans to develop the swampland for agriculture for a long 
time; however, all former projects had failed (Interviews K11, K12, K14). Dominion 
Farms, a privately held US-investment, took over the land from the parastatal Lake 
Basin Development Authority in 2003 (Interview K12). Dominion holds a 25 year 
lease of 6,900 hectares that it has gradually been reclaiming, with about 1,500 
hectares being in use in 2011 (Interview K9). The owner claims God sent him to 
Africa to help poor people (Interview K9). When Dominion first came to Kenya, the 
owner looked for support in the highest political ranks of the country and approached 
Oburo Odinga, Member of Parliament for the region at the time. Odinga approved 
the investment and linked Dominion up with the Investment Promotion Centre. This 
in turn facilitated contact with the county councils (Interviews K16, K25). In 2003, 
Dominion signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the County Council of 
Siaya and the County Council of Bondo (Dominion Farms, County Council of 
Bondo, & County Council of Siaya 2003).
The local community was informed through church channels – in the words of one 
interviewee, ‘they used religion to manifest the investment’ (Interview K16). The 
owner went into partnership with a local priest and held services in the area to inform 
the population about the project (Interview K10; FGDs K3, K7). This priest later 
became MP in Kisumu Town – some claim through support and for the benefit of 
Dominion (Interview K15). In general, information on consultations and 
compensations is scarce.
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Whether Dominion complied with the law when they negotiated the Memorandum of 
Understanding and whether they did their EIAs as required is impossible to 
reconstruct from hindsight. Dominion and the National Environment Management 
Authority claim that EIAs were conducted in an orderly manner (Interviews K9, 
K11–K13, K17, K24, K25). However, others argue that EIAs were not done 
properly. Accusations have been made that official documents on public consultation 
were prepared in retrospect (Interview K16) or that officials were bribed (Interview 
K15). 
Selected outcomes of the game
GOPDC
In the case of GOPDC, resentment against the acquisition of the Okumaning 
Concession is widespread (FGDs G1–G12). In particular, participants of FGDs see 
the following negative immediate impacts: decreasing access to agricultural land 
(FGDs G1–G12), and low and late compensation (FGDs G1–G10). Moreover, as 
compensation was not paid for the land itself, the amounts calculated by the Land 
Valuation Board were inadequate to restore the migrants’ livelihoods (FGDs G1–G8, 
G10). Furthermore, people who used to live or farm at Okumaning Concession 
reported that after they had left the land, five years went by before compensation was 
paid (FGDs G1, G4–G9).15 The fact that people only received a check with the 
aggregated sum (FGDs G2–G7, G10) increased the suspicion that they were being 
tricked by their own government.
In terms of medium- to long-term impacts, participants criticise low wages (FGDs 
G1–G3, G11), casual labour contracts (FGDs G1–G3, G5, G7, G11), low corporate 
social responsibility (FGDs G1–G12), increased food prices in the area (FGDs G1–
G12), and low retail prices for fresh oil palm fruit (Interview G5; FGDs G11, G12).
Nonetheless, in most of the focus group discussions participants did not deny they 
had received benefits like employment creation (FGDs G1–G4, G7–G12), better road 
infrastructure (FGDs G1–G4, G7, G8, G10–G12), electricity (FGDs G1–G4, G7, G8, 
G12), and improved health and schooling facilities (FGDs G1–G8, G10–G12).
Since GOPDC extended production, conflicts have accrued: in the beginning, the 
land of the Kwae Concession seemed ample, but as soon as areas closer to villages 
  
20 
 
were affected by the investment, tensions arose with neighbouring communities 
(Interview G8; FGD G12). The Company responded by establishing a smallholder 
scheme for those who had lost their farms (Interviews G7, G8; FGD G12). In order 
to run the mill efficiently and foster economic integration, the Company also 
increased its access to fresh oil palm fruit by contracting outgrower farmers16 (who 
could prove that they would have secure land use rights for at least 25 years, the 
period of the contract) (Interviews G5, G6). The Company also made purchases from 
independent farmers. With its nucleus-estate system with more than 2,000 plantation 
workers, 200 smallholders, and more than 7,000 outgrowers, GOPDC is identified as 
a driver of development in the region (Interviews G1–G3, G10, G11, G13, G14; 
FGDs G1–G4, G7, G8, G10–G12).
However, criticism is not limited to GOPDC but includes the chiefs and the 
government. As a focus group participant said, ‘the chief has misled [us], the 
investor could not know. A portion of blame can be also given to the government’
(FGD G4). Given the important role of the chief, it is obvious that benefits for the 
local population are not institutionalised but rather depend on the chief’s goodwill 
and his capacity to negotiate.
Dominion Farms
In the Kenyan investment case, the most pertinent immediate impact is the loss of 
access to land. The land Dominion uses is no longer available for pastoral activities, 
fishing, and seasonal agriculture during the dry months. Furthermore, more and more 
people move into the now arable areas once the land has been cleared and drained by 
the company. When Dominion then starts claiming the land for its own use these 
people are driven out.
Adverse medium- to long-term impacts, such as food insecurity, and damage to 
health caused by chemicals and working in the rice fields, are mentioned by 
participants in all our FGDs. While statements like ‘Of course Dominion is very 
negative – that I have no doubt about – when they came they were good but they 
have kept on deteriorating year by year’ (FGD K5) were frequent in conversations 
with affected communities, positive impacts could not be denied at the same time. 
Long-term improvements in employment, and in infrastructure, such as roads, 
electricity, health centres, and schools, were named in particular (Interviews K10–
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K12; FGDs K1–K8). According to the season, between 200 and 1,600 casual,
contract, and permanent employees are working for Dominion (Interviews K9, K14).
Heavy resistance from community members (see for example Ochieng 2011) has 
worsened over the last years. In the beginning, enthusiasm about Dominion Farms –
clearly the most influential project in the region – was the dominant view. However, 
once the project moved from construction to actual farming activities, less 
employment than expected was generated and frustration set in. For instance, one 
participant in a focus group discussion claimed that ‘the negativity came in 2006 
during the transition between construction and farming when most of the workers 
became redundant and they could not all continue working with Dominion’ (FGD 
K8). Many blame Dominion for this messy situation; others hold the government 
responsible, as a focus group discussion participant observed: ‘So it is worth saying 
that Dominion did not grab our land but the government, because the government 
took our land and gave it to foreigners’ (FGD K1).
 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS
To align our analysis with the conceptual framework, we start with a brief systematic 
comparison between Ghana and Kenya. The stepwise analysis shows that the land 
legislation in both countries is not clear-cut, and thus the implementation of formal 
land laws is very loose. Many actors who acquire land operate in the legal grey areas. 
This is a consequence of ambiguous land tenure systems with weak monitoring and 
sanctioning mechanisms. Hence, in both cases, official legal procedures are not 
necessarily followed. This is exemplified by the cases GOPDC and Dominion Farms, 
which produced outcomes perceived as ranging from very negative to positive. 
While we cannot describe the full impact of large-scale agricultural projects (with 
regard to social differentiation or different time horizons), we can elucidate 
underlying causal mechanisms by looking at our findings in greater detail against the 
conceptual framework.
With respect to informal institutions, the Ghanaian system is backed by strong 
customary rules that are widely accepted by the society. Nevertheless, some 
traditional authorities’ behaviour when it comes to leasing out large land tracts is 
heavily debated and criticised. This indicates that informal institutions are under 
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pressure, which might lead to slow shifting of the rules. In Kenya, the customary 
system is much weaker. However, elite rule as an informal way of governing land is 
coming under increasing pressure.
In both case study countries, land is not solely a production factor but also connected 
with cultural identity and religious beliefs. Land issues are complex, and thus a 
consensus-based change in the formal institutions is also complex. However, both 
countries show signs of transition: the Lands Commission of Ghana is currently 
drafting a new land bill in order to coordinate its different and partly overlapping 
pieces of land legislation (Republic of Ghana 2010). The same holds for Kenya, 
which has enacted – and is currently implementing – a new constitution addressing 
important aspects of land (Republic of Kenya 2010a). The first steps towards reform 
have been taken, but it is not yet clear whether the reform will be implemented 
completely. In Kenya, for instance, the fear has been expressed that established elites 
will keep the old institutions alive despite the new constitution (Boone 2012; 
Interviews K15, K20). Similarly, the Ghanaian civil society fears that those in power 
have intentionally withheld the Draft Bill until 2013 in order to hold on to the power 
guaranteed by the present system (Interview G15).
As first and second level institutions are changing to different degrees, we analyse
which set of rules investors follow when ‘playing the land game’ (third level). As 
there is no clear guidance by the governing institutions (first and second level) and as 
the correct procedure is time intensive, some investors bypass formal institutions. 
Foreign investors do not know how to move in the legal grey areas: they lack the 
tacit knowledge required to adhere to informal institutions or make strategic use of 
them (which might be an advantage enjoyed by domestic investors). Thus, they are 
tempted to engage with local professionals or to enter the ‘land game’ through 
unknown, dubious channels. This can provoke popular outrage if unveiled (as 
happened in the Qatari case mentioned above). Overall, the current ‘game’ of large-
scale land acquisitions in Ghana and Kenya is played in a de facto ‘institutional self-
service shop’: investors decide themselves how they will enter the country depending 
on the discretion for action allowed by the host country’s key actors, such as high-
level politicians, civil servants in land- and environment-related agencies, 
businessmen, or traditional authorities.
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Consequently, analysis on the fourth level reveals that outcomes are diverse and 
range from positive to very negative. We assume that they are arbitrary depending on 
the investor’s strategy as well as on the above-mentioned key actors. Accordingly, 
investors have substantial influence on crucial aspects, such as informing the local 
population, being environmentally accountable and distributing factor inputs 
including labour and produce. This can lead to insufficient consultation of the local 
communities. Those being worst affected by negative impacts are dissatisfied as they 
are often left out of the whole process. This discontent may in turn contribute to a 
shift in first and second level institutions (at least in countries with a democratic 
orientation and an active civil society, such as Ghana and Kenya). We can thus assert 
that large-scale land acquisitions can fuel institutional change. 
Hence we can say in summary that it is not only the land governance system that 
shapes land deals but also the reverse: high numbers of large-scale land acquisitions 
put the land governance system under pressure to change; or, put differently, they
have a feedback effect on the system.
 
CONCLUSIONS
We can summarise four main findings of our comparative embedded case studies as 
follows:
Firstly, an examination of procedures followed in large-scale land acquisitions
reveals the present land governance system as inadequate to cope with the 
increasing pressure on land resources. The present systems are a result of the 
recognition of pre-colonial customary land tenure systems and statutory laws 
introduced by colonial powers, which were partly amended and adjusted for by post-
independence rulers. Notwithstanding the intense wave of reform since the 1990s, in 
both countries the system is still a collection of miscellaneous rules and regulations 
with overlaps and loopholes, rather than a consistent legal framework. Against the 
global trend of increasing pressure on land resources, the present systems seem to be 
poorly designed to cope with these challenges. To address this problem, continuous 
effort to pursue the institutional reform processes is therefore crucial.
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Secondly, the procedure generally followed (de facto) does not conform to the 
procedure laid down by the legislation (de jure). This is partly because the 
legislation is confusing, and partly because the formal rules are poorly implemented 
and enforced. Poor enforcement is a consequence of understaffed and underfinanced 
government institutions and low institutional capacity. In both countries, the lack of a 
computerised land registry is one of the main reasons for ‘skipping the queue’ and 
other illegal actions, which clearly contravene the legislation. We suggest not only 
technical reform, but also far-reaching capacity development at all levels to 
overcome these challenges.
Thirdly, investors determine to a large extent how their specific project affects the 
host country. This is because the land governance system is too weak to deal with the 
heavy pressure on land. Thus, the impacts of a project are arbitrary, as neither are the 
rules well-defined nor is their implementation guaranteed. Benefits for the host 
country and the local population therefore depend very largely on the behaviour of 
the particular investor – given that those in charge of enforcing regulations allow 
investors such liberty. Therefore, we recommend additionally supporting the 
implementation of international guidelines, as set out in the Voluntary Guidelines on 
Responsible Governance of Tenure, Land, Fisheries, and Forests (FAO 2012) or the 
AU Framework & Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa (AU 2010). This could be an 
important step towards fostering investors’ commitment to sustainable investment 
practices.
Finally, investors’ actions have repercussions for the land governance system in the 
host country. The weak governance system allows investors considerable leverage. 
Some may misuse the ‘institutional self-service shop’ to find loopholes to escape 
regulations. Such behaviour encourages rent-seeking and elite capture at all levels. 
Even though both phenomena are not new, they have become so widespread as to 
provoke resistance by the local population, civil society organisations, and the 
international community. In the recent past, projects first failed because of local 
protest. In this regard, the pressure on the land governance system is increased not 
only by the rising demand for land, but also by the growing dissatisfaction of the 
excluded local population and investors who fear that conflicts will hinder 
operations. Hence, large-scale land acquisitions can trigger institutional reform of 
both the formal and the informal institutions that govern a land tenure system. 
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Taking into account, that a shift in formal institutions improves ‘the rules of the 
game’ only if it is supported by informal institutions, we see awareness creation,
including public education and open discourse, as important for changing mindsets.
Although we found variations in the way the large-scale agricultural projects in our 
case studies were implemented, we identified similar problems for both countries 
which we believe to be applicable for a larger set of land deals. Acknowledging that 
investors’ actions have repercussions for the land governance system, we suggest 
there may be a window of opportunity here for policy makers, investors, and the 
local population to discuss the land governance system and shift its parameters 
towards more efficiency, given the sub-optimal outcomes of many land deals.
However, from a scientific point of view, more research is needed to fully understand 
how the recent investment boom in agricultural land shifts the future investment 
climate and the underlying regulatory framework.
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NOTES
                                                          
1. The term “land grab” is widely used in media and NGOs, development organizations prefer 
terms such as “land-based investment”, or “agricultural investment”. While every term implies a
certain stance in the debate, we refrain from using them and settle on neutral terms like “large-scale 
land acquisition”, “land deal” or simply “project”.
2. The topic is now appearing in many academic journals like the Journal of Peasant Studies, 
including several special issues: e.g. Development and Change (2013, Vol. 44, 2), Globalizations 
(2013, Vol. 10, 1), Development (2011, Vol. 54, 1). An overview of growing evidence is provided by 
Cotula (2013).
3. In choosing these countries, we aimed for close similarity with regard to contextual factors that 
are expected to have an influence on the not yet well understood phenomenon of large-scale land 
acquisitions (Dion 1998). Ghana and Kenya largely satisfy this condition, as they are both important 
targets of land acquisitions in Africa (Anseeuw et al. 2012). They claim leadership in their respective 
regional economic communities and have a reasonable degree of macro-economic stability with 
access to the sea (Mehler et al. 2012). Both are former British colonies and have inherited comparable 
institutional settings (Republic of Ghana 1999; Republic of Kenya 2009a). In addition, the coexistence 
of statutory and customary laws marks their land governance systems, which are both undergoing 
institutional change (Republic of Ghana 2010; Republic of Kenya 2010a). However, there are a 
number of important differences. For instance, their customary systems differ: while land allocation 
via the chieftaincy system is still crucial for Ghana (Ray 1996; Kasanga & Kotey 2001), common 
property based systems play rather a minor role for Kenya. Also, our case studies within the countries 
are located in diverse environments: The Ghanaian case is situated in a tropical forest zone with 
comparatively high population densities, while the Kenyan case is located within a wetland with 
comparatively low population densities. 
4. Williamson calls the fourth level the ‘resource allocation and employment’ level. Here, 
neoclassical analysis, in particular analysis of adjustments to prices and outputs and agency theory are 
typically employed in a marginal analysis.
5. The term ‘interest in land’ means a bundle of property rights associated with ownership which is 
in the Ghanaian land tenure system not necessarily clearly distinct and exclusive (cf. Kasanga & 
Kotey 2001). 
6. A ‘stool’ is the seat of a chief (or head of a family) of an indigenous group. It represents a 
source of authority, a symbol of unity and its responsibilities devolve upon its living representatives.
Land owned by such a group is referred to as ‘stool land’ (Republic of Ghana 1999). A ‘skin’ in 
northern Ghana is equivalent to a ‘stool’ in southern Ghana. 
7. The present constitution also recognises private land under common law under the category of 
customary land because it originates from gift or sale by the allodial right holder before 1992. A 
freehold title under common law can be held only by Ghanaians (Republic of Ghana 1992: Art. 266 
(2)). 
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8. For more detailed accounts of the Kenyan land tenure system and conflicts with regard to the 
‘land question’ see Syagga (2006, 2011), Kanyinga (2009), and Berman & Lonsdale (1992a,b). 
9. These categories emerged historically. In the colonial days, Kenya had only crown land and 
reserve land. The Swynnerton Plan of 1954 paved the way for a nation-wide land registration enacted 
under the Native Land Tenure Rules of 1956 and thus introduced private land (derived from both 
crown and reserve land and its successors) (Shipton 1988). Since then, Kenyans have been able to 
register land. At independence, crown and reserve land were renamed government and trust land. 
With the new constitution, government land became public land and trust land became community 
land. 
10. The Land Registration Act revises, consolidates and rationalises the registration of land titles. 
It repeals the numerous Acts that have been created over the time: the Indian Transfer of Property Act 
1882, the Government Lands Act, (Cap 280), the Registration of Titles Act, (Cap 281), the Land 
Titles Act, (Chapter 282), and the Registered Land Act, (Cap. 300) (Republic of Kenya, 2012a). 
11. The National Land Commission Act stipulates the creation of the National Land Commission 
(NLC) in charge of administering public land (Republic of Kenya 2012b). See also chapter 4.2.2. 
12. The Land Act revises, consolidates and rationalises land laws. It repeals the Wayleaves Act, 
Cap. 292 and the Land Acquisition Act, Cap. 295 (Republic of Kenya 2012c). 
13. The land was expropriated from the stools of Kwae, Asuom, Anweam, and Mintah under the 
State Lands Act (No. 125 of 1962) by the Government of Ghana to develop the area (Interviews G7, 
G14). As land acquisitions under this Act are ultimate, the stool land was finally transformed into 
public land. Under the military rule of the late 1970s, compensation of the stools as allodial right 
holders and individual land users with lesser interests like customary freehold or sharecropping 
arrangements (cf. Amanor 2001) was erratic (Interview G7). Officials dealt arbitrarily with 
compensations for farmland and cultivated crops. At the same time compensation for the use of 
communal forest resources was not paid at all (FGDs G11, G12). However, after more than three 
decades the acquisition process cannot be exactly reconstructed. 
14. Even though GOPDC had the legal right to use the land for which it pays ground rent to the 
Lands Commission, it abstained from using 2,343 hectares of its 8,359 hectares concession because
further expansion would have required the destruction of old-established villages and the Apam 
shrine, a cultural heritage (Interview G7). 
15. According to the Lands Commission, inflationary adjustment took place for delayed payments, 
but we were unable to gain detailed information on this. 
16. We define ‘outgrowers’ as farmers who enter into a contract with GOPDC for a period of 25 
years. While the Company offers inputs, credit, and extension, the outgrower contributes labor and 
land. This land is either owned or leased for 25 years. In case of a lease, the landlord also has to sign 
the contract. In contrast, GOPDC also provides the land for participants in the smallholder schemes.
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G1, traditional authority (m), Kwaebibirem District, 27/10/2011.
G2, traditional authority (m), Kwaebibirem District, 04/11/2011.
G3, traditional authority (m), Kwaebibirem District, 04/11/2011.
G4, Manager a, GOPDC (m), Kwaebibirem District, 08/11/2011.
G5, Executives outgrowers association (m), Kwaebibirem District, 09/11/2011.
G6, Manager b, GOPDC (m), Kwaebibirem District, 09/11/2011.
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G14, Traditional authority d (m), Kwaebibirem Dist., 12/11/2011.
G15, Representative, civil society (f), Accra, 14/11/2011.
G16, Snr. official a, Lands Commission (f), Accra, 15/11/2011.
G17, Official, Ministry of Food and Agric. (m), Accra, 16/11/2011.
G18, Snr. official a, Land Administration Project (m), Accra, 17/11/2011.
G19, Official, Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (m), Accra, 17/11/2011.
G20, Snr. official b, Lands Commission (m), Accra, 17 & 22/11/2011.
G21, Snr. official c, Lands Commission (m), Accra, 18/11/2011.
G23, Snr. Official, Office of the Administrator of Stool Land (f), Accra, 18/11/2011.
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G28, Snr. official b, Ministry of Food and Agric. (f), Accra, 23/11/2011.
G29, Snr. Official, House of Chiefs (m), Accra, 24/11/2011.
G30, Expert, Town and Country Planning Dep. (m), Accra, 24/11/2011.
G31, Official, Water Resource Commission (f), Accra, 25/11/2011.
G32, Professor, University of Ghana (m), Accra, 28/11/2011.
G33, Snr. Official, Environmental Protection Agency (m), Accra, 29/11/2011.
                                                          
† m = male; f = female.
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30/09/2011.
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K24, Snr. official c, Minstry of Agriculture (m), Nairobi, 14/10/2011.
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G3, Group of casual workers (harvesting), GOPDC, Okumaning, 27/09/2011.
G4, Group of rich before they received compensation, Okumaning, 27/09/2011.
                                                          
‡ Each group set out to have between 7 and 15 participants. To reduce hierarchy within the groups, we 
divided the participants into groups according to their perceived wealth level, as well as their age 
(youth groups up to the age of 35). For employees of the investor, we used the employment position to 
form different groups among casual staff, contract workers, and permanent staff.
Vulnerable in Ghana: no house or only a small structure, none or few domestic animals, no bicycle, 
none or only a small piece of land.
Vulnerable in Kenya: no house or only a small house, no domestic animals, no bicycle, only a small 
piece of land, use of hoe to cultivate, children not going to school.
Average in Ghana: medium sized house, few animals, bicycle, school attendance at primary and at 
often junior secondary level, little land ownership, but cultivation of several plots under 
sharecropping.
Average in Kenya: semi-permanent house (mud and then plastered), few animals, bicycle, children go 
to a poor quality school, at least two acres of land, use of ox-plough.
Wealthier 
Average in Ghana: big house, more animals, motorbike or car, often fewer children, more extensive 
land ownership, cultivation of more than five plots, often additional sources of income from non-farm 
activities.
Average in Kenya: brick house, many cattle, motorbike, one wife, few children, children go to a good 
school, five acres and above, use of tractor or ox-plough.
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G5, Youth, Aboabo, 28/09/2011.
G6, Group of average, Aboabo, 28/09/2011.
G7, Group of vulnerable, Okumaning, 31/10/2011.
G8, Group of average, Okumaning, 31/10/2011.
G9, Group of those to be compensated, Congo, 01/11/2011.
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G11, Group of outgrowers, Asuom, 01/11/2011.
G12, Group of smallholders, Kwae, 01/11/2011.
K1, Group of vulnerable, Kadenge, 22/09/2011.
K2, Mixed group: Vulnerable & average, Kadenge, 23/09/2011.
K3, Group of average, Kadenge, 23/09/2011.
K4, Group of wealthier, Kadenge, 27/09/2011.
K5, Youth group, Kadenge, 27/09/2011.
K6, Group of casual workers, Dominion Farms, Siaya, 29/09/2011.
K7, Group of contract workers, Dominion Farms, Siaya, 29/09/2011.
K8, Group of permanent employees, Dominion Farms, Siaya, 30/09/2011.
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ABSTRACT Outcomes of large-scale land investments in developing countries often seem 
arbitrary. This study uses a conceptual framework inspired by the work of Elinor Ostrom to 
explain why outcomes for the local population vary greatly between and within investment 
cases. It uses qualitative analyses of an oil palm investment in Ghana to show how a large-
scale investment affected neighbouring communities, permanent and casual employees and 
contract farmers, with outcomes ranging from very negative to positive. To mitigate social 
differentiation, I recommend corrective measures to improve contextual factors and make 
land deals transparent and investments sustainable.
Keywords: land; large-scale investment; Ghana; new institutional economics; social 
differentiation
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1. Introduction
From the perspective of neoclassical economic theory, large-scale investments in agricultural 
land seem to be a perfect match of demand and supply. Public and private investors 
worldwide are looking for large land tracts. Their search is driven by factors such as
population growth, changing diets, desertification, urbanisation and water shortages; by the 
increasing demand for raw materials (such as forest products), renewable energy sources and
ecosystem services; and by space requirements for eco-tourism and speculative investment 
(Cotula et al., 2009; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Zoomers, 2010; Cotula and 
Vermeulen, 2011a; Cotula et al., 2011b; Deininger et al., 2011). At the same time, 
governments and local elites in developing countries are willing to offer the vital production
factor land in order to foster commercialisation of their agricultural sectors, overcome 
persistent underinvestment in rural economies, and increase employment, infrastructure 
endowment, technology transfer and tax income (Cotula et al., 2009; Görgen et al., 2009; 
Zoomers, 2010).
The outcomes of such a seemingly perfect match are, however, often rather disappointing. 
This has been for example researched by White et al. (2012) in a general matter, by Li (2011) 
with a focus on labour issues or by German et al. (2013) who point to the difficulty of 
customary rights protection. For my case study country Ghana, several scientific studies 
reveal mixed or predominantly negative outcomes (Schoneveld et al., 2011; Tsikata and Yaro, 
2011; Amanor, 2012; Wisborg, 2012; Berry, 2013; Yaro and Tsikata, 2013), but some
positive effects have been reported (Boamah, 2011; FAO, 2012b).
The wide range of possible outcomes makes the neoclassical interpretation of large-scale land 
acquisitions appear simplistic in the extreme. The fields of New Institutional Economics 
offers more appropriate tools for analysing institutions that define ‘the deliberate incentive 
structure of a society’ (North, 2005, p. 1). For this study I therefore used Ostrom’s (2005) 
institutional analysis and development framework as theoretical approach for investigating
why the outcomes of large-scale investments in land vary.
The aim of my case study is to shed light on the mechanisms that produce a particular 
outcome. It is ‘an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set 
of units’, as described by Gerring (2004, p. 341). I treat the Ghana Oil Palm Development 
Company’s investment as ‘single unit’ (Gerring, 2004; Seawright and Gerring, 2008) and the 
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long-term impacts for the different population groups as ‘within units’ (Gerring, 2004, p.
343). My aim in analysing these impacts was to reveal how the outcomes of large-scale 
investments in land vary.
The analysis is based on field research conducted in 2010 and 2011. My qualitative data are 
derived from 33 semi-structured interviews with a wide range of experts who are stakeholders 
at national and local levels (Table A1 in the appendix); 12 focus group discussions (Table A2 
in the appendix) which capture the voice of subgroups of the local population variously
affected by the investment (contract farmers, casual workers, permanent staff, the vulnerable, 
the better-off, and so on); and a survey of community representatives in 49 villages.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. I first explain my conceptual framework and 
apply it to the case study country, Ghana. I then present the two land acquisitions by Ghana 
Oil Palm Development Company in the light of the country’s legal framework. Next I discuss 
the consequences of these acquisitions retrospectively. I follow this by discussing and 
systematising social differentiation with regard to long-term outcomes at household and 
village level. In concluding I offer some generalised recommendations.
2. A Conceptual Framework for Analysing Land Acquisitions and its Application to 
Ghana
According to Eggertsson (2005), we cannot improve outcomes without understanding the 
structure that produces them. To examine the reasons why the outcomes of large-scale 
investment in agricultural land vary, I follow Bates (1998) in drawing on analytical narratives 
to analyse the structures of complex action-outcome linkages and their consequences.
Ostrom’s institutional analysis and development framework is my starting point, and what she 
calls the action arena is my unit of analysis. Any particular action arena can be understood as 
a set of dependent variables (Ostrom, 2005). In analysing the action arena for large-scale land 
transactions, I look at the multitude of possible actions that are involved in implementing a 
land deal. 
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2.1 The Context
In Ostrom’s framework (2005), three context variables affect the structures of the action 
arena. First, the action arena is influenced and confined by the resource endowment; that is,
the physical, ecological and biological context, which in the case of Ghana comprises the 
coastal zone, the forest belt and the savannah.
The second variable is the cultural and constituting political context, which can be termed the 
constitutional choice level (modified from Ostrom, 2005). It defines a society and comprises 
in line with Williamson (2000) both informal institutions (i.e. norms, customs and traditions) 
and formal institutions (i.e. the legislative framework). In Ghana, for example, the 
constitutional choice level incorporates the informally instituted notion that land belongs to 
the dead, the living and the yet to be born (Larbi et al., 1998; Osei, 1998), which makes land a 
source of cultural identity (Kwadwo, 2004). In its narrow sense the constitutional choice level 
incorporates the constitution as a formal institution which is fundamental to constitute a 
society.
Ostrom’s third variable is the socioeconomic and political context, termed the collective
choice level (modified from Ostrom, 2005). This level consists of the rules defining the 
relationship between participants in the action arena. While the constitutional choice level 
forms the foundation of a society, the collective choice level interprets and translates that 
foundation into more tangible informal and formal institutions. In the case of large-scale land 
acquisitions in Ghana, the formal institutions are characterised by legal pluralism which 
expanded under colonial rule (Aryeetey et al., 2007; Ubink and Amanor, 2008). The result is 
present-day Ghana’s 166 different pieces of land legislation (Yeboah and Shaw, 2013), and 
consequently a weak land administration system (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001; Ubink and Quan, 
2008). The informal institutions are manifested in a strong customary system that governs 
daily life in general and land transactions in particular (Kwadwo, 2002; Blocher, 2006; 
Anyidoho et al., 2008) and, moreover, the consultation process for drafting a new land bill in 
Ghana also recognises traditional procedures (Interviews G15, G29 in appendix A.11).
These three variables, the resource endowment, the constitutional choice level and the 
collective choice level, are the nested levels of the context. They frame the level which is the 
                                                          
1 All interviews G1-G33 can be found in appendix A.1. 
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focus of my analysis, namely the operational choice level, where the action arena for large-
scale land acquisitions is placed. 
2.2 The Action Arena
The action arena involves participants, termed the ‘actors’, and an ‘action situation’ which 
allows different possible actions (Ostrom, 2005). Possible actions in the case of large-scale 
land acquisitions are: requesting land, offering land, expropriating land, negotiating 
transactions, implementing land acquisitions, regulating the acquisition process, enforcing 
contract regulations and monitoring. The actors associated with these actions are the 
investors; the traditional authorities; officials of government regulatory bodies such as (in 
Ghana) the Lands Commission, Land Valuation Board, Environmental Protection Agency and 
Water Resource Commission; and civil society.
These actors, assigned to various positions, are equipped with varying degrees of information 
about and control over the particular action situation (Ostrom, 2005). Hence, the power 
constellations inside the action arena affect the actions, which in turn have repercussions for 
the actors. Moreover, the set of possible actions for the action arena is determined by the 
context. 
Finally, the outcomes at the operational choice level are produced by patterns of interactions.
These patterns originate from actors who are linked to actions within the action arena. It is 
here that we can begin to analyse the outcomes of the actions. 
2.3 Rationale for Varying Outcomes
In the case of large-scale land investment in Ghana, a literature review reveals varying 
outcomes between and within different investment cases (Schoneveld et al., 2011; Boamah, 
2011; Tsikata and Yaro, 2011; Amanor, 2012; FAO, 2012b; Wisborg, 2012; Berry, 2013; 
German et al., 2013; Yaro and Tsikata, 2013). This variation can be explained as follows. In 
the context of weak land legislation with a plurality of laws and a weak land administration 
system, the collective choice level is characterised by ambiguous rules. Even worse, the 
constitutional choice level fails to provide clear guidance. Although it recognises the highly 
influential customary land governance system (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001; Kwadwo, 2002) in 
its constitution (Republic of Ghana, 1992), Ghana lacks a broad societal consensus between 
customary and statutory rules (Blocher, 2006; Anyidoho et al., 2008; Ubink and Quan, 2008).
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Moreover, the resource endowment is not well understood by land and investment related 
agencies and by traditional authorities. Due to the lack of a complete land registry and 
documentation at the local level, the amount of available land for large-scale investment 
projects is unknown (Aryeetey et al., 2007, Schoneveld et al. 2011). Those who negotiate land 
deals are thus often unaware of potential resource scarcity. Long-term trends such as 
population growth and land degradation or extensive land use are often not taken into 
consideration when renting out seemingly idle land (Cotula et al., 2009).
As the rules that govern land acquisitions are neither clearly defined as formal institutions nor 
harmonised with informal rules that are widely agreed upon, they cannot provide the actors 
with uniform directions. The result is an ambiguous pattern of interactions for large-scale land 
investments. Instead of structuring the operational choice level, the miscellany of rules 
encourages exploitation of legal grey areas, thus providing opportunities for rent-seeking. 
The consequences for the action arena are obvious: different actors use their power with 
regard to natural and financial resources, access to information, or control over other actors, to 
realise their goals (Goldstein and Udry, 2008). Whether this is in line with common welfare 
depends very much on the personal motivation of the actors. We can therefore conclude that 
outcomes will vary considerably.
Figure 1, summarises the theoretical framework used in this study to analyse the underlying 
process of large-scale land acquisitions. It shows that the outcomes of such investments send 
feedback at all levels. In the action arena at the operational choice level, outcomes lead to 
adjustment, confirmation or questioning of the actions (depending on which actors are 
involved). At the collective choice and constitutional choice levels, arbitrary outcomes reveal 
institutional inefficiencies. One effect of such feedback in Ghana has been a far-reaching 
institutional reform process initiated by the National Land Policy (Republic of Ghana, 1999) 
and supported by a Land Administration Project (Aryeetey et al., 2007). In addition to the 
third draft stage of the Land Bill (Republic of Ghana, 2010), a new Land Use and Spatial 
Planning Bill (Republic of Ghana, 2011) is currently at the consultation stage. Moreover, 
negative outcomes of investment projects lead to increasing criticism of the customary system 
and consequently to stronger pressure on informal institutions (Logan, 2011). This happens, 
for instance, when chiefs lease land to investors without proper consultation of the local 
population or when there is little accountability in the use of revenue (Berry, 2009). Both 
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institutional reform and criticism of the customary system might result in what we can 
interpret as ‘level-shifting’, using Ostrom’s term (2005).
Figure 1. A framework for varying outcomes in conjunction with large-scale land acquisitions 
Source: Own data, modified from Ostrom (2005); Di Gregorio et al. (2008)
My conceptual framework so far answers the question as to why the outcomes of land-based 
large-scale investment vary, whether the variation is between different investment cases or 
within a particular investment case. Given that different population groups are represented in 
different ways by the actors in the action arena, it is obvious that this leads to (or manifests 
existing) social differentiation. For instance, chiefs in their roles as landowners and traditional 
leaders of the local population are important actors in the action arena (see Ray, 1996). If we 
take D’Exelle’s (2009) view of elites as intermediaries, this helps us to see that elites are in a 
position to lobby for different population groups and thus more likely to bargain for their own 
people, the inhabitants of old-established villages, than for the settlements of migrant farmers. 
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In the following sections I use a specific investment case to explain how the outcomes of a 
particular investment case varied, affecting different population groups in different ways.
3. Land Acquisitions in Retrospect
Ghana Oil Palm Development Company (GOPDC) is the biggest palm oil producer in Ghana 
and the largest employer in the Kwaebibirem District (Eastern Region). It was established in 
1976 as a state owned company but in the course of the liberalisation wave in 1995 the 
majority of shares were divested to the Belgian investor Société d’Investissement pour 
l’Agriculture Tropicale (SIAT, 2013; GOPDC, 2013). Today, GOPDC holds two land leases 
in the rural forest belt of Ghana, one for the Kwae Concession and another for the Okumaning 
Concession.
3.1 The Kwae Concession
The Kwae Concession was acquired in the process of privatising the formerly state-owned 
GOPDC. Thereby, the initial 50 years leasehold (Republic of Ghana, Registered Leasehold 
No. 1258/1976) between the state and the ‘old’ GOPDC was transferred to the new investor in 
1995. The Government of Ghana acquired the land in 1976 to foster economic development in 
the region. Thus, an area of 8,359 ha was expropriated in the public interest from the stools 
(that is, chieftancies) of Kwae, Asuom, Anweam and Mintah under the State Lands Act 
(Republic of Ghana, No. 125 of 1962) (Interviews G7, G14). 
After more than three decades, an exact reconstruction of the acquisition process is not 
possible, but anecdotal evidence reveals that officials behaved arbitrarily and compensation 
was rather erratic (Interview G7; FGDs G11, G12 in appendix A.22). According to the 
conceptual framework this is no surprise, as the constitutional amendments of the 1960s
formed Ghana into a one-party state and anchored severely restricted civil rights and 
unlimited power of the state at the constitutional choice level. Given various military coups in 
the 1970s the collective choice level was therefore characterised by the rule of power instead 
by the rule of law. Thus, at the operational choice level the ruling elite extracted shamelessly 
rents from those with less power.
                                                          
2 All focus group discussions (FDGs) G1-G12 can be found in appendix A.2.
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When the state owned company commenced operations in 1976, only a few land users in the 
sparsely populated area had to give way for the construction of a nursery, housing structures 
and the mill (Interview G8, FGD G12). Under military rule, they were forced to leave the 
centre of the concession, the point from which the expansion over the next decades started. As 
the oil palm plantations expanded, more densely populated areas closer to the surrounding 
villages were affected and the communal forests were depleted, depriving the villagers of 
resources such as firewood, game meat, snails and herbs (FGDs G11, G12). The number of 
land losers increased and peace in the area was threatened because idle land, which could 
have served as a buffer zone for small-scale farming, was no longer available. As suggested 
by the conceptual framework, heavier resistance consequently forced the actors to rethink 
their behaviour at the operational choice level.
As part of compensation initiatives and with the aim of economic integration, the state-owned 
company established therefore smallholder schemes. With World Bank support, demarcated 
plots of the concession were allocated between 1978 and 1982 for oil palm cultivation (7 
ha/farmer in the beginning, later 2 ha/farmer) to those who had lost their farm land 
(Interviews G7, G8, FGD G12).3 The smallholder agreement obliged farmers to sell their 
produce to GOPDC, in return for which they received technical assistance and inputs on credit 
from the company. In addition, oil palm production was augmented from 1986 onwards 
through the introduction of outgrower schemes. With the outgrower contract GOPDC offered 
the same smallholder agreement conditions to oil palm farmers who could prove secure land 
use rights for at least 25 years for a plot (Interviews G5, G6).4 Thus, over the next two 
decades roughly 250 farmers per year received an outgrower contract for their plots, which 
varied from 0.5 to 4 ha (Interview G8).
Nevertheless, the mill could still not be operated at full capacity. A further reason was that the
new investor had abstained from using 2,343 ha of its 8,359 ha concession. Even though the 
privatised GOPDC pays ground rent for the whole concession to the Lands Commission and 
thus has the legal right to use all the land, further expansions within the concession had been
stopped in the late 1990s. This was the only way to maintain operational peace with 
GOPDC’s neighbours or in line with the conceptual framework a result of further adjustment 
                                                          
3 These land allocations were governed by a 25-year smallholder contract. After this period the contract was 
renewed, but the plot size was decreased from seven to two hectares because the farmers could not afford to 
cultivate the whole of the larger plot. In the beginning farmers also received one hectare for food cultivation.
4 Secure land use rights either means owning land (customary freehold) or having a long-term sharecropping 
arrangement. In the latter case, the landlord has to agree to the outgrower contract by signing it. For more details 
on sharecropping, see Amanor (2001).
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in the action arena to prevent sabotage and uprising.5 Otherwise, the destruction of the Apam 
shrine (a cultural heritage) and autochthonous villages (Kwae, Adiembra, Afunya and 
Atobriso) would have been inevitable (Interview G7). Thus, it is obvious that the original land 
acquisition went hand in hand with serious government failures: instead of surveying the area 
carefully and allocating only tracts of viable land to economic exploitation, the military 
regime of the late 1970s included cultural heritage and old-established villages in an 
economic concession.
As another way of obtaining additional oil palm fruit, GOPDC purchased from independent 
farmers. This enhanced the economic integration of the local population, but still did not 
provide sufficient fruit to operate the mill efficiently. GOPDC therefore acquired a second 
concession.
3.2 The Okumaning Concession
The Okumaning Concession covers 5,205 ha. In 2000 it was leased to GOPDC by the 
government for 50 years (Registered Deed RE 2538/2008). In contrast to the Kwae 
Concession, this second concession was originally acquired by the state under the 
Administration of Lands Act (Republic of Ghana, No. 123 of 1962) from the Okumaning, 
Takworase and Kusi stools to set up the state owned enterprise State Oil Palm Plantations in 
1976.
Whereas acquisitions under the State Lands Act (Republic of Ghana, No. 125 of 1962), for 
instance Kwae, ultimately transform customary land into public land, acquisitions under the 
Administration of Lands Act (Republic of Ghana, No. 123 of 1962), for instance Okumaning, 
create double structures when introducing vested land: in such cases, the chief keeps the 
allodial title (that is, the overall ownership), while the management functions are transferred 
to the state. Thus, in the case that is the subject of this study the state finally leased the land to 
GOPDC. This split of property rights hugely complicates matters and intermingles
responsibilities of actors in the action arena. Consequently, the chiefs remain entitled to 
ground rents and GOPDC resumes assets and liabilities when taking over the management 
functions of the state. In the course of leasing the land, liabilities arising include the duty to 
compensate people who lived and farmed at the concession for loss of crops and housing 
                                                          
5 Currently 28 land conflicts are being disputed in court. They are related to smaller land tracts and can be seen 
as individual conflicts with GOPDC. The majority of neighbours live in operational peace with GOPDC (FGDs 
G11, G12).
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structures (according to the Administration of Lands Act, Republic of Ghana, No. 123 of 
1962).
This turned out to be challenging for various reasons. In the days of the State Oil Palm 
Plantations, the concession was even less populated than the Kwae Concession and instead of 
old-established villagers there were only a few migrant farmers who had settled in the forests. 
After GOPDC took over the Okumaning Concession in 2000, it presented a resettlement plan 
to the migrants within the frame of its 2002 environmental impact assessment. Since they had
no social ties to the land, the migrants rejected the plan and opted for cash compensation (AY 
& A Consult, 2007; Interview G3, FGD G4). Because migrants lack customary rights (Kobo, 
2010), they were entitled to compensation only for their housing structures and crops, which 
were valued accordingly by the Land Valuation Board (Interviews G1, G2, G3, G7, G14, 
FGDs G4–G10). As these payments were not sufficient to ensure self-sustainability, the 
migrants felt cheated by GOPDC and the Board (FGDs G1–G8, G10). Although the investor 
followed the rules set by the collective choice level, unfair outcomes for the migrants were
produced in the action arena. Thus, the state actors who agreed upon the legislation have 
failed to implement measures which guarantee alternative livelihoods for those who lost their 
land use rights and consequently their main source of living.
Moreover, the whole process, from information and sensitisation to valuation and 
compensation, was heavily criticised. There was no systematic information. Participants of 
focus group discussions revealed various ways they had heard about GOPDC’s land 
acquisition: some had heard it from the chiefs (FGD G8), some had been informed in a 
meeting with GOPDC (FGD G1), and others had only become aware of it due to the 
demarcation activities of the Board (FGD G9). This shows that the action arena has rather 
produced ambiguous patterns of interaction and for this reason, arbitrary outcomes.
In addition, time frames between valuation and payments were entirely unclear and 
contravened the legally guaranteed entitlement to ‘prompt, fair and adequate compensation’ 
(Republic of Ghana, 1992, Chap. 5, 20(2)). In many cases several years had elapsed between 
valuation and compensation (FGDs G5, G6). Frustration was further increased by the inability 
of the Board to disclose the amount of remuneration for the various crops (FGDs G2, G3–G7, 
G10). Although fundamental provisions for compensations are embedded in the constitution 
of Ghana and are consequently part of the constitutional choice level, their translation into 
tangible regulations at the collective choice level is fuzzy and lacked clear guidance for the 
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Land Valuation Board. Even worse, the Board failed to enforce minimal provisions 
immediately in the action arena due to its financial and personnel capacity constraints.
Even though GOPDC followed the legally required procedure (Interviews G16, G20), the fact 
that cheques only stated the aggregated sum worsened the tensions. It discloses that mal-
designed or poorly enforced rules yield to negative outcomes for the local population which in 
turn provoke feedback in the form of pressure on the context.
However, to convey the full picture I must emphasise that the role played by some traditional 
authorities was problematic. Janus faced, they received their portion of the ground rent from 
GOPDC through government channels while at the same time ignoring the acquisition under 
the Administration of Lands Act (Republic of Ghana, No. 123 of 1962) and renting out 
smaller portions of the same land to migrants according to customary rules (FGDs G4, G5, 
G7, G9). Thus, their opportunistic behaviour underlines how actors in the action arena behave 
when a context lacks harmonised formal and informal institutions.
In general, the chiefs are powerful actors and, according to custom, highly appreciated (Osei, 
1998; Logan, 2011). Their discourse with GOPDC on corporate social responsibility (CSR)
activities to enhance the welfare of the communities (Interviews G7, G8) and their lobbying 
for oil palm farmers are welcome (Interviews G1, G2, G14) but the fact that negotiations lack 
accountability and that some chiefs had misused their position to bargain for personal benefits 
led to criticism (Interviews G7, G15); as one discussion participant said, ‘the chief has misled; 
the investor could not know’ (FGD G4). Once again, opportunistic behaviour at the cost of the 
local population produces feedback. This is reflected in questioning informal institutions at 
the constitutional choice level. Thus, caused by large-scale land acquisitions people nowadays 
ask whether the power of the chiefs has to be limited by checks and balances to prevent abuse.
Overall, this case reveals the challenges of large-scale investment within a weak land 
governance system. Moreover, it shows that investors are likely to inherit land disputes and 
that overlapping claims emanate from earlier acquisition activities. Widespread resentment is 
thus a logical consequence and was prominent in the case of GOPDC (FGDs G1–G12).
However, the fact that GOPDC’s nucleus estate system incorporates more than 2,000 
plantation workers, 200 smallholders and 7,000 outgrowers calls for a deeper analysis of its 
outcomes to avoid drawing superficial conclusions. In the following section I therefore offer a 
detailed assessment of the outcomes with respect to different population groups.
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4. Outcomes: Variation and Social Differentiation
4.1 Overview of General Outcomes
I conducted a community survey in 49 villages within a 35 km radius of GOPDC’s mill at the 
Kwae Concession. In each village I interviewed three representatives together (a member of 
the royal family, a member of the village council and a leading farmer), so they could discuss 
the questions and come up with a common answer. Data from this survey gave a first 
impression of GOPDC’s performance and its spillover effects. Of the 49 groups, 11 (20%) 
agreed without hesitation that their community had benefited from the investment. The 
opinion of one fifth does not speak of a general success, but does suggest that some villages 
had experienced improvements. The remaining 28 groups (60%) said their community had not 
benefited at all.
To assess developments without arousing emotions by mentioning GOPDC, I asked the 
groups whether living conditions in their villages had changed over the last decade. Thirty-
two (65%) said they had experienced an improvement, seven (15%) had observed no change 
and 10 (20%) reported a deterioration. Given the absence of special government initiatives, 
development assistance or NGO projects in 45 of the 49 communities, these assessments may 
be directly attributable to GOPDC as it represents the biggest investment project in the area. 
But although the living standards had improved for roughly two thirds of the surveyed 
villages, the investment is also likely to have made conditions worse for one fifth.
Perceptions of the outcomes of the investment therefore varied widely. When asked ‘What are 
the three main weaknesses of GOPDC?’, most said that GOPDC had failed
- to build a school or provide education for children and scholarships (28 groups –
60%),
- to construct or maintain roads (20 groups – 40%),
- to help solve water problems (10 groups –20%),
- to help with or provide social amenities (9 groups – 20%), and/ or
- to provide electricity or electricity poles (9 groups – 20%).
These statements may reflect unmet expectations. Unrealistic expectations seem to be a 
common problem of large-scale investment projects (Schoneveld et al., 2011; Tsikata and 
Yaro, 2011). As conceptualised by my theoretical framework, they often arise as a by-product 
in the action arena and are a consequence of a single actor’s motivation. Unrealistic 
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expectations are created by rhetoric from three directions: from the investors, who try to 
balance profit maximisation with positive spillover effects to gain support from the local 
population; from the national and local politicians, aiming to retain or attract rural votes, who 
suggest that the investment will develop the neglected agricultural sector and remote areas 
(Lindberg, 2010); and from the traditional elites, who justify their personal gain from the 
investment by promising to defend the customary system as a facilitator for local 
development.
Even though GOPDC addresses CSR matters such as education, health, water, electricity and 
road maintenance, the top five answers to the question ‘What are the three major strengths of 
GOPDC?’ showed that community representatives did not perceive the benefits of the 
investment to be in such activities, but rather in
- introducing the oil palm business in the area (39 groups – 80%),
- improving living standards (by buying from farmers) (19 groups – 40%),
- distributing oil palm seedlings to farmers (14 groups – 30%),
- creating employment (14 groups – nearly 30%), and/ or
- introducing smallholder and outgrower schemes (9 groups – 20%).
Hence, GOPDC was recognised rather as a driver of economic development in the area, and 
this view was broadly confirmed in the focus group discussions (FGDs G1–G3, G7, G8, G10–
G12). Groups of on average 10 participants discussed the development of their village in the 
last 40 years, the implementation process of the investment project and the way it has affected 
their community. Although resentment was prevalent (FGDs G1–G12) and outcomes fell 
short of expectations, the discussion groups also mentioned some positive outcomes; they 
could not, for example, deny benefits such as employment creation (FGDs G1–G4, G7–G12). 
Whereas the community representatives generally complained about lack of infrastructural 
improvements, several of the discussion groups noted the advantages of better road 
infrastructure (FGDs G1–G4, G7, G8, G10–G12), support to get electricity (FGDs G1–G4, 
G7, G8, G12) and improved health and schooling facilities (FGDs G1–G4, G7, G8, G10-
G12).
The negative views can be summarised as follows: decreased access to agricultural land 
(FGDs G1–G12), increased food prices on local markets (FGDs G1–G12), low and late 
compensation (FGDs G1–G10), low wages (FGDs G1–G3, G11), unsatisfactory casual 
contracts (FGDs G1–G3, G5, G7, G11), low prices for oil palm fruit (FGDs G11, G12) and 
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too little corporate social responsibility (FGDs G1–G12).6 These complaints suggest not only 
that expectations remain unmet, but also that the investment was partly responsible for 
deteriorating living conditions (for example because of increased food prices and decreased 
land availability).
The contrasting views of the community survey representatives and the discussion groups 
illustrate how outcomes varied and are in line with earlier findings of Amanor (1999) who 
points to rural social differentiation around GOPDC. They also give a first hint how rather 
positive impacts as shown by Adjei-Nsiah et al. (2012) and Huddleston and Tonts (2007) fit 
to the negative outcomes revealed by Watts (1994) and Gyasi (1994). The following section 
analyses the causes of this variation in more detail.
4.2 Specific outcomes
To differentiate between various population groups and varying outcomes, I ensured that my 
focus groups captured a wide range of population subgroups, neighbouring the investment. 
4.2.1 Okumaning Village: Mixed Outcomes for Nearest Neighbours
As a direct neighbour of the Okumaning Concession, Okumaning Village has been affected 
by GOPDC’s operation since 2000. All the discussion groups in Okumaning (vulnerable, 
average and wealthier) mentioned employment creation, access to electricity, the setting up of 
a clinic by GOPDC and improved roads as benefits, and increasing food prices and loss of 
agricultural land as the heaviest burdens (FGDs G7, G8, G10). The degree to which single 
groups were affected varies. For example, one participant in the vulnerable group did not see 
the benefit of electricity, saying: ‘I think the coming of GOPDC did not help the community. 
What is the use of electrical power, if you don’t have money? You can’t even pay the 
electricity bills’ (FGD G7). It was the more affluent who benefited from the electricity supply, 
particularly because refrigerators and other electrical appliances enabled them to earn income 
(FGD G10).
One participant thought it was the elders and chiefs who had benefited most from GOPDC 
(FGD G10), which is what my conceptual framework would lead me to expect. As actors in 
the action arena the chiefs have the chance to directly negotiate their outcomes, especially 
                                                          
6 Whether the company exhibits too little CSR is debatable. We need to question to what extent the development 
of social and physical infrastructure is part of an investor’s duties. However, this perception does reflect the 
prevalence of unrealistic expectations.
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when an ambiguous context allows them to manoeuvre in the legal grey areas. However, all 
the groups agreed that employment possibilities were beneficial, especially for youths with 
sufficient strength to do plantation work (FGDs G7, G8, G10).
With regard to the loss of land, the groups were differently affected, since not all had their 
farm plots on the concession. The vulnerable group were the most seriously affected, as they 
cultivated fewer farm plots in total and were thus more likely to lose all the land they owned. 
As has been mentioned, for some the compensation was insufficient to restore livelihoods. For 
some people, the compensation sufficed only to settle debts (FGD G7) and pay for children’s 
education (FGDs G7, G8, G10), while others were enabled to rebuild houses or invest in 
productive assets such as cars (FGD G8).
Overall, the Okumaning discussion groups reported mixed outcomes, on average emphasising 
advantages such as employment creation and improved infrastructure (FGD G8). The 
vulnerable group seemed to benefit least from the positive effects and to suffer 
disproportionately from the burdens, while the average and wealthier groups highlighted both 
pros and cons. The wealthier group were aware that GOPDC had limited their ‘room to 
manoeuvre’. For example, before the investor took over there were certain uncontrolled areas 
where people could expand their farming activities; as one participant said: ‘I didn’t own the 
land, but nobody complained when you farmed on the land’ (FGD G10). This group not only 
lost big farm plots, they also suffered most from the loss of markets for their remaining 
produce as a result of the displacement of migrant settlers from the concession (FGD G10). 
One participant complained about a decrease in access to finance: ‘When we had our farms, 
every year we gained something meaningful from them. Formerly, it was easy to obtain loans, 
but now because we do not have the land and the farms any more, people do not grant us 
loans any more’ (FGD G10). 
Focus group discussions with people from Okumaning Village reveal that the investment met
a society where social differentiation was already prevalent. As vulnerable people were 
affected disproportionally negatively, the investment is likely to increase inequalities. 
However, it also led to shifts in social differentiation as it benefited for example especially the 
youth who gained employment. Furthermore, the burden to lose land to the investment was 
not equally distributed among villagers, while some lost a lot and did not receive sufficient 
compensation to restore their livelihood, others were not affected at all or managed to attract 
higher compensation payment. With regard to the conceptual framework, these outcomes are 
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associated to the actors’ behaviour in the action arena. It is obvious that the nature of the 
investment (i.e. its recruitment policy, the amount and quality of CSR activities, or its 
geographical location) explain much, but many outcomes are additionally caused by other 
actors like the chiefs who bargained strategically or the state agencies who transferred the 
concession to GOPDC without accompanying measures to prevent increasing social 
differentiation or ensuring adequate compensation for land losers.
4.2.2 Congo Village: Inadequately Compensated
Two former migrant villages, Agye Badu and Dwenase, had disappeared in the course of oil 
palm expansion within the Okumaning Concession. It was thus impossible to capture the 
perceptions of a mixed group of villagers, as most of them had relocated to their hometowns 
in other regions of Ghana. I was, however, able to hold discussions with people who had 
received compensation for housing structures and had relocated to Okumaning or Kade (the 
district capital). I also conducted a discussion group in Congo Village, where the land had 
already been valued and people were waiting for compensation so they could leave. 
Those who had relocated to Okumaning or Kade mentioned benefits similar to those 
mentioned by the Okumaning groups (FGD G4), although the negative outcomes – the loss of 
homes and farms – were more severe. In contrast, those living in Congo were experiencing 
nothing but loss. It was likely that their compensation would be insufficient, because of the 
weaknesses in the land governance system. According to the conceptual framework, state 
agencies were unable to enforce the constitutional provisions for ‘prompt, fair and adequate 
compensation’ in the action arena. Comments like the following were frequent: ‘They will tell 
you not to farm this year, because they will start operations on the land. The year will pass by, 
yet they have not started and you cannot farm’ (FGD 9). Furthermore, these people were too 
far away from the centre of operations to benefit from CSR activities such as improved health 
or schooling facilities, from direct benefits such as employment creation, or from spillover 
effects such as road maintenance (FGD G9). 
Even worse, since their village was moribund, the better-off people had started outmigrating, 
while the poorer families were doomed to stay and wait for compensation. This had led to a
decline in economic welfare and the collapse of the primary school, as the number of school 
children fell below a critical mass. People had to stop farming perennial crops, as their farm 
plots were to be destroyed in the near future (FGD G9). One farmer summed up the effects of 
this decrease in subsistence farming and lack of alternative sources of livelihood as follows: 
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‘Those days [before GOPDC] we were not given money for housekeeping. We were used to 
get all the foodstuffs from the farm. The only thing we bought to eat was meat, but currently 
we will buy almost everything’ (FGD 9). These migrant settlers, forced to leave their villages 
without prompt, fair and adequate compensation, were thus the biggest losers from the 
investment.
4.2.3 Aboabo Village: Too Distant to Benefit, but Close Enough to Lose
A similar picture emerged from discussions with an averagely wealthy group and a youth 
group in Aboabo Village. Aboabo is located outside the Okumaning Concession, but large 
parts of its farmlands had been claimed due to the land acquisition. This village also used to 
benefit from the surrounding migrant settlements within the concession. When these were 
resettled, Aboabo’s junior secondary school and its weekly market collapsed as many of those 
who had been compensated left the area (FGDs G5, G6). Aboabo itself is smaller than 
Okumaning and falls under the traditional jurisdiction of the Okumaning chief. Since many 
inhabitants were migrants, they were strongly affected when they lost their farm plots as it is 
more difficult for migrants to replace farm land. 
This led to an increase in social differentiation and to people being forced to work as casual 
labourers or under unfavourable sharecropping arrangement on the lands of farmers who had 
not been affected (FGDs G5, G6). Pressure on land therefore increased; as one participant 
observed: ‘It is now the norm of the day: people give plots to more than one person. This has 
resulted in so many disputes in the community’ (FGD G6).
In addition, Aboabo is further away from GOPDC’s centre of operations than the direct 
neighbour, Okumaning, and thus did not profit from infrastructural improvements such as 
road construction. As the village is rather small, it had also not yet benefited from CSR 
activities such as support in getting access to electricity. Possible reasons for this could be that 
the fixed costs are disproportionately high for a relatively small village and that CSR 
activities in bigger villages might have broader impact and thus represent the more rational 
choice for investors.
My conceptual framework again suggests that the Okumaning chief would lobby for benefits 
for his own people rather than for those of Aboabo. With regard to employment creation, the 
youth of Aboabo was not benefiting much. Given the greater distance to GOPDC’s offices 
and to the workers’ meeting point, only three people were managing to work for the company 
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(FGD G5). In summary, then, Aboabo is too far away and too small to benefit, but close 
enough to be affected by negative outcomes.
4.2.4 The Workers: Employment Does Not Suit All
Another set of outcomes is related to GOPDC’s workers. Once again, to minimise group 
heterogeneity I arranged three focus groups: permanent staff, casual workers who are paid per 
task for harvesting and can earn considerable wages, and casual workers who do slashing 
(weeding around the oil palms) on a fixed daily rate above the minimum wage. As the 
workers are from various surrounding villages which are all differently affected, I highlight 
here only the outcomes relevant to their employment situation. 
On the negative side, both groups of casual workers complained that despite having worked 
for the investor for many years they had still not been offered a permanent contract (FGDs 
G1, G3). They were concerned about not being able to maintain their livelihood if they had an 
accident or when they retired (FGD G1). All three groups felt they were not appropriately 
paid (FGDs G1–G3). The low paid slashers, and also the harvesters, complained that what 
they were now earning as workers did not equal their earlier benefits from farming oil palm, 
cocoa, citrus or food crops (FGDs G1, G3). 
On the positive side, workers mentioned education and credit, saying, for example: ‘It has 
helped me to have my children educated up to the final stage of secondary school’ (FGD G1) 
or ‘If we compare the situation from the time when there was no GOPDC, working for 
GOPDC now makes it easy to obtain a loan’ (FGD G1).
One person even said that he had benefited because the company had enabled him to buy two 
cars (FGD G2). Both pros and cons were evident in the outcomes for the workers, with the 
younger people and the better educated benefiting more than the others (FGDs G1, G2). 
Nevertheless, resentment against the land acquisition was common among workers who did 
extra work as part-time farmers or whose families also relied on farming (FGDs G1–G3).
In the light of the conceptual framework the focus group discussions with the workers reveal 
that their interests were not appropriately recognised in the action arena. While the state 
agencies were unable to negotiate benefits for employees when negotiating the land 
acquisition, the rather weak workers’ unions failed to lobby appropriately for retirement 
provisions and insurance against accidents.
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4.2.5 The Smallholders: Bitter Resentment despite Economic Benefits
More than three decades after its arrival there was still intense resentment of GOPDC among 
smallholders and outgrowers (FGDs G11, G12). Being close to the Kwae Concession, the 
smallholders had access to infrastructure provided by GOPDC, such as their clinic and their 
school, and the transport system in the area had improved with a growing Kwae Estate 
population. Higher population density had increased demand not only for minibuses, which 
led to improved connections, but also for goods and services, which in turn boosted the local 
economy (FGD G12). 
However, people from Kwae Village, where most of the smallholders came from, had lost two 
thirds of their land because of GOPDC; the problem of land scarcity was pronounced (FGD 
G12). Moreover, smallholders’ expectations were very high as they compared their neighbour 
GOPDC with large-scale investments by the mining industry (FGD G12), where a higher 
gross profit margin traditionally results in more CSR activities for communities. The focus 
group discussion with smallholders in Kwae Village disclosed exemplarily the long-term 
impacts caused by inappropriate actions in the action arena. In the course of the forceful 
acquisition of the Kwae Concession, interests of the local population were not at all 
recognised by the military regime. Later, the set up of the smallholder scheme was a move in 
the right direction, but turned out only partly beneficial. Until today, alternative livelihood 
strategies recognising the land scarcity are missing.
4.2.6 The Outgrowers: The Real Winners
The outgrowers’ rating of GOPDC was the most positive of all the groups. Although they 
were not free from resentment, they mentioned the benefits of learning agricultural techniques 
and technologies promoted by GOPDC, such as plant spacing, fertiliser application and the 
use of chainsaws (FGD G11). Another positive outcome they mentioned was the 
improvement of the markets, which was interpreted from different angles in the discussion. 
First of all, they appreciated the introduction of the oil palm business in the area (FGD G11). 
The scheme had given the outgrowers access to inputs, credits and training, which enabled 
them to set up businesses and earn cash (FGD G11). In addition, GOPDC had helped to 
improve the banking system, as it channelled payments through the rural banks, resulting in 
improved access to loans (FGD G11). Another important benefit was improved schooling: 
some children could attend GOPDC’s school and some outgrowers had been able to save 
enough money to send their children to university (FGD G11). The unclear policies of the 
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investor with regard to oil palm fruit prices and supportive inputs within the scheme remained
a problem for the outgrowers, however. As one participant put it: ‘GOPDC is acting like a 
chameleon; it changes from time to time’ (FGD G11).
In the interest of fair assessment it must be said that the outgrowers also challenged GOPDC 
when they started side-selling or interrupted the payback of loans granted to them under the 
outgrower scheme (FGD G11, Interviews G4, G11). Despite their disappointment at the 
company’s recent policy changes, the outgrowers must be identified as the winners when it 
comes to outcomes of the investment. Besides their economic integration which was actively 
fostered by the investor, they may also have benefited because actors lobbied for them within 
the action arena. For example, the International Finance Corporation was interested in the 
outgrower scheme in conjunction with supplying a loan to support further expansion of the 
investment (IFC, 2007). The outgrowers also received strong attention from civil society, and 
development assistance within the framework of the National Interpretation of Principles and 
Criteria of the Roundtable of Sustainable Oil Palm in Ghana (RSPO in Ghana, 2013).
5. Conclusion
In this study I developed a conceptual framework to help explain why the outcomes of large-
scale investment in agricultural land vary within and between investment cases. In this
framework, I applied the ideas of Ostrom (2005) to systematically disclose varying outcomes 
in the case country Ghana. The framework differentiates between the context as a set of 
influencing factors (the resource endowment, the cultural and political setting and the 
socioeconomic background), which consist of a mix of informal and formal institutions, and 
the action arena as a dependent variable, where land transactions are implemented by actors 
who have various options as to how to act.
I discovered that the outcomes of large-scale investments vary for three reasons: the lack of a 
fully implemented and effective land governance system within a frame of clear formal 
institutions; the formal system’s failure to harmonise with the informal rules of the customary 
system; and asymmetric power relations between constellations of actors. Consequently, an 
institutional environment has been produced which encourages rent-seeking activities at all 
levels, unrealistic expectations about outcomes as a result of some actors’ rhetoric, and
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lobbying activities aimed at converting outcomes of land acquisitions into benefits for the 
actors themselves or particular subgroups of the local population.
To show how such outcomes can de facto vary, I used the example of an in-depth analysis of 
focus group discussions conducted in the catchment area of the Ghana Oil Palm Development 
Company (GOPDC). While neighbouring villages (such as Okumaning) experienced mixed 
outcomes in the form of land loss on the one hand and infrastructural improvements and 
employment creation on the other, villages further away (such as Aboabo) were negatively 
affected because their geographic distance from the core of the investment area prevented 
them from accessing spillover benefits. Worst off were the people in villages such as Congo 
who had to relocate or were still in the process of resettlement, because the institutional 
environment was too weak to guarantee legal entitlement to prompt, fair and adequate 
compensation. Outcomes were mixed for the workers: my discussion groups revealed that the 
positive outcomes linked to employment creation were marred by the less than satisfactory 
quality of the casual jobs. Best off were the contract farmers, with the outgrowers in particular 
profiting from long-term economic integration, although the smallholders were still suffering 
from loss of land – a drawback that was highlighted by all subgroups of the local population.
These findings call for action to improve the outcomes of large-scale investment in 
agricultural land. I recommend corrective measures at various levels. To enhance the context,
I suggest legal reform, to improve guidance for actors and ensure transparency, and 
modification of informal institutions, to create checks and balances in the customary system. I
also recommend the implementation of voluntary standards – as suggested by the Voluntary 
Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Tenure, Land, Fisheries and Forests (FAO, 2012a),
the African Union Framework & Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa (African Union et al.,
2010) and the Responsible Agricultural Investment Principles (FAO et al., 2010). With 
investor commitment, these standards could help to channel actions towards positive 
outcomes and help to overcome the weaknesses of the existing land governance system.
Within the action arena I recommend more emphasis on sensitisation of negotiating parties, 
with respect to over-optimistic expectations, and of investors, with respect to the local 
population’s strong cultural ties to their ancestral land. In the aim of improved transparency I
recommend the use of institutionalised communication channels as a precondition for 
sustainable investment. However, my strongest recommendation for producing positive 
outcomes is the early development of alternative livelihood strategies to anticipate increasing 
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land pressure due to the investment project. Thereby, it is especially important to consider 
social differentiation.
First of all, large-scale land investment does not meet a homogenous local population, but 
occurs in a society with already inherent social differences. Thus, it is important to analyse 
whether the investment manifests, increases or decreases social differentiation. Secondly, 
large-scale land investment does not yield to equally outcomes, but can have quite different 
impacts caused by households’ distance to the centre of operations, its amount of land lost to 
the project, its possibility to gain permanent, casual or no employment or its chance to 
participate in contract farming schemes. To realise benefits for the local population therefore 
requires rigorous ex-ante assessments on how to mitigate negative impacts and how to benefit 
rural households without rising social inequality or worsening the livelihoods of already 
disadvantaged households. At this stage, state actors have to check carefully whether a large-
scale land investment truly has the potential to commercialise agriculture in remote rural 
areas. However, even if projects seem to be promising, state actors have to be realistic that 
such projects cannot be a cure-all, but rather require accompanying measures to avoid a 
widening poverty gap.
Finally, a comparison of characteristics of the context and the action arena reveals similarities 
to the land governance systems of other African countries and to other case studies on large-
scale investments in developing economies. I suggest that the application of my framework to 
a particular investment case is a promising way to elicit insights. It will help to structure the 
way of thinking about large-scale investments in agricultural land and make generalised 
recommendations for the future.
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Appendix A
To guarantee anonymity, interviewees are listed according to their (rough) position and 
organisation but not names (Table A1). All interviewees were informed about the 
purpose of the interviews and how the data were to be used. Due to interviewees’ 
reservations and the sensitiveness of the topic, interviews were not recorded.
Each focus group discussion (FGD) had 7 to 15 participants (Table A2). To reduce 
hierarchy within the groups, since it can hamper active participation, I organised the 
groups according to age (separating participants up to the age of 35 into ‘youth’ groups)
and perceived wealth as follows:
Vulnerable: no house or only a small structure, none or few domestic animals, no 
bicycle, none or only a small piece of land.
Average: medium sized house, few animals, bicycle, school attendance at primary 
and often junior secondary level, little land ownership, but cultivation of several 
plots under sharecropping.
Wealthier: big house, more animals, motorbike or car, often fewer children, more 
extensive land ownership, cultivation of more than five plots, often additional 
sources of income from non-farm activities.
Employees of the investor were grouped according to staff category: casual, contract and 
permanent.
There are no gender-differentiated group discussions in the sample, since resources were 
limited. To compensate for this weakness, facilitators of FGDs were specially trained to 
encourage women’s participation. Moreover, male and female local experts denied that 
gender was a critical factor in discussions on topics such as community history, the state 
of agriculture, and impacts of an investment (Interviews G13, G15, G17). Evidence from 
the FGDs did not support the common belief that the presence of men prevented women 
from voicing their concerns. Discussions were led in local languages (Twi or Fante), 
recorded and then transcribed into English. All participants were informed about the 
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purpose of the FGDs and how the data were to be processed. Before recording, the 
group’s consent was obtained.
Table A1. Interviews 
Note: AGRA – Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa; IFPRI – International Food Policy Research 
Institute; OASL – Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands
Code Position/ Institution Gender Place Date
G1 Traditional authority a M Kwaebibirem Dist. 27/10/2011
G2 Traditional authority b M Kwaebibirem Dist. 04/11/2011
G3 Traditional authority c M Kwaebibirem Dist. 04/11/2011
G4 Manager a – GOPDC M Kwaebibirem Dist. 08/11/2011
G5 Executives outgrowers association M, M Kwaebibirem Dist. 09/11/2011
G6 Manager b – GOPDC M Kwaebibirem Dist. 09/11/2011
G7 Manager c – GOPDC M Kwaebibirem Dist. 09/11/2011
G8 Manager d – GOPDC M Kwaebibirem Dist. 09/11/2011
G9 Manager e – GOPDC M Kwaebibirem Dist. 09/11/2011
G10 Snr. official – District Assembly M Kwaebibirem Dist. 10/11/2011
G11 Middle men M Kwaebibirem Dist. 10/11/2011
G12 Official – OASL M Kwaebibirem Dist. 11/11/2011
G13 Snr. official a – Ministry of Food and Agric. M Kwaebibirem Dist. 11/11/2011
G14 Traditional authority d M Kwaebibirem Dist. 12/11/2011
G15 Representative – civil society F Accra 14 & 30/11.
G16 Snr. official a – Lands Commission F Accra 15/11/2011
G17 Official – Ministry of Food and Agric. M Accra 16/11/2011
G18 Snr. official a – Land Administration Project M Accra 17/11/2011
G19 Official – Ghana Investment Promotion Centre M Accra 17/11/2011
G20 Snr. official b – Lands Commission M Accra 17 & 22/11.
G21 Snr. official c – Lands Commission M Accra 18/11/2011
G22 Snr. official b – Land Administration Project M Accra 18/11/2011
G23 Snr. official – OASL F Accra 18/11/2011
G24 Snr. researcher – AGRA M Accra 21/11/2011
G25 Snr. official – IFPRI M Accra 21/11/2011
G26 Snr. official – Ghana Agric. Workers Union M Accra 21/11/2011
G27 Snr. official d – Lands Commission M Accra 22/11/2011
G28 Snr. official b – Ministry of Food and Agric. F Accra 23/11/2011
G29 Snr. official – House of Chiefs M Accra 24/11/2011
G30 Expert – Town and Country Planning Dep. M Accra 24/11/2011
G31 Official – Water Resource Commission F Accra 25/11/2011
G32 Professor – University of Ghana M Accra 28/11/2011
G33 Snr. official – Environmental Protection 
Agency
M Accra 29/11/2011
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Table A2. Focus group discussions (FGDs)
Code Place Category Date
G1 Okumaning Plantation Casual workers – slashing – GOPDC 26/09/2011
G2 Okumaning Plantation Permanent employees – GOPDC 27/09/2011
G3 Okumaning Plantation Casual workers – harvesting – GOPDC 27/09/2011
G4 Okumaning Rich before they received compensation 27/09/2011
G5 Aboabo Youth 28/09/2011
G6 Aboabo Average 28/09/2011
G7 Okumaning Vulnerable 31/10/2011
G8 Okumaning Average 31/10/2011
G9 Congo To be compensated 01/11/2011
G10 Okumaning Mixed: average & wealthier 01/11/2011
G11 Asuom Outgrowers 01/11/2011
G12 Kwae Smallholders 01/11/2011
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Abstract
With the rising demand for agricultural land, land deals must be designed to benefit not only 
the investors but also the local population. This paper looks at two ways this might be done 
for farmers in the vicinity of a large-scale oil palm investment in Ghana: contract farming and 
secure property rights to land. We compare farmers to whom outgrower contracts were 
allocated, in a quasi-natural experiment, with independent oil palm growers. We find that 
property rights have a significantly positive effect on households’ agricultural income, profit 
per acre, and perceived future security, but that while contract farming has a significantly 
positive effect on households’ aggregated assets and perceived future security, its effect on 
agricultural income and profit per acre is significantly negative because of effort substitution, 
since outgrowers have a higher probability of engaging in non-farm business. The identified 
effects are highly significant and supported by robustness checks. We conclude that large-
scale investment need not be to the disadvantage of the local population if it respects existing 
bundles of property rights and may be beneficial for those who participate in contract farming. 
JEL classifications: D60, O17, Q13
Keywords: Contract farming; Property rights; Large-scale land investment; Quasi-natural 
experiment; Oil palm; Ghana
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1. Introduction
Driven by the latest food, fuel, and financial crises, private and public investors from all over 
the world are rediscovering the agricultural sector and investing in large tracts of arable land. 
However, their demand for food and fodder, industrial raw materials, bio mass, or safe 
financial investment does not necessarily coincide with host countries’ demand for economic 
integration of the local population, infrastructure development, employment creation, and 
technology transfer (Borras and Franco, 2012; Cotula and Vermeulen, 2011; Deininger et al., 
2011; De Schutter, 2011; Görgen et al., 2009). In particular, where properly enforced legal 
frameworks are lacking, customary ownership is often inappropriately recognized (German et 
al., 2013; Deininger et al., 2011; Sjaastad and Cousins, 2008; Ray, 1996), and poor 
documentation and weak enforcement of rules and regulations prepare the ground for rent-
seeking activities and elite capture (Nolte and Väth, 2013; Ubink and Quan, 2008). There is 
therefore a danger of land being acquired at the cost of the local population (Amanor, 2012,
for Ghana; Wisborg, 2012, for Ghana; Schoneveld et al., 2011, for Ghana; Cotula et al., 2009; 
von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009).
Although risks are high and institutional environments are challenging, large-scale investment 
in agricultural land may – if well-designed – be a means to close yield gaps after decades of 
neglect of agriculture in developing countries (HLPE, 2011; World Bank, 2008; Bruinsma, 
2003). It is therefore worth learning from the experience of a country like Ghana that aims to 
maximize welfare. The aim of our study was to investigate whether contract farming can 
forge a sustainable link between the local population and an investor. 
Whether outgrower schemes2 can simultaneously enable an investor to benefit from local land 
resources and small-scale farmers to commercialize their agricultural production is subject to 
debate. Some researchers point to increased efficiency as a result of overcoming rural market 
imperfections (e.g. Saenger et al., 2013; Bellemare, 2012; Minten et al., 2009; Simmons et al., 
2005); others point to increased vulnerability because of one-sided risk transfers from the 
investor to the farmers (e.g. Yaro and Tsikata, 2013; Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi, 2008; Porter 
and Phillips-Howard, 1997; Little and Watts, 1994). As Narayanan (2014) shows, the effects
of outgrower schemes vary according to the contracted commodity and the contracting 
company. It is thus inappropriate to generalize. Our study looked at potentially beneficial 
                                                          
2 The terms ‘contract farming’ and ‘outgrower scheme’ are used interchangeably in this study. 
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contract farming in a competitive setting where the investor has an excess demand due to 
large production capacities and offers long-term contracts for tree crop production to rural 
households whose land rights remain untouched.
Our study benefits from a setting in which contracts were allocated in a quasi-natural 
experiment where farmers did not influence their assignment to the treatment (contract 
farmer) or the control group (independent farmer) (see DiNardo, 2008, for a discussion on 
quasi-natural experiments). Our analysis therefore does not suffer from reverse causality 
problems and biases caused by unobserved differences between treatment and control group.
This enables us to estimate the causal effect of contract farming and go beyond a number of 
studies that fail to eliminate possible selection bias with regard to famers’ attitudes, 
geographical placement, and the selection criteria applied by the company, as highlighted by 
Barrett et al. (2012). Our study complements a recent strand of literature addressing possibly 
unobserved ex-ante heterogeneity, such as Dedehouanou et al. (2013), Bellemare (2012), Rao 
and Qaim (2011), Ashraf et al. (2009), Minten et al. (2009), and Miyata et al. (2009).
Considering various transmission channels of contract farming, we complement household-
level measures of asset endowment and agricultural income with plot-level measures of profit 
per acre. Household data enables us to capture the overall effect, including potential spillover
effects; for example, knowledge transfer may improve agricultural income from non-
contracted plots when outgrowers switch to new agricultural techniques, and access to credit 
may foster outgrowers’ investment beyond oil palm production and in turn enhance their asset 
endowment. Plot data enables us to emphasize direct productivity effects; for example,
contracted plots may increase profits because of quality inputs supplied by the investor or 
decrease profits because of principal-agent problems since the investor cannot completely 
monitor the outgrower’s effort on the contracted plot. 
To gain a more comprehensive picture, we add a subjective well-being measure to these 
objective outcome variables (MacKerron, 2012; Frey et al., 2002). Following Cummins’s
(1996) ‘domains of life satisfaction’ approach, we draw on satisfaction with future security 
and use subjective well-being as a proxy for self-assessed utility (Krueger and Schkade, 
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2008).3 This enables us to analyze the risk-reducing effects of contract farming that cannot be 
assessed using conventional monetary outcome variables (Dedehouanou et al., 2013). 
We go beyond Dedehouanou et al. (2013), who were the first to relate contract farming to 
subjective well-being when analyzing overall life satisfaction. Although they point to various 
transmission channels linking contract farming to subjective well-being (e.g. income and 
productivity effects, security aspects, or health and work-related conditions), their outcome 
variable ‘overall life satisfaction’ does not make it possible to differentiate between these 
channels. In contrast, with our measure of perceived future security, we detach the security 
aspects of contract farming from income, productivity, and wealth effects, which we assess
separately.
Finally, by using multiple outcome variables, we differentiate between flow and stock 
measures (Grootaert, 1983; Sahn and Stifel, 2003). Whereas the former capture short-term 
effects, which are often highly volatile, such as agricultural income or profit per acre, the 
latter assess more stable long-term impacts such as asset endowment and perceived future 
security. 
We find that holding an outgrower contract has a significantly positive effect on the 
household’s asset endowment and the perceived future security of the household head. Thus, 
contract farming improves households’ welfare and performs a risk-reducing function in rural 
areas where markets are often imperfect and social safety nets underdeveloped. This is in line 
with research by Huddleston (2006), who describes beneficial effects of contract farming for 
oil palm farmers in Ghana and Indonesia, and Pagliettie and Sabrie (2012), who describe 
positive effects for rubber and sorghum outgrower schemes in Ghana. Nonetheless, our 
analyses show that being an outgrower has a significantly negative effect on a household’s 
agricultural income and the oil palm profit on contracted plots. Similarly, besides some
positive effects, Pagliettie and Sabrie (2012) also identify inefficiencies in sorghum 
production under contract. However, given our finding that outgrowers are significantly more 
likely to engage in non-farm business, this poor performance might be caused by effort 
substitution. In this regard, our case study provides empirical evidence of a fairly beneficial 
connection between a large-scale investor in agricultural land and the surrounding local 
population. 
                                                          
3 Cummins (1996) identifies eight domains of life satisfaction: standard of living, personal health, life 
achievement, future security, personal relationships, personal safety, community connectedness, and 
spirituality/religion.
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In our study we show that various bundles of property rights to land have a positive effect on 
agricultural income, plot profit per acre, and perceived future security. This is in line with 
analyses of monetary outcome variables by Abdulai et al. (2011), Goldstein and Udry (2008), 
and Besely (1995), who show the importance of property rights given the weak land 
administration system in Ghana, and with the findings of Gobien (2014), van Landeghem et 
al. (2013), and Huq et al. (2007), who show for Cambodia, Moldova, and Bangladesh 
respectively a positive relationship between landownership and measures of subjective well-
being. Our study’s additional contribution is that it shows the importance of secure property 
rights for local land users adjacent to a large-scale investment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives hypotheses about 
possible effects of contract farming and property rights to land; Section 3 provides 
background information on the oil palm investment and argues that the implementation of the 
outgrower scheme occurred as a quasi-natural experiment; Section 4, the empirical analysis, 
presents an overview of our data and first descriptive analyses, introduces the estimation 
strategy, and provides estimation results and the associated robustness tests; and Section 5 
concludes.
2. Possible effects of contract farming and property rights
In general, the term “contract farming” comprises institutional arrangements that formalize a
farmer’s supply of a contracted commodity to a processing or retailing company (Grosh, 
1994). Many studies find positive outcomes of this kind of farming. For example, they find 
that it helps participants to overcome various market shortages, be better integrated into the 
value chain, earn higher (agricultural) income, and be more productive (e.g. Bellemare, 2012, 
for Madagascar, Escobal and Cavero, 2012, for Peru; Rao and Qaim, 2011, for Kenya; Miyata 
et al., 2009, for China; Simmons et al., 2005, for Indonesia; Warning and Key, 2002, for 
Senegal). By facilitating access to credit, high value inputs, and better extension services than 
are usually provided in rural areas, outgrower schemes can enhance investment and efficiency 
(e.g. Begum et al., 2012, for Bangladesh; Key and Runsten, 1999, for Mexico; Glover, 1984,
for less developed countries). In addition, contract farming can produce positive spillover 
effects for non-contracted crops and for neighboring farmers who do not hold a contract (e.g. 
Bellemare, 2012, for Madagascar; Govereh and Jayne, 2003, for Zimbabwe; Warning and 
Key, 2002, for Senegal). When outgrowers invest more, and over a longer period, than they 
would if they were independent farmers, and at the same time use their resources more 
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efficiently, they can accumulate extra wealth from higher returns to investment. Thus, 
participation in an outgrower scheme may also have a positive influence on households’ 
aggregated assets.
Beyond lowering transaction costs, contract farming is often associated with risk sharing (e.g. 
Key and Runsten, 1999 for Mexico) and can therefore have a positive effect on perceived 
future security. By enabling households to secure the sales of their produce regardless of peak 
and lean seasons, it decreases price and income volatility (e.g. Michelson et al., 2012 for 
Nicaragua, Bolwig et al., 2009 for Uganda; Minten et al., 2009 for Madagascar). Agricultural 
extension service by the contracting firm may result in improved management practices,
which in turn produce higher self-esteem (Dedehouanou et al., 2013 for Senegal). When such 
a positive change in attitude contributes to a better social standing, it may enhance 
outgrowers’ access to social safety nets and thus have an additional positive influence on their 
perceived future security. 
Many other researchers, however, find negative outcomes. They observe that contract farming 
can lead to risk transfers from companies to farmers and thus increase the already very 
unequal power relations (e.g. Singh, 2002, for India; Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997, for 
Nigeria and South Africa; Little and Watts, 1994, for sub-Saharan Africa). This not only 
decreases farmers’ autonomy, it also increases their vulnerability because of their heavy 
dependence on the contracted crop (e.g. Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002, for developing countries; 
Key and Runsten, 1999, for Mexico; Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997, for Nigeria and South 
Africa). When a company secures only its own risks in such a setting, there is a strong 
probability that outgrowers’ perceived future security and agricultural income will decrease. 
There is also a risk of hold-ups when processors, especially exporters, reject produce on the 
grounds of non-compliance with quality standards (e.g. Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi, 2008, for 
India). This can decrease outgrowers’ agricultural income and in the long run also their asset 
endowment when they have to dispose of assets to mitigate income shocks.4
However, the negative effects of outgrower schemes may be caused not solely by the 
contracting company but also by the farmers. This can be explained by the principal-agent 
problem that is inherent to contract farming (Lajili et al., 1997). Because of time restrictions 
                                                          
4 Further negative effects have also been found: higher pressure and increased workloads can reduce farmers’ 
subjective well-being (Dedehouanou, 2013), companies may extract maximal rents at the cost of the outgrowers, 
and the poorest farmers may be excluded from participation (Key and Runsten, 1999, for Mexico), rural social 
differentiation may be increased (e.g. Escobal and Cavero, 2012, for Peru; Singh, 2002, for India; White, 1997,
for Indonesia), and the local political ecology may be ignored (Yaro and Tsikata, 2013, for Ghana).
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and high monitoring costs, the principal (the company) is unable to fully monitor the agent 
(the outgrower). This opens the door to a moral hazard problem, where outgrowers may 
exploit the asymmetric information for their own benefit. Instead of following the intention of 
the contract and maximizing the outcome of the contracted plot, farmers may relocate inputs 
and effort to other plots or other tasks, resulting in a lower plot profit per acre and in turn
possibly decreasing agricultural income.
In our particular setting the contract does not specify special quality standards, thus hold-up 
risks are expected to be low. This seems to be especially the case as the contracted crop is also 
traded at local markets, which can provide alternative sales channels and enhance outgrowers’ 
bargaining power. Given that the investor, the company that buys the produce and does the 
processing, has underutilized production capacity and thus an excess demand, it is unlikely to 
breach contract on its side.5 Outgrowers, furthermore, cultivate multiple plots with various 
commodities; we therefore expect that they are not heavily dependent on the contracted crop. 
Consequently, we assume for our setting that the positive effects of outgrower schemes 
outweigh the negatives and suggest the following hypothesis: 
Contract farming has a positive effect on asset endowment, perceived future security,
agricultural income, and profit per acre. 
With the establishment of a large-scale agricultural investment, land availability in the area 
declines and, with the increased pressure on the remaining resources, tenure security becomes 
of utmost importance. Many studies show that secure property rights to land provide 
incentives for long-term investment as they guarantee that future profits return to the 
landowner (e.g. Ali et al., 2012, for Pakistan; Ali et al., 2011, for Ethiopia; Abdulai et al., 
2011, for Ghana; Fenske, 2011, for West Africa; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2010, for 
Argentina; Deininger and Feder, 2009, on a general matter; Holden et al., 2009, for Ethiopia; 
Goldstein and Udry, 2008, for Ghana; Place and Otsuka, 2001, for Malawi; Gavian and 
                                                          
5 Our study took advantage of the structure of Ghana’s underfinanced oil palm sector. Since the 1970s, when 
government-backed investment was based on land expropriation by the military government, four large-scale 
investments, now privatized, have dominated the sector. The rest of the sector consists of thousands of small-
scale farmers cultivating roughly 85% of the estimated 285,000 ha of oil palm plantations (Poku and Asante, 
2008). Because the capacity of the large-scale mills is larger than the big players’ plantations can supply,
investors are forced to obtain additional oil palm fruit (Fold, 2008). But as landownership in Ghana is 
fragmented among various chieftaincies, families, and individuals with rather low willingness to lease land on a 
long-term basis to foreigners (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001), it is rarely possible to acquire more land to convert
into large-scale oil palm plantations. The investors have therefore been forced to link up with small-scale 
farmers. With government initiative and donor support, this has led over the past three decades to contract 
farming being implemented as a rather new rural institution, with the investors’ aim being to run their mills 
efficiently and the public’s aim being to close the persistent yield gap between large-scale plantations and small 
landholdings.
9 
 
Fafchamps, 1996, for Niger; Besley, 1995, for Ghana). Thus, property rights to land increase 
the productive use of land resources (e.g. Bellemare, 2013, for Madagascar; Chand and Yala, 
2009, for Papua New Guinea; Holden et al., 2009, for Ethiopia; Goldstein and Udry, 2008, for 
Ghana; Deininger and Jin, 2006, for Ethiopia; Banerjee et al., 2002, for India) and in turn 
enable landowners to transfer effort from agricultural activities and property protection to 
non-farm business or the labor market (Field, 2007). Thus, secure land rights can translate 
into higher profit per acre and higher agricultural income. Apart from efficiency gains through 
higher productivity, clearly defined property rights also facilitate land sales and rentals, which 
increase factor mobility and, in turn, allocation efficiency (Deininger and Chamorro, 2004, for 
Nicaragua, Besley, 1995, for Ghana). 
Secure property rights to land can also serve as collateral, which facilitates access to credit 
(Carter and Olinto, 2003, for Paraguay; Feder and Nishio, 1998, for Thailand; Feder and 
Onchan, 1987, for Thailand) and enhances a landowner’s position in social networks 
(Binswanger et al., 1995). These rights thus increase food security by enhancing a
landowner’s ability to cope with shocks (Deininger, 2003) and, by reducing exposure to risks,
should have a positive effect on perceived future security. However some studies point out 
that perceived tenure security is often more crucial than registered property rights (Awuah and 
Hammond, 2013; Abdulai, 2006; Dekker, 2003).6 Therefore, our second hypothesis is:
Perceived secure property rights to land have a positive effect on perceived future 
security, agricultural income, and profit per acre.
3. Research setting
3.1 Contract farming as a quasi-natural experiment
In 1976 the Ghana Oil Palm Development Company (GOPDC) was established as a state-
owned company in the Kwaebibirem District of the Eastern Region in order to expand the oil 
palm business and foster development in this remote area (Adjei-Nsiah et al., 2012; Fold and 
Whitfield, 2012; Fold, 2008; Huddleston and Tonts, 2007; Huddleston, 2004). Today it is the 
biggest palm oil producer in Ghana and the biggest employer in its district. In 1995, the 
                                                          
6 This is in line with findings by Abdulai and Hammond (2010), for Ghana, that land registration is not a 
prerequisite for obtaining formal loans and Jacoby and Minten (2007), for Madagascar, that land titles do not 
result in higher investment.
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Belgian investor Société d’Investissement pour l’Agriculture Tropicale (SIAT) took over the 
majority shares of the company (GOPDC, 2013; SIAT, 2013). In the course of privatization
the state transferred a 50-year leasehold (as of 1976) for the Kwae Concession directly to the 
investor. This concession comprises 8,953 ha including the land containing the mill and
housing structures (Republic of Ghana, 1976). In 2000 a second 50-year leasehold, the 
5,205 ha Okumaning Concession, was transferred to GOPDC to expand its oil palm 
plantations (Republic of Ghana, 2008).7
Complementary to the plantation system, an outgrower scheme was established in 1986 as a 
World Bank-supported development project with the twofold aim of running the mill in an 
economically efficient manner and integrating the local population into the economy by
recruiting as many outgrowers as possible from a broad pool of rural farmers (World Bank, 
1994; interview with Lands Commission senior official; interview with GOPDC senior 
manager)8. Expert interviews and focus group discussions revealed that the outgrower scheme 
had been expanded in waves over the years.9 This expansion did not follow a clear pattern but 
came about arbitrarily as a consequence of the differing financial status and changing policies 
of various GOPDC managements. When a decision had been made as to the time and extent 
of an expansion, the management would then select the area where it would be put into effect.
Each particular expansion wave was thereby strictly limited to a demarcated area to keep 
transaction costs low for inspecting potentially suitable farms, carrying out training activities,
and later collecting the fruit (interview with GOPDC senior manager). It was thus impossible 
to anticipate where – if at all – to expect the next extension wave. Hence, because the pace, 
scope, and sites of expansion were unpredictable, farmers could not migrate strategically in 
order to self-select into the scheme. 
                                                          
7 For more details on GOPDC please refer to Väth (2013).
8 Our quantitative database was enriched by semi-structured expert interviews conducted in the Kwaebibirem 
District and Accra in October and November 2011. Due to the sensitiveness of the topic, interviews were not 
recorded. To guarantee the anonymity of the interviewees, we reveal their (rough) position and organization but 
not their names.
9 We also conducted focus group discussions from September to November 2011 with groups of independent 
farmers and outgrowers in the Kwaebibirem District. They were conducted in the local languages Twi and Fante, 
recorded and transcribed in English. Between 7 and 15 participants per group were selected according to 
perceived wealth levels.
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The company offered a contract at short notice to those farmers who had a ready-to-cultivate 
plot in a specific area at a specific time (interviews with GOPDC senior managers; interview
with outgrower association executives).10 Farmers considered themselves lucky to get a one-
time offer by the time their plots were cleared. They had the option to refuse the offer but,
according to interviews with the executives of the outgrower association and focus group 
discussions with farmers, the rejection rate was as good as zero. According to Fold (2008) and 
Huddleston (2006), farmers were keen to access credit and technology and were motivated to 
sign a contract.
However, farmers were only eligible to participate if they could prove secure land use rights 
for a period of 25 years by holding either documented property rights or a long-term 
sharecropping arrangement (GOPDC, n.d.). Given the weak land administration system in 
Ghana, deed registration is poor in rural areas and titles to verify ownership rights are to date 
not available in the Kwaebibirem District. Nevertheless, the predominantly customary land 
tenure system of the Akyem area around GOPDC proved to be dynamic and partially filled 
this gap (Amanor, 1999; Gyasi, 1994) as family heads and chiefs began to document 
customary rights upon request and for a small fee. This enabled landowning farmers to enter 
into an outgrower contract with a kind of “informal deed” (GOPDC, n.d.). The cocoa industry
of the late 19th century had made long-term sharecropping arrangements common in Akyem 
(Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001; Amanor, 1999; Gyasi, 1994). 11 GOPDC therefore also
offered tripartite contracts to farmers who had held a sharecropping agreement for at least 25 
years. Such contracts were similar to those offered to farmers possessing customary 
ownership except that the landlord had to agree by signing the contract (GOPDC, n.d.).
Independent oil palm farmers also rely on long-term land use rights. Given the high 
investment costs and the late break-even point around the seventh year after planting (Poku 
and Asante, 2008), they only grow oil palm if they hold customary ownership or long-term
sharecropping arrangements that are expected to guarantee usufruct rights. As the poorest are 
unlikely to possess secure land rights for a long period and to be able to afford high 
                                                          
10 A ready-to-cultivate plot is one that is not currently under cultivation. Farmers in our research area typically 
cultivate various plots with food (maize, plantain, cocoyam, cassava etc.) and cash crops (cacao, citrus and oil 
palm) that can be partly intercropped (interview with Ministry of Food and Agriculture official). Given the 
different crop cycles over multiple farms and periods under fallow, rural households have from time to time a
ready-to-cultivate plot available.
11 As has been shown for other parts of the world (Otsuka et al., 1992), sharecropping is a flexible instrument for 
improving allocation efficiency of land and labour resources as a reaction to land pressure caused by the 
establishment of plantations and population growth. Thus, sharecropping arrangements tend to be as important as 
customary claims for assessing long-term land use rights.
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investment costs, they are unable to engage in any kind of commercial oil palm farming. 
Watts (1994) confirms that the poorest do not participate in GOPDC’s outgrower scheme.
Given this exclusion, which is caused by the nature of the crop and thus also pertains to 
independent oil palm farmers, the poorest do not belong to the population under consideration 
in our study and thus cannot cause any bias.
Furthermore, GOPDC did not apply selection criteria specific to the characteristics of the plot.
Interviews with two managers revealed that the company merely organized a short farm visit 
to confirm that the potential land for the scheme was low land. Low land is not intrinsically of 
better quality than high land, but it is more suitable for oil palm cultivation, and Ghanaian 
farmers have long balanced their needs for low and high land for various crops through 
sharecropping arrangements (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001; Gyasi, 1994). Thus, the visit can 
be understood as a pro forma measure. This holds true especially as technical suitability such 
as the soil fertility or rainfall patterns of the plots under consideration were also not assessed
because of measurement costs and the desire to expand the outgrower scheme quickly to run 
the mill efficiently (interviews with GOPDC senior managers). Moreover, neither the 
outgrower association executives nor GOPDC’s staff reported that the criterion of 
accessibility played a role. Even though it was at first declared that a plot should not be more 
than 400 meters from an accessible road (GOPDC, n.d.), the underdeveloped road system 
allowed for a completely arbitrary definition of accessibility. Thus, differences in the 
performance of independently managed plots and outgrower plots are not caused by 
GOPDC’s plot selection criteria, because these criteria were either common knowledge (and 
therefore applied without the help of GOPDC) or only existed on paper (and thus were not 
enforced).
Another set of selection criteria was supposed to be used to assess individual characteristics.
Originally, GOPDC intended to target Ghanaian nationals aged 18 to 45, but Huddleston’s
data (2006) reveals that the age criterion was not implemented. This was confirmed in
interviews with two outgrower association executives and three GOPDC managers. We did 
not find any evidence that GOPDC tried to assess personal or socio-economic characteristics. 
Hence, differences in the performance of farmers with and without contract are not based on 
selection bias according to individual characteristics. We can therefore claim that contracts 
were allocated in a quasi-natural experiment.
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3.2 The status quo
At the time of data collection 7,279 outgrowers were linked to GOPDC. They are obliged to 
sell all oil palm fruit from the contracted plot to the company, which, in turn, pays them 
according to a formula based on the world market price for crude palm oil. The outgrower 
provides the land and the labor force, and GOPDC provides inputs, credit, and extension 
services (GOPDC, n.d.; interview with GOPDC manager; interview with outgrower 
association executives; focus group discussion with outgrowers).
In addition to the outgrower scheme, GOPDC also makes third party purchases to utilize its
production capacities. Within a 30 km radius of the company’s oil palm mill some 3,000 
independent farmers decide on the spot whether they will sell their produce to GOPDC or the 
local market (interview with Ministry of Food and Agriculture official). Although the investor 
and the local economy compete at input markets, their output markets are distinct (Poku and 
Asante, 2008). Thus, they are able to pay different prices for oil palm fruit. As GOPDC pays 
according to world market prices, it tends to pay more than the local market during the peak 
season. This is because the Ghanaian market is too small to affect the world market. In 
contrast, when oil palm fruit is scarce the domestic market is more attractive as local 
competition for the fruit increases prices for farmers. While GOPDC manufactures
standardized palm oil for industrial purposes, small-scale mills in the area produce the locally 
demanded red cooking oil, which cannot be manufactured by the investor (Osei-Amponsah et 
al., 2012). Consequently, the company is constantly under pressure to deal with problems with 
the local population, in order to guarantee a sufficient delivery of oil palm fruit.
Besides the independent farmers who are free to sell to anyone, outgrower farmers also tend 
to sell to local markets (Fold and Whitfield, 2012; Fold, 2008). They are likely to breach 
contracts if they feel unfairly treated by the company. To prevent such side-selling, GOPDC 
can improve its relations with the local population by acting as a good corporate citizen or by 
competing with the market women and the surrounding small mills for higher oil palm fruit 
prices. To take legal action against outgrowers seems to be no comprehensive solution, as 
transaction costs are high given Ghana’s slow and costly jurisdiction (interviews with
GOPDC senior managers).
In the past the company sometimes coped by making more investments in infrastructure such 
as roads, electricity poles, boreholes, educational institutions, and medical clinics, and 
sometimes by carrying out fewer social responsibility activities and instead offering farmers 
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higher prices (interviews with GOPDC senior managers; focus group discussion with 
outgrowers; Väth, 2013). Considering the conflict-sensitive and at the same time highly 
competitive environment, it has not yet been possible to forge stable links between the 
investor and the local population. There is always a danger of dissension being caused by 
common daily operational difficulties such as changing price policies, reduced absorption 
capacity of the mill due to repairs, or delay of payments due to force majeure (interviews with 
GOPDC senior managers). Nevertheless, there is more potential for satisfying the needs of 
both the investor and the local population in a dynamic environment like that of our study 
area than in a context where a monopolistic company has the power to dictate its conditions to 
contract farmers. 
4. Empirical analysis
4.1 Data and descriptive statistics
Our quantitative analysis is based on a household survey (N= 824) conducted from October to
December 2010 within a 30 km radius of the mill. Access to the company’s database enabled 
us to draw a random sample (confidence level: 95%, confidence interval: 5). We interviewed
436 outgrowers, spread across 47 villages, out of a total population of 7,279 households (see 
Table 1). 
Table 1
Populations and sampling
Contractual arrangement Population size Sample size
Outgrowers 7,279 436
Independent farmers XQNQRZQ§,000 388
Observations § 824
Note: Outgrowers based on random sampling; independent farmers based on two-stage sampling with 
community size as stratum and clustering at village level.
We also interviewed 388 independent farmers out of an estimated population of 3,000 
households, sampled in a two-stage selection process. Village size served as a stratum to 
sample proportionally 25 of these 47 communities. In small villages (<1,000 inhabitants) we 
interviewed all the independent oil palm farmers. In medium (>1,000–5,000 inhabitants) and 
large villages (>5,000 inhabitants) we applied a second-stage cluster sampling. We excluded 
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migrant farmers who had been in the catchment area less than 24 years – since the 
introduction of the outgrower scheme – to avoid biases through migration effects. 
We follow Johnson et al. (1990) in generating the outcome variables aggregated assets (i.e. 
equipment, appliances, houses and land owned by a household) and household’s agricultural 
income per year. To assess productivity effects, we generate the profit per acre as an 
additional outcome variable. 
We modify our sample towards a plot level data set (N= 761), to capture the fact that 
households typically cultivate several plots (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). A household 
may cultivate oil palm independently on its plots, while at the same time having other plots 
under contract. This is the case for more than 90% of households in our sample. Besides oil 
palm, households cultivate other cash crops (i.e. cocoa and citrus) and food crops on separate 
plots. Our sample comprised only oil palm plots with trees that were at least four years old, to 
ensure that crop production had already begun. Plots with other crops were excluded from the 
plot level analysis. We included only plots belonging to farmers who sell their produce per 
kilogram, to avoid measurement errors when calculating profits for those who sell per bunch.
We follow the Cook’s Distance criterion to eliminate outliers that might distort our analysis.
Thus, we distinguish between plots under outgrower contract and independent oil palm plots 
without any contractual arrangements. 
Following Cummins (1996), we take household head’s perceived future security as an 
additional dependent variable to complement mainstream economic measures with a measure 
of subjective well-being. On a scale of 0 to 10, 0 represents a very low and 10 a very high 
interviewee satisfaction with future security. Table 2 summarizes medians of these outcome 
variables with regard to contractual arrangement.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of outcome variables at household level (medians)
OUTCOME Data Observ. Medians (sd) Diff. in 
VARIABLES Outgrowers Independent farmers medians
Aggregated assets HH level 824 1,126 (24,274) 732 (3,673) ***
Perceived future security HH level 824 7 (2.221) 5 (1.967) ***
Agricultural income per year HH level 824 8,660 (50,119) 9,340 (92,524) *
Output per acre per year Plot level 761 721 (815) 930 (741) ***
Note: As all outcome variables are strongly skewed to the right, medians are more informative than means. 
Currency is Ghana cedi (exchange rate 1 October 2010: 1 GHS = 0.70 USD). Differences in medians according 
to Wilcoxon’s rank sum test.
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Wilcoxon’s rank sum tests show that outgrowers report significantly higher values than
independent farmers for aggregated assets (1,126 vs 732 GHS) and perceived future security 
(7 vs 5). This is in line with Väth’s (2013) qualitative analysis of focus group discussions,
which shows improved asset endowment and credit access for outgrowers. In contrast, 
independent farmers outdo outgrowers with regard to household’s agricultural income (8,660
vs 9,340 GHS) and oil palm profit per acre (721 vs 930 GHS). This is rather surprising in 
view of Huddleston’s (2006) finding that outgrowers realize higher incomes and Väth’s
(2013) finding that outgrowers apply new agricultural technologies and techniques.
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of independent variables (means)
Means (sd) Diff. in 
CATEGORIES VARIABLES Outgrowers Independent farmers means
(436) (388)
Land-related Own land (in acres) 6.202 12.81 4.821 5.519 **
characteristics Land under cultivation (in acres) 17.27 10.47 9.410 5.794 ***
% of land with right to sell and 
use as collateral
0.251 0.364 0.453 0.460 ***
% of land with right to use as 
collateral 
0.0520 0.186 0.0880 0.245 *
Sharecropping factor 1/3 for 
landlord (plot level)
0.712 0.453 0.426 0.495 ***
Sharecropping factor 1/2 for 
landlord (plot level)
0.0200 0.140 0.0236 0.152
Average plot size (in acre) 4.657 2.795 5.273 3.062 ***
Minutes to walk to plot 51.18 42.62 50.08 28.08 *
Oil palm Age of trees (plot level) 13.12 5.719 9.411 4.262 ***
specifics Number of prunings 1.284 0.608 1.059 0.517 ***
Number of fertilizer applications 0.158 0.465 0.0928 0.672 ***
Use of a cover crop 0.963 0.188 0.845 0.362 ***
Improved techniques dummy 0.328 0.470 0.131 0.388 ***
Labor Use of hired labor 0.956 0.204 0.912 0.283 **
characteristics Use of household labor 0.683 0.466 0.611 0.488 **
1st occupation not in agriculture 0.0413 0.1991 0.0850 0.2793 ***
Head: absences > 6 months/yr 0.0573 0.233 0.106 0.308 **
Household number 6.041 2.844 4.054 2.091 ***
Security Taken a loan within last year 0.179 0.384 0.0567 0.232 ***
Member of a self-help group 0.360 0.481 0.294 0.456 **
Socio- Age of head 52.86 10.86 47.66 12.92 ***
demographic Female-headed household 0.112 0.316 0.0773 0.267 *
characteristics Years of schooling of head 8.362 0.223 7.193 0.229
Head is married 0.826 0.380 0.814 0.389
Household is not Akan 0.255 0.436 0.258 0.438
Village level Large village (>5,000) 0.255 0.436 0.232 0.423
characteristics Small village(>1,000) 0.294 0.456 0.289 0.454
Traditional area: Bosome 0.0229 0.150 0.0387 0.193
Traditional area: Kotoku 0.463 0.499 0.407 0.492
Note: Sample contains only household heads; significance levels at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; for 
dummies: yes = 1, no = 0, for percentages: values within a range from 0-1; dummy for improved techniques = 1 
if household uses cover crops, applies fertilizer at least once a year, and prunes at least twice a year; two sample 
tests of proportions for dummies, otherwise Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are applied.
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An overview of different sets of independent variables such as land-related characteristics, oil 
palm specifics, labor characteristics, access to security mechanisms, household and individual 
level socio-demographics, and village characteristics is presented in Table 3.
Outgrowers and independent farmers are quite similar with regard to time-invariant socio-
demographic and village level characteristics. Other control variables differ considerably,
which might be a consequence of different development paths induced by the length of time 
the contract has been held. In particular, outgrowers own larger areas of land and have more 
land under cultivation than independent farmers. Descriptive analysis reveals that roughly 
75% of their non-contracted plots were acquired after they became outgrowers. Independent 
farmers have to invest more money to establish oil palm plots than outgrowers do and they 
have to build savings to mitigate shocks. Outgrowers invest less because they receive 
subsidized inputs and credit from GOPDC, and they can mitigate shocks by accessing
additional land or accumulating productive assets such as a chainsaw or a vehicle.
4.2 Estimation strategy
Our data from a quasi-natural experiment enables us to run various OLS regressions for the
outcome variables: logged aggregated assets (y1), perceived future security (y2), 12 logged
agricultural income (y3), and logged plot profit per acre (y4). We thus focus on the effect of 
holding an outgrower contract (x1) and the effect of different bundles of property rights to 
land (x2 and x3).
We identify the effect of an outgrower contract in three ways. We start our sets of estimations 
with an outgrower dummy for households holding at least one plot under contract, then in a 
second step replace it with the logged size of the land under contract, and finally in a third 
step replace it with the number of years a household has held a contract. This enables us to 
capture the effect of holding a contract from different angles. The dummy variable tests for an 
on/off effect of contract farming independently of the size of the land under contract, whereas 
the logged size of the land under contract tests for size effects in association with economies 
of scale (assuming that a percentage increase in the size of land under contract has a constant 
effect), and the number of years a household has held a contract tests for time effects
(assuming that experience matters).
                                                          
12 Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) find that ordinal and cardinal treatments of subjective well-being 
variables produce similar results. However, as a robustness check we complement our OLS estimates with
logistic regressions.
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With regard to property rights to land, we distinguish between two bundles of rights. This 
enables us to capture varying qualities of customary land rights when it comes to mortgage 
and disposal. The lack of clearly documented land rights in Ghana obliged us to use reported 
rights instead of registered deeds. At the plot level we differentiate between plots with the 
right to sell them and to use them as collateral (x2) and plots with the right to use them as 
collateral only (x3) (both measured as dummies). At household level we stick to these
categories, but since households cultivate several plots, each of which might be associated 
with a different bundle of property rights, we calculate (x2) and (x3) as percentages of the total 
amount of land owned and convert them into a scale of 0 to 1. These proxies enable us to 
estimate the effects of property rights at plot and household level. Even though, we cannot 
ensure that property rights to land are exogenous and are therefore unable to estimate a causal 
effect, correlations might give us a hint on their importance.13
In a first step, we estimate the net effects of holding a contract when controlling for
exogenous time-invariant socio-demographic and village level characteristics. In a second 
step, we introduce the two bundles of property rights and further controls for land-related 
variables, oil palm specifics, access to security mechanisms, labor characteristics, and 
productive assets. Thus, our estimation strategy follows the general model:
y1-4  ȕ0 ȕ1 x1 ȕ2 x2ȕ3 x3ȕ4 c1 ȕ3+r cr İ
with r>1
y1 = aggregated assets (log)
y2 = perceived future security
y3 = agricultural income (log)
y4 = profit per acre (log)
ȕ0 = constant 
ȕ1 - 3+r = parameters related to the corresponding individual variables 
x1 = outgrower dummy (alternatively: size of land under contract (log) or duration of 
contract in years)
x2 = % of land with the right to sell it and to use it as collateral (for plot level: dummy)
x3 = % of land with the right to use it as collateral (for plot level: dummy)
c = control variables for land-related characteristics (not applicable for y1) oil palm 
specifics, labor characteristics, access to security mechanisms, socio-demographics, 
and village level characteristics
İ = error term
                                                          
13 We assume that the bundles of property rights to land are more important than sharecropping. Nevertheless, 
we control for sharecropping factors at plot level.
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For estimations at household level standard errors are clustered at village level, whereas plot 
level data is clustered at household level.14 In a second step, we limit our plot level analysis to 
independently managed plots. This enables us to compare the productivity of outgrowers and 
independent farmers on plots that are free from GOPDC’s sphere of direct influence and thus 
identify possible spillover effects.
Finally, we calculate the probability of outgrowers being engaged in a non-farm business by 
using the following logistic regression model:
ߨ(ݔ) = ݁
ఉబ ାఉభ௫భାఉమ௖భା...ାఉయశೝ௖ೝାఌ
1 + ݁ఉబ ାఉభ௫భାఉమ௖భା...ାఉయశೝ௖ೝାఌ
with r>1
ߨ(ݔ) = probability of being engaged in a non-farm business
ȕ0 = constant 
ȕ1 - 3+r =parameters related to the corresponding individual variables 
x1 = outgrower dummy (alternatively: size of land under contract or duration of 
contract in years)
c = control variables for land-related characteristics, oil palm specifics, labor 
characteristics, access to security mechanisms, socio-demographics, and village level 
characteristics
İ = error term
We thus investigate whether holding an outgrower contract encourages households to engage 
in income generating activities beyond agriculture. Once again, we differentiate between the
net effect (controlling for socio-demographic and village level characteristics only) and the
effects when including additional controls.
4.3 Results
As Table 4 shows, we find that participating in the outgrower scheme has a highly significant
and positive effect on household’s aggregated assets (models 1, 2, 3, and 4). When controlling 
for exogenous socio-demographic and village level characteristics, holding an outgrower 
contract leads to a 41.4% increase in households’ aggregated assets (model 1). When we add 
additional control variables, this effect remains highly significant and there is a similar 
increase (40.5%) in the household’s aggregated assets (model 2). The positive effect is 
confirmed when we replace the outgrower dummy with the continuous variables logged 
                                                          
14 Alternatively, we estimate our models with sample weights and linearized standard errors and find similar
results.
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acreage of land under contract and years of holding a contract (models 3 and 4). Doubling the 
size of the contracted land increases aggregated assets by 5.3% (model 3), and one additional 
year of holding a contract results in a 2.0% increase (model 4). As both coefficients are quite 
low, we expect the on/off effect of outgrower contracts to be more important than size- and 
time-related effects.
In the subsequent models we therefore focus on the outgrower dummy, which might capture 
the effect of contract farming best from a content-based perspective. Nevertheless, for all the 
models in the remainder of this paper, our results hold when replacing the outgrower dummy 
with the size of contracted land and the number of years of holding a contract. The same holds 
true for estimating the net effects instead of controlling for a wide range of variables.
Table 4 
Estimations at household level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agg. assets
(log)
Agg. assets
(log)
Agg. assets
(log)
Agg. assets
(log)
Future 
security
Agric. 
income
(log)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Outgrower dummy 0.414*** 0.405*** 2.220*** -0.397***
(0.102) (0.100) (0.216) (0.104)
Size of contract land (log) 0.0532***
(0.0113)
Years of holding contract 0.0204***
(0.00504)
% of land with right to 
sell and use as collateral
0.486* 0.756***
(0.281) (0.170)
% of land with right to 
use as collateral
0.387 0.418**
(0.316) (0.180)
Socio-demographic and 
village characteristics
yes yes Yes yes yes yes
Other controls no yes Yes yes yes yes
Observations 824 824 824 824 824 824
R-squared 0.176 0.192 0.201 0.190 0.218 0.132
Adjusted r-squared 0.164 0.176 0.185 0.174 0.198 0.107
Test of joint significance F(12,46)=
24.87***
F(16,46)= 
26.18***
F(16,46)=
27.17***
F(16,46)=
29.10***
F(20,46)=
20.36***
F(23,46)=
15.63***
Highest variance inflation 
factors (without age and 
age squared)
1.76 2.08 2.08 2.09 3.26 3.28
Ramsey’s RESET test (p-
value)
0.607 0.888 0.508 0.967 0.984 0.241
Note: Clustered standard errors at village level; significance levels at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls 
for labor characteristics, access to security mechanisms, and socio-demographic and village level characteristics 
are reported in Appendix A. Variance inflation factors for age and age squared around 40.
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Model 5 reveals a 2.2 points higher level of perceived future security for outgrowers than for 
independent farmers and thus confirms earlier findings. Given the scale of 0 to 10, this is a 
tremendous positive effect of contract farming. Moreover, the right to sell the land and also to 
use it as collateral has a positive effect on perceived future security but the effect is only 
weakly significant. Thus, the finding that a 100% increase of land with those rights leads to a
0.5 point increase in perceived future security should be treated with caution.15
With regard to households’ agricultural income, model 6 reveals strong and highly significant 
effects of the two bundles of property rights under consideration. We find that 100% of land 
with the right to sell and also to use it as collateral increases households’ agricultural income
by 75.6%, and that 100% of land with the right to use it only as collateral still results in a
41.8% increase (model 6). Thus, our analysis lends support to the idea that even an 
incomplete bundle of property rights is beneficial for households in rural areas where land 
administration systems are weak. In contrast, holding an outgrower contract decreases 
agricultural income by 39.7% (model 6). With a highly significant effect, this result 
contradicts our earlier findings of a beneficial effect for contract farming.
As Table 5 shows, plot level analysis also reveals a negative effect as plots under contract 
show a 27.2% decrease in profit per acre (model 1). To verify whether this effect holds for all 
oil palm plots cultivated by an outgrower household, we limit our subsequent analysis to 
independently managed plots (i.e. we exclude plots under contract). Model 2 reveals that the 
outgrower dummy is insignificant and does not have an effect on independently managed 
plots.16 Thus, contract-holding households are not less productive in general – it is only on 
their plots under contract that they are less productive. In line with Lajili et al. (1997), this can 
be explained by principal-agent problems.
                                                          
15 With regard to subjective well-being measures, we point to a substitutive relationship between contract 
farming and property rights to land, as they expect both to fulfil rural households’ security needs, and thus 
follow Palmer’s (1998) diminishing marginal returns argument.
16 These results also hold when estimating the profit per plot.
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Table 5
Estimations at plot level
(1) (2)
All plots Independent plots
Profit per acre (log) Profit per acre (log)
VARIABLES OLS OLS
Plot under outgrower contract -0.272***
(0.0596)
Outgrower dummy -0.0778
(0.0895)
Right to sell plot and use as collateral 0.423***
(0.102)
Right to use plot as collateral 0.0330
(0.0896)
Socio-demographic and village characteristics yes yes
Land-related and other controls yes no
Observations 761 539
R-squared 0.221 0.04
Adjusted r-squared 0.191 0.02
Test of joint significance F(28,463) = 14.8*** F(12, 273) = 2.22**
Highest variance inflation factors (without age and age squared) 2.20 1.72
Ramsey’s RESET test (p-value) 0.73 0.32
Note: Clustered standard errors at household level; significance levels at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Controls for land-related characteristics, oil palm specifics, labor characteristics, access to security mechanisms,
socio-demographic and village level characteristics are reported in Appendix A. Variance inflation factors for 
age and age squared around 40.
However, with regard to property rights to land, we find that holding a plot with the right to 
sell it and to use it as collateral has a high and significant effect, resulting in a 42.3% increase 
in plot profit per acre in model 1.17 Whereas all our estimations fully support the hypothesis
that secure property rights to land have a positive effect on perceived future security, 
agricultural income, and profit per acre, the contradictory findings for contract farming call 
for further investigation. 
Given that contract farmers’ profit on independently managed plots is similar to that of 
farmers without a contract, we can reason that they divert effort from contracted plots. The 
estimations in Table 6 support this explanation. Whether we estimate the net effect of contract 
farming by controlling only for socio-demographic and village level effects (model 1) or by 
including further control variables (model 2), we find that outgrowers have a significant and 
roughly 10% higher likelihood of engaging in non-farm activities. 
                                                          
17 Given the lack of degrees of freedom, we cannot control for the effect of property rights to land in model 2.
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Table 6 
Estimations of likelihood of engaging in non-farm business at household level
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Logit Logit
Outgrower dummy 0.097*** 0.092***
(0.0330) (0.0380)
Socio-economic and village characteristics yes yes
Land-related and other controls no yes
Observations 824 824
Wald’s chi2 chi2(12) = 88.56*** chi2(22) = 197.09***
Pseudo R-squared 0.054 0.065
Note: Marginal effects are displayed. Clustered standard errors at village level; significance levels at: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls for land-related characteristics, labor characteristics, access to security 
mechanisms, and socio-demographic and village level characteristics are reported in Appendix A.
To sum up: our hypothesis that contract farming has a positive effect holds true for the 
outcome variables aggregated assets and perceived future security, but has to be rejected for 
agricultural income and profit per acre. Despite the interpretation that poor agricultural 
performance is a result of effort substitution, we can nevertheless conclude that contract 
farming is to some extent beneficial for farmers in the vicinity of a large-scale investment.
4.4 Further robustness checks
In Appendix B we provide further robustness tests. The ordered logit model in Table 10 
shows that the positive outgrower effect on perceived future security also holds for a different 
estimation procedure. In Table 11 we complement the estimation of oil palm profit per acre 
(models 1 and 2 in Table 5) with estimations of absolute profit per plot. Our similar results
show that ratio fallacies of spurious correlation induced by indices of a common component 
do not disturb our estimations (Kronmal, 1993). The models in Table 12 are based on the
various models presented in Table 4 and refer to all our dependent variables of interest. To 
avoid possible bias caused by large landowners, we exclude households that own more than 
30 acres from the analysis (what we call ‘extreme’ landowners). The coefficients for the 
outgrower dummy (models 1, 2, 5, and 6), the size of land under contract (model 3), the years 
of holding a contract (model 4), and the two bundles of property rights (model 6) stay 
significant and keep the same sign. Similarly, significance levels and signs for our variables 
of interest hold when we exclude extreme landowners from the earlier plot level analysis 
shown in Table 5 (models 1 and 2 in Table 13).
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In another set of robustness checks, we differentiate between landowning and landless 
households. All the estimations for landowners confirm the earlier results at household level 
(models 1, 3, and 5 in Table 14) and at plot level (model 1 in Table 15). They emphasize that 
the right to sell the land and also to use it as collateral has a positive effect on agricultural 
income and plot profit per acre and that holding an outgrower contract affects aggregated 
assets and perceived future security positively, whereas it has a negative effect on agricultural 
income and plot profit per acre. The positive effect of being an outgrower on aggregated 
assets and perceived future security also holds true for landless households (models 2 and 4 in 
Table 14). Similarly, the negative effect of contract farming on agricultural income and plot 
profit is confirmed (model 6 in Table 14). Moreover, models 3 and 4 in Table 14 reveal that 
landowning and landless farmers who hold an outgrower contract are equally productive on 
independently managed plots. Thus, additional robustness checks indicate that our results are 
highly robust to model specifications and changes in estimation techniques.
5. Conclusion
In this study we found that property rights matter. We found that holding the right to use the 
land as collateral already has a positive effect on households’ agricultural income in rural 
areas where land administration is weak and cumbersome. Further, having the right both to 
sell the land and to use it as collateral has a positive effect on perceived future security, 
agricultural income, and profit per acre. Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind that it is 
unclear if our findings go beyond identifying correlations. As we cannot be sure if property 
rights are exogenous in our setting, results have to be taken with caution.
In contrast, our setting, where contracts were allocated as in a quasi-natural experiment, 
allows us to identify a causal effect. With regard to contract farming we observed mixed 
effects. While holding a contract has a positive effect on a household’s aggregated assets and,
according to our interviewees, on perceived future security, the effect on agricultural income
is negative. Furthermore, profits on contracted plots were lower than on independently 
managed plots. Nevertheless, we provided further evidence that contract farmers tend to 
benefit from the scheme as inputs and credit offered by the investor enable them to diversify
risks. Thus, they show a 10% higher probability than independent farmers of engaging in non-
farm business. Given that outgrowers’ profits on non-contracted plots do not differ 
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significantly from those of independent farmers, we identified principal-agent problems and 
the associated effort substitution as a plausible explanation for their lower profits on 
contracted plots.
In terms of policy implications we conclude that large-scale investments in agricultural land 
can be good for rural development if they respect existing bundles of property rights and if 
they integrate the local population. However, we do not claim that our results can be 
generalized, but rather point to an exemplary case which is bound to a specific setting. One 
way an investor can do this is by offering contracts to farmers. Outgrower schemes offer long-
term security as they enhance participants’ asset endowment and perceived future security.
This gives rural households room to maneuver and enables them to invest in non-farm 
activities. At the same time we observe that in the short run farmers are able to earn higher 
agricultural income and profit per acre when they bear the full risk for independently 
managed plots. Therefore, economic integration of the local population seems to be most 
beneficial if investors aim at a mix of outgrower schemes and buying oil palm fruit from 
independently managed plots.
However, even under such favorable conditions, it would be illusory to interpret large-scale, 
land-based investments per se as an instrument to reduce poverty. In their first and narrow 
sense they aim to generate profits for their shareholders. In doing so, they can simultaneously
benefit rural farmers who participate in a well-designed contract farming scheme. But, as 
highlighted in our study, the poorest and neediest people do not benefit from such schemes as 
they are often not eligible to participate. Regardless of possible spillover effects and corporate 
social responsibility, large-scale investment in agricultural land therefore runs the danger of 
fostering inequality in its neighborhood. Thus, host countries aiming for sustainable rural 
development should avoid a crowding-out of development projects by large-scale agricultural 
investments and rather initiate development projects to support disadvantaged population 
groups in the vicinity of an investment.
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Appendix A: Full models
Table 7
Estimations at household level 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agg. assets 
(log)
Agg. assets 
(log)
Agg. assets 
(log)
Agg. assets 
(log)
Future 
security
Agric. 
income 
(log)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Outgrower dummy 0.414*** 0.405*** 2.220*** -0.397***
(0.102) (0.100) (0.216) (0.104)
Size of contract land (log) 0.0532***
(0.0113)
Years of holding contract 0.0204***
(0.00504)
% of land with right to sell 
and use as collateral
0.486* 0.756***
(0.281) (0.170)
% of land with right to use 
as collateral
0.387 0.418**
(0.316) (0.180)
Own land in acres (log) 0.0197 -0.00999
(0.0303) (0.0159)
Cultivated land in acres (log) 0.225* 0.464***
(0.129) (0.103)
Applying improved 
techniques
0.0351
(0.128)
Use of hired labor -0.0153
(0.187)
Use of household labor -0.0978
(0.0892)
1st occupation not in agric. 0.408** 0.410** 0.388** 0.238 -0.368***
(0.157) (0.158) (0.156) (0.421) (0.106)
Head: absence > 6 months/yr 0.0410 0.0280 0.0600 0.0247
(0.167) (0.168) (0.164) (0.143)
Taken a loan within last year 0.0519 0.0396 0.0627 0.0682 0.0784
(0.123) (0.122) (0.120) (0.257) (0.116)
Member of a self-help group 0.240*** 0.234*** 0.245*** 0.239 0.109
(0.0569) (0.0570) (0.0575) (0.154) (0.0865)
Subjective household 
income
-0.0251
(0.0757)
Years of schooling head 0.0281*** 0.0233** 0.0221** 0.0228** -0.0284* -0.0240***
(0.00982) (0.00917) (0.00935) (0.00915) (0.0156) (0.00750)
Age of head 0.00929 0.0128 0.0104 0.0126 -0.0116 0.0375**
(0.0195) (0.0199) (0.0197) (0.0191) (0.0397) (0.0153)
Squared age of head -0.000118 -0.000143 -0.000127 -0.000144 4.20e-05 -.000347**
(0.000171) (0.000173) (0.000172) (0.000167) (0.000375) (0.000151)
Female-headed household -0.316** -0.312* -0.319* -0.301* 0.677*** -0.0370
(0.145) (0.160) (0.162) (0.155) (0.183) (0.159)
Head married 0.274* 0.310* 0.315* 0.323* -0.207 0.186
(0.143) (0.181) (0.182) (0.179) (0.203) (0.122)
Household is not Akan -0.141 -0.177* -0.178* -0.180* 0.161 -0.0733
(0.106) (0.103) (0.102) (0.101) (0.193) (0.0903)
Household number 0.0732*** 0.0752*** 0.0691*** 0.0787*** -0.106*** -0.0177
(0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0386) (0.0115)
Big village (>5,000) 0.184** 0.175* 0.175** 0.176* 0.196 0.0210
(0.0889) (0.0888) (0.0863) (0.0897) (0.214) (0.0906)
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Small village(>1,000) -0.201* -0.203* -0.209* -0.191* 0.105 -0.0148
(0.109) (0.109) (0.108) (0.107) (0.216) (0.112)
Traditional area: Bosome -0.136 -0.163 -0.150 -0.142 -0.178 0.0838
(0.106) (0.111) (0.110) (0.102) (0.356) (0.113)
Traditional area: Kotoku -0.171** -0.160** -0.159** -0.130 0.219 0.0130
(0.0788) (0.0767) (0.0756) (0.0800) (0.189) (0.0830)
Constant 5.811*** 5.596*** 6.050*** 5.594*** 4.550*** 7.667***
(0.461) (0.511) (0.518) (0.486) (1.202) (0.527)
Observations 824 824 824 824 824 824
R-squared 0.176 0.192 0.201 0.190 0.218 0.132
Adjusted r-squared 0.164 0.176 0.185 0.174 0.198 0.107
Test of joint significance F(12,46)= 
24.87***
F(16,46)= 
26.18***
F(16,46)= 
27.17***
F(16,46)= 
29.10***
F(20,46)= 
20.36***
F(23,46)= 
15.63***
Highest vif (without age) 1.76 2.08 2.08 2.09 3.26 3.28
Ramsey’s RESET test (p-
val.)
0.607 0.888 0.508 0.967 0.984 0.241
Note: Clustered standard errors at village level; significance levels at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; for 
dummies: yes = 1, no = 0, where not stated differently values within a range from 0-1. Sample contains only 
household heads. Reference categories, where not self-explanatory: contractual treatment : independent farmer, 
occupation: farmer, ethnicity: Akan, village: small, traditional area: Abuakwa. Dummy for improved techniques 
= 1 if household uses cover crops, applies fertilizer at least once a year, and prunes at least twice a year. 
Subjective income is self-assessed on a scale of 0 to 5. Variance inflation factors above 10: age and age squared 
around 40.
Table 8
Estimations at plot level
(1) (2)
All plots Independent plots
Profit per acre (log) Profit per acre (log)
VARIABLES OLS OLS
Plot under outgrower contract -0.272***
(0.0596)
Outgrower dummy -0.0778
(0.0895)
% of land with right to sell and use as collateral 0.423***
(0.102)
% of land with right to use as collateral 0.0330
(0.0896)
Own land in acres (log) -0.00297
(0.00795)
Cultivated land in acres (log) -0.242***
(0.0492)
Sharecropping factor 1/3 for landlord (plot level) -0.131*
(0.0791)
Sharecropping factor 1/2 for landlord (plot level) -0.658***
(0.142)
Average plot size (in acres) 0.0190**
(0.00904)
Minutes to walk to plot -0.000252
(0.000625)
Age of trees (plot level) 0.0221***
(0.00543)
Applying improved techniques 0.0942
(0.0690)
Use of hired labor 0.299**
(0.147)
Use of household labor -0.0537
(0.0578)
1st occupation not in agric. 0.0606
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(0.114)
Head: absence > 6 months/yr -0.0862
(0.116)
Taken a loan within last year 0.0977
(0.0848)
Member of a self-help group 0.137**
(0.0584)
Years of schooling head -0.0164*** -0.0117
(0.00564) (0.00732)
Age of head 0.0104 0.0133
(0.0114) (0.0154)
Squared age of head -0.000140 -0.000156
(0.000101) (0.000138)
Female-headed household -0.405*** -0.433***
(0.102) (0.135)
Head married -0.0417 -0.143
(0.0829) (0.107)
Household is not Akan -0.0989 -0.0833
(0.0648) (0.0809)
Household number -0.0219* -0.0199
(0.0123) (0.0145)
Big village (>5,000) 0.0772 0.125
(0.0644) (0.0894)
Small village(>1,000) 0.0200 0.0197
(0.0724) (0.0882)
Traditional area: Bosome 0.140 -0.136
(0.120) (0.174)
Traditional area: Kotoku -0.0851 -0.178**
(0.0588) (0.0750)
Constant 7.120*** 6.834***
(0.346) (0.423)
Observations 761 537
R-squared 0.220 0.044
Adjusted r-squared 0.191 0.020
Test of joint significance F(28,463) = 14.8*** F(12, 273) = 2.22**
Highest vif (without age) 2.20 1.72
Ramsey’s RESET test (p-val.) 0.73 0.32
Note: Clustered standard errors at village level; significance levels at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; for 
dummies: yes = 1, no = 0, where not stated differently values within a range from 0-1. Sample contains only 
household heads. Reference categories, where not self-explanatory: contractual treatment: independent farmer, 
occupation: farmer, ethnicity: Akan, village: small, traditional area: Abuakwa. Dummy for improved techniques 
= 1 if household uses cover crops, applies fertilizer at least once a year, and prunes at least twice a year. 
Subjective income is self-assessed on scale of 0 to 5. Variance inflation factors for age and age squared around 
40.
Table 9
Estimations of likelihood of engaging in non-farm business at household level
Non-farm business (1) (2)
VARIABLES Logit Logit
Outgrower dummy 0.0974*** 0.0925***
(0.0330) (0.0343)
% of land with right to sell and use as collateral 0.0179
(0.0723)
% of land with right to use as collateral -0.157
(0.154)
Own land in acres (log) 0.00240
(0.00687)
Cultivation land in acres (log) 0.0229
(0.0318)
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Applying improved techniques -0.0302
(0.0348)
Use of hired labor 0.133**
(0.0522)
Use of household labor 0.0289
(0.0413)
Head absence > six months per year -0.0548
(0.0705)
Taken a loan within last year -0.0175
(0.0449)
Membership in a self-help group 0.0104
(0.0384)
Years of schooling of head 0.00420 0.00332
(0.00369) (0.00383)
Age of head 0.00161 -0.00193
(0.0103) (0.0106)
Squared Age of head -9.26e-05 -6.53e-05
(9.26e-05) (9.50e-05)
Female-headed household 0.102 0.0976
(0.0634) (0.0698)
Head is married 0.0114 -0.00805
(0.0552) (0.0634)
Household is not Akan -0.0191 -0.0163
(0.0400) (0.0402)
Household number 0.0116 0.0104
(0.00795) (0.00785)
Big village (>5,000) 0.110*** 0.106***
(0.0298) (0.0320)
Small village(>1,000) -0.00301 -0.0104
(0.0408) (0.0412)
Traditional area: Bosome 0.131** 0.141**
(0.0544) (0.0576)
Traditional area: Kotoku -0.0352 -0.0382
(0.0280) (0.0286)
Observations 824 824
Wald’s chi2 chi2(12) = 88.56*** chi2(22) = 197.09***
Pseudo R-squared 0.054 0.065
Note: Clustered standard errors at village level; significance levels at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; for 
dummies: yes = 1, no = 0, where not stated differently values within a range from 0-1. Sample contains only 
household heads. Reference categories, where not self-explanatory: contractual treatment: independent farmer, 
occupation: farmer, ethnicity: Akan, village: small, traditional area: Abuakwa. Dummy for improved techniques 
= 1 if household uses cover crops, applies fertilizer at least once a year, and prunes at least twice a year. 
Subjective income is self-assessed on scale of 0 to 5. Variance inflation factors for age and age squared around 
40.
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Appendix B: Robustness checks
Table 10
Alternative estimations of perceived future security of household heads
(1)
VARIABLES Ologit
Outgrower dummy 1.882***
(0.202)
% of land with right to sell and use as collateral 0.344
(0.239)
% of land with right to use as collateral 0.325
(0.254)
Socio-demographic and village characteristics yes
Land-related and other controls yes
Observations 824
Wald’s chi2 chi2(20) = 388.06***
Pseudo r-squared 0.055
Note: Clustered standard errors at village level; significance levels at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls 
for land-related characteristics, labor characteristics, access to security mechanisms, and socio-demographic and 
village level characteristics upon request.
Table 11 
Estimations of absolute plot profit
(1) (2)
All plots Independent plots
Profit per plot (log) Profit per plot (log)
VARIABLES OLS OLS
Plot under outgrower contract -0.355***
(0.0701)
Outgrower dummy -0.0317
(0.112)
Right to sell plot and use as collateral 0.454***
(0.156)
Right to use plot as collateral -0.00795
(0.103)
Socio-demographic and village characteristics yes yes
Land-related and other controls yes no
Observations 762 539
R-squared 0.338 0.039
Adjusted r-squared 0.313 0.017
Test of joint significance F(28,460)= 20.51*** F(12,271)= 2.23**
Highest variance inflation factor (without age) 2.20 1.8
Ramsey’s RESET test (p-val.) 0.325 0.313
Note: Clustered standard errors at household level; significance levels at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Controls for land-related characteristics, oil palm specifics, labor characteristics, access to security mechanisms,
and socio-demographic and village level characteristics upon request. Variance inflation factors above 10: age 
and age squared around 40.
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Table 12
Estimations at household level excluding extreme landowners (>30 acres)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agg. 
assets 
(log)
Agg. 
assets 
(log)
Agg. 
assets (log)
Agg. assets 
(log)
Future 
security
Agric. 
income 
(log)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Outgrower dummy 0.406*** 0.391*** 2.264*** -0.416***
(0.105) (0.101) (0.219) (0.101)
Size of contract land (log) 0.0507***
(0.0115)
Years of holding contract 0.0205***
(0.00512)
% of land with right to sell and 
use as collateral
0.419 0.704***
(0.278) (0.169)
% of land with right to use as 
collateral
0.313 0.359*
(0.318) (0.191)
Socio-demographic and village 
characteristics
yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other controls no yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 809 809 809 809 809 809
R-squared 0.168 0.187 0.195 0.187 0.217 0.125
Adjusted r-squared 0.156 0.170 0.179 0.170 0.198 0.100
Test of joint significance F(12,45)=
20.33***
F(16,45)=
25.53***
F(16,45) = 
26.29***
F(16,45)=
29.95***
F(20,45)=
16.51***
F(23,45)= 
12.90***
Highest vif (without age) 1.79 2.13 2.13 2.14 3.25 3.27
Ramsey’s RESET test (p-val.) 0.675 0.579 0.327 0.725 0.693 0.081*
Note: Clustered standard errors at village level; significance levels at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls 
for labor characteristics, access to security mechanisms, and socio-demographic and village level characteristics 
upon request. Variance inflation factors above 10: age and age squared around 40.
Table 13
Estimations at plot level excluding extreme landowners (>30 acres)
(1) (2)
All plots Indep. plots
Profit per acre (log) Profit per acre (log)
VARIABLES OLS OLS
Plot under outgrower contract -0.264***
(0.0623)
Outgrower dummy -0.0892
(0.0919)
Right to sell plot and use as collateral 0.418***
(0.103)
Right to use plot as collateral 0.0322
(0.0904)
Socio-demographic and village characteristics yes yes
Land-related and other controls yes no
Observations 743 524
R-squared 0.218 0.045
Adjusted r-squared 0.187 0.023
Test of joint significance F(28,455)= 14.42*** F(12,267)= 2.22**
Highest variance inflation factor (without age) 2.23 1.7
Ramsey’s RESET test (p-val.) 0.702 0.370
Note: Clustered standard errors at household level; significance levels at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Controls for land-related characteristics, oil palm specifics, labor characteristics, access to security mechanisms,
and socio-demographic and village level characteristics upon request. Vif > 10: age and age squared around 40.
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Table 14
Estimations at household level split by landownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agg. assets
(log)
Agg. 
assets
(log)
Future 
security
Future 
security
Agricultural 
income
(log)
Agricultural 
income (log)
landowner landless landowner landless landowner landless
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Outgrower dummy 0.417*** 0.442*** 2.249*** 2.198*** -0.391** -0.470***
(0.142) (0.129) (0.285) (0.318) (0.149) (0.129)
% of land with right to sell 
and use as collateral
0.562 0.964***
(0.400) (0.253)
% of land with right to use as 
collateral
0.527 0.615**
(0.425) (0.291)
Socio-demographic and 
village characteristics
yes yes yes yes yes yes
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 479 345 479 345 479 345
R-squared 0.233 0.174 0.247 0.240 0.098 0.189
Adjusted r-squared 0.207 0.133 0.214 0.200 0.052 0.139
Test of joint significance F(16,43)=
13.93***
F(16,42)=
12.88***
F(20,43)=
9.37***
F(17,42)=
11.59***
F(23,43)=
11.98***
F(20,42)=
37.02***
Highest vif (without age) 2.31 1.89 3.90 1.55 3.94 1.9
Ramsey’s RESET test (p-val.) 0.57 0.837 0.156 0.892 0.314 0.044**
Note: Clustered standard errors at village level; significance levels at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls 
for land-related characteristics, oil palm specifics, labor characteristics, security mechanisms, and socio-
demographic and village level characteristics upon request. Variance inflation factors above 10: age and age 
squared around 40.
Table 15
Estimations of logged plot profit per acre split by landownership
(1) (2)
All plots All plots
landowner landless
VARIABLES OLS OLS
Outgrower dummy -0.319*** -0.201**
(0.0835) (0.0903)
Right to sell plot and use as collateral 0.368***
(0.118)
Right to use plot as collateral 0.0184
(0.0958)
Socio-demographic and village characteristics yes yes
Land-related and other controls yes yes
Observations 419 342
R-squared 0.245 0.236
Adjusted r-squared 0.191 0.175
Test of joint significance F(28,262)= 11.18*** F(25,200) =6.50***
Highest vif (without age) 2.58 1.90
Ramsey’s RESET test (p-val.) 0.93 0787
Note: Clustered standard errors at village level; significance levels at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls 
for land-related characteristics, oil palm specifics, labor characteristics, access to security mechanisms, and 
socio-demographic and village level characteristics upon request, due to too little degrees of freedom only the
effects for independently managed plots of landless households can be estimated. Variance inflation for age and 
age squared around 40.
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2Abstract
Recently, large-scale land acquisition has increased dramatically in the developing world.
The question whether land deals can benefit both the local population and the investor is 
therefore high on the international agenda. Contract farming is discussed as a possible
solution but studies identifying the causal effects are rare. Using data from a quasi-natural 
experiment in contract allocation, we compare the subjective well-being of outgrowers and 
independent farmers in the sphere of the biggest palm oil producer in Ghana. We identify a 
positive causal effect of the outgrower scheme which increases subjective well-being by 1.5 
points on a scale of 0 to 10. We find a substitutive relationship between having an outgrower 
contract and having property rights, and thus we argue that by increasing security a contract 
increases well-being, as secure rights to land matter substantially for the overall life 
satisfaction of non-contract but not of contract farmers.
JEL Codes: D60, I31, Q13
Keywords: contract farming, property rights, quasi-natural experiment, subjective well-being,
large-scale land acquisition
31. INTRODUCTION
Large-scale land acquisition, especially in Africa, is recently on the rise. Whether large-scale 
investment in agricultural land promotes growth and development by increasing productivity, 
providing infrastructure, improving technology, and creating work opportunities or whether it
harms the local population by exploiting the workers, causing environmental destruction, and 
taking land away from local users is currently the subject of much debate in the literature 
(Cotula et al., 2009; Görgen et al., 2009; Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Deininger et 
al., 2011; Cotula, 2012; Deininger and Byerlee, 2012). Some authors argue that where a 
country has a weak land governance system and at the same time a strong customary system,
as Ghana does, large-scale investors can acquire land through traditional authorities at the cost 
of the local population (Schoneveld et al., 2011; Wisborg, 2012; Amanor, 2012).
Outgrower schemes1 could bring dual benefits in the sphere of large-scale investment in 
agricultural land. Contracts, if they respect existing local land rights, could foster the 
commercialization of farmers’ produce while at the same time enabling the investor to profit 
from local land resources (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; De Schutter, 2011). Because 
they are so prevalent in developing countries, especially in Africa, outgrower schemes 
deserve particular attention (Grosh, 1994; Oya, 2012). In general, “contract farming” refers to
an agreement between a farmer and a firm which processes the farmer’s produce or puts it on 
the market (Grosh, 1994). Institutional arrangements vary widely between different contracts. 
De Schutter (2011) describes the optimal scheme as one which has reliable producers for the 
investor, reliable buyers for the farmers and untouched secure land rights.2
Even though many studies identify positive effects of contract farming on the livelihood of 
farmers, outgrower schemes are still controversial. On the positive side, several authors, for 
example Porter and Phillips-Howard (1997), Warning and Key (2002), Bolwig et al., (2009), 
Minten et al., (2009), and Bellemare (2012), identify income and productivity gains of 
contract farming in Africa. Moreover, since contract farming can lead to risk-sharing between 
the producer and the processor (Key and Runsten, 1999), it can reduce price and income 
volatility (Minten et al., 2009; Bolwig et al., 2009), show positive spillover effects for non-
contract crops and for adjacent non-contract farmers (Warning and Key, 2002; Govereh and 
Jayne, 2003; Minten et al., 2009; Bellemare, 2012), and reduce market imperfections by 
1 We use the terms “contract farming” and “outgrower schemes” interchangeably.
2 For political discussions on the benefits of contract farming for poverty alleviation see also World Bank (2007) 
and UNCTAD (2009). 
4providing credit, inputs, technology and information and hence lower transaction costs 
(Grosh, 1994; Key and Runsten, 1999; Deininger, 2011).
On the negative side, contract farming is interpreted as just a tool for the investor to extract 
rents without positive effects for landowners (Little and Watts, 1994; Porter and Phillips-
Howard, 1997). Very unequal power relations can make producers more vulnerable, since 
risks may be transferred to them and they may lose autonomy (Little and Watts, 1994; Porter 
and Phillips-Howard, 1997; Key and Runsten, 1999). Moreover, the prevalence of contract 
farming is found to disrupt social structures, disturb the local political ecology, increase 
economic inequality, and increase workloads (Carney and Watts, 1990; Korovkin, 1992; 
Dolan, 2001; Yaro and Tsikata, 2013). 
Despite these negative findings, however, farmers seem generally very willing to enter into 
contracts. Huddleston (2006) and Väth and Kirk (2014) have shown for our research setting 
that contract offers were not refused and, similarly, Guo and Jolly (2009) find a large excess 
demand for contract farming in China. Farmers’ main motive for signing a contract seems to 
be to reduce uncertainty. Masakure and Henson (2005), for example, using principal 
component analysis, show that reduced market uncertainty (a guaranteed market for crops, a
reliable supply of inputs, guaranteed minimum prices, and reliable transport provided to 
collect the produce) is what drives farmers to produce under contract.3 In Ghana, it has been 
found that farmers are eager to secure access to inputs, credit and extension services via an 
outgrower scheme (Huddleston, 2006; Väth and Kirk, 2014). Guo and Jolly (2009) identify
market access and price stability as their main motives for entering into contracts. These 
findings are supported by Blandon et al. (2009), who identify prearranged quantities and 
prices as an incentive for farmers to sign contracts with supermarkets in Honduras. It 
therefore seems that the big advantage of contracts is that they satisfy security needs.
In rural areas, a land tenure regime which guarantees secure property rights to land is another 
way to satisfy these needs. By ensuring that future profits from investing in land return to the 
landowner, these rights reduce uncertainty and help to overcome the inevitable time lag 
between agricultural investment and output, and hence stimulate investment (Besley, 1995; 
Brasselle et al., 2002; Carter and Olinto, 2003). Moreover, income gains (Bouis and Haddad,
1990; Grootaert et al., 1997; Carter and May, 1999; Scott, 2000; Gunning et al., 2000) and 
3 Farmers in Schipmann and Qaim’s (2001) study in Thailand, on the other hand, did not show a preference for 
contract farming. Farmers were, however, more likely to choose a contract when input or credit provision was
involved.
5better social standing (Binswanger et al., 1995) for the holder of these rights ease the access 
to credit (Feder, 1988)4 and open up social networks (Townsend, 1994), which in turn help to 
smooth consumption patterns and improve food security (Deininger, 2003; Dekker, 2006). 
To jointly capture all effects of contract farming and its relation to secure property rights to 
land we used a subjective well-being approach, which we understand as a measure of utility 
(Frey and Stutzer, 2002). Since it comprises both monetary and non-monetary aspects,
subjective well-being is a good complement to more traditional approaches, which 
concentrate mainly on monetary issues (Diener and Suh, 1997; Frey and Stutzer, 2002) and 
dominate the literature on contract farming. Thus, by controlling for income effects, a 
subjective well-being approach allows us to focus on risk-reducing mechanisms and security-
related aspects, which form a key dimension of subjective well-being (Oishi et al., 1999;
Webb, 2009; Wills-Herrera et al., 2011). In doing so, we go far beyond the direct monetary 
effects of contract farming.
Whereas some authors find high correlation between subjective well-being and objective 
measures (Oswald and Wu, 2010), others argue that adaptation to circumstances and stable 
dispositional characteristics lead to rather low correlations (Diener and Suh, 1997). 
Identification of causal effects has therefore attracted considerable attention in the subjective 
well-being literature (see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004, for a good overview on 
estimation techniques).
We contribute to this literature by identifying the causal effect of contract farming on 
subjective well-being in the sphere of a large-scale land acquisition. Unobserved differences 
between contract and non-contract farmers, which are correlated with the outcome variable 
(e.g. entrepreneurial spirit and ability, risk preferences, trust, or effort), make appropriate 
estimation techniques necessary to avoid biased estimates. Several studies have used an 
instrumental variable approach to correct for selection bias (e.g. Warning and Key, 2002; 
Simmons et al., 2005; Miyata, 2009; Rao and Qaim, 2011; Bellemare, 2012). However, 
Dedehouanou et al. (2013) claim that instruments are often weak. Using panel data on 
contract farmers in Senegal, they find that having a contract had a positive influence on 
subjective well-being. 
Our study confirms the positive link between contract farming and subjective well-being for 
oil palm farmers in Ghana. We take advantage of a research setting where contract allocation 
4 Some authors do not find improved access to the credit market from providing secure land titles (see for 
example Place and Migot-Adholla, 1998; Carter and Olinto, 2003).
6took place as a quasi-natural experiment. Whereas using panel data can bias results because of 
omitted time-variant variables,5 natural experiments provide the most robust evidence of 
causality (MacKerron, 2012). In addition, we broaden the view by using two measures of 
contract farming, firstly a dummy variable indicating that a household has an outgrower 
contract on at least one of its agricultural plots, and secondly by using the size of land under 
outgrower contract. Both variables remain positively significant throughout different model 
specifications. However, it seems that holding an outgrower contract, independently of the 
size of land under contract, explains gains in subjective well-being better. Moreover, we 
propose that contract farming contributes to subjective well-being by fulfilling security needs,
as property rights for land play an important role for non-contract holders but not for contract 
holders. Hence, contract farming turns out to be a promising tool for overcoming lacks of 
security.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the 
connection between contract farming and subjective well-being, and between secure property 
rights to land and subjective well-being, and the way these two kinds of connection are 
interlinked, with a special emphasis on security aspects. Section 3 describes our research 
setting, including contract allocation as a quasi-natural experiment, Section 4 presents our 
estimation strategy with a discussion of previous findings in the subjective well-being 
literature, the data and descriptive statistics, as well as our empirical findings, and Section 5
concludes.
2. LIFE SATISFACTION AND THE SECURITY DIMENSION OF CONTRACT 
FARMING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
Overall life satisfaction can be understood as an aggregate concept which comprises various 
domains (Meadow et al., 1992; Cummins, 1996; Van Praag et al., 2003; Rojas, 2007; Van 
Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2008). The identification and demarcation of different domains 
is somewhat arbitrary (Rojas, 2008; Bardo and Yamashita, 2013), but over the last decade the 
International Wellbeing Group (2013) has developed a standard “personal well-being index”
(PWI) which is widely used in developing and emerging countries (e.g. Tiliouine et al., 2006;
Webb, 2009; Wills-Herrera et al., 2011; Davey and Rato, 2012). The index identifies future 
5 For example income movements and changes in well-being are linked through omitted variables such as
“seniority in the workplace” (Gardner and Oswald, 2007).
7security as an important feature of overall life satisfaction.6 Especially in developing 
countries, where (rural) markets show high imperfections, formal safety nets are 
underdeveloped, and stability needs are inadequately satisfied, security plays an important 
role in overall life satisfaction (Oishi et al., 1999). Webb (2009) shows for Tibet that future 
security is even slightly more important for overall life satisfaction than the standard of living 
domain. Willis-Herrera et al. (2011) show from a different angle that perceptions of political, 
economic and communitarian insecurity, in turn have a negatively significant correlation with 
subjective well-being in Columbia.
In the sphere of large-scale land acquisitions, contract farming is seen as one important way to 
address security needs, as it reduces some of the risks a farmer has to face. Dedehouanou et 
al. (2013) point out that marketing risk is reduced because there is a secure buyer for the 
produce and improved access to the market, and production risk is reduced because inputs and 
credit are provided by the contractor. However, they also mention that it brings one new risk: 
a contract may be breached, either by the buyer, because of decreased demand for processing 
or by the farmer, because of failure to meet high quality standards.
Apart from the security aspects, Dedehouanou et al. (2013) indicate that contract farmers may 
earn higher income, have more self-esteem, be more efficient because they receive training,
and have better health conditions due to access to less harmful pesticides and other chemicals
– all benefits which increase subjective well-being. On the other hand, contract farmers lose 
their autonomy and may have to adapt their production and management techniques to meet 
specified quality standards (especially for export production), which can mean increased 
pressure and higher labour requirements and consequently decreased subjective well-being. In 
a setting with very unequal power relations, farmers are endangered to enter into adhesion 
contracts which foster such negative effects. Therefore, Dedehouanou et al. (2013) argue that 
contract farming can affect overall life satisfaction both positively and negatively. As in our 
particular setting the risk of contract breach by the buyer is rather negligible due to the excess 
demand for oil palm fruits, and as the contractual agreement does not specify particular 
quality standards, we expect that positive effects will outweigh the negative ones. Thus, we 
hypothesize that holding an outgrower contract has a positive influence on farmers’ subjective 
well-being. In line with Masakure and Henson (2005), Guo and Jolly (2009), and Blandon, 
Henson and Islam (2009), who highlight the reduction of uncertainty as the main motive for 
6 Based on Cummins (1996), the PWI lists eight domains of life: standard of living, personal health, life 
achievement, personal relationships, personal safety, community connectedness, future security, and spirituality/
religion.
8entering into contracts, we believe that security is the aspect most responsible for enhanced 
overall life satisfaction, when controlling for income effects.
Secure property rights to land are a second important way to address the security needs of 
rural households and thus increase their subjective well-being. In the absence of these rights, 
land conflicts arise when an increasing demand for land meets a limited supply. This is 
especially the case when a large-scale investor enters the scene and demands huge tracts of 
land. Thus, numerous studies document land disputes around large-scale investments, mostly 
to the disadvantage of the local population (Li, 2011; Borras Jr and Franco, 2012; German,
2013). Clearly defined property rights can foster social stability and prevent disputes (Palmer 
1998) and are therefore a precondition for satisfying the needs of both the local population 
and the investor.
Moreover, land with secure property rights can be used as collateral to access the credit 
market (see for example the seminal work by Feder, 1988, in Thailand, which identifies the 
credit supply effect as the main benefit from land titling). In particular, it allows the farmer to 
enter the formal lending market, where imperfect information about the borrower and high 
monitoring costs are even more of an obstacle than in the informal sector (Feder and Nishio,
1998). If households are credit constrained, any increase in investment may be accompanied 
by decreased consumption in the short run. Access to credit in turn reduces food insecurity, 
mitigates health shocks and decreases vulnerability to environmental disasters. Thus, in line 
with Deininger (2003), we can say that secure property rights to land provide an important 
safety net function which is expected to enhance subjective well-being. 
In addition, secure ownership reduces the time spent on protecting property and allows 
household members to spend it on other activities (Field, 2007). This may lead to greater 
labour market participation, thus increasing non-agricultural income, which may lead to an 
increase in subjective well-being beyond addressing security needs. Finally, secure property 
rights guarantee the long-term use of the land and thereby increase investment incentives,
which may bring additional income and improve agricultural productivity (e.g. Deininger and 
Chamorro, 2004; Deininger and Jin, 2006; Goldstein and Udry, 200; Fenske, 2011). Higher 
income in turn is positively associated with subjective well-being.7 Consequently, we 
hypothesize that holding secure property rights to land has a positive influence on farmers’ 
7 Compare Besley (1995) for a discussion on endogeneity issues, for example that investment may not be a 
response to higher levels of tenure security but rather undertaken to enhance tenure security.
9subjective well-being. Again, we assume that this is mainly caused by gains in security when 
controlling for income effects.
Considering that both holding an outgrower contract and possessing secure property rights are 
expected to have a positive influence on the security domain and in turn overall life 
satisfaction, it is worthwhile conceptualizing possible links. Whereas several researchers 
assume an additive relationship between domain satisfaction and overall life satisfaction (e.g. 
Møller and Saris, 2001; Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2008), Rojas (2006) provides 
theoretical and empirical evidence that a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) specification 
is preferable. Thus, allowing a variety of imaginable relationships between domain 
satisfaction and overall life satisfaction, he shows for Mexico that effects on overall life 
satisfaction emanating from increasing satisfaction in one domain tend to decay with 
increasing satisfaction in this domain. This is in line with Palmer’s diminishing marginal 
returns argument (1998), which states that once a certain level of security has been reached, 
the benefits of additional security will be too small to foster further efforts to realize extra 
security. In the context of overall life satisfaction, we therefore assume a substitutive rather 
than an additive relationship between contract farming and secure property rights to land.
3. RESEARCH SETTING
3.1. The Investor
Our research was conducted within a 30 km radius of the Ghana Oil Palm Development 
Company (GOPDC) large-scale investment. GOPDC is the biggest palm oil producer in 
Ghana. It was founded in 1976 as a state-owned company with 8,953 ha of land, expropriated 
from the local population by the military government (Republic of Ghana, 1976; Sutton and 
Kpentey, 2012). The land known as the Kwae Concession was gradually transformed into oil 
palm plantations to feed the newly constructed large-scale mill. The investment is located in 
the remote Kwaebibirem District in the Eastern Region, where the oil palm business was 
introduced to facilitate local development (Huddleston, 2006; Huddleston and Tonts, 2007; 
Fold, 2008; Fold and Whitfield, 2012; Adjei-Nsiah et al., 2012).
From 1986 onwards, an outgrower scheme was established through a World Bank supported 
development programme which aimed to integrate the local population. At that time the mill 
was not being used to anywhere near full capacity, because the expansion pace and yield of 
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the nucleus farm had been overestimated (World Bank, 1994; interviews with Lands 
Commission senior official and GOPDC senior manager),8 so GOPDC was interested in 
increasing the local supply.
In the course of the privatization wave in 1994, the government transferred GOPDC to the 
Belgium investor Société d’Investissement pour l’Agriculture Tropicale (SIAT), which took 
over the majority of shares (GOPDC, 2013; SIAT, 2013). In addition to the 50-years 
leasehold for the Kwae Concession (as of 1976), GOPDC acquired 5,205 ha for the adjacent 
Okumaning Concession (as of 2000) (Republic of Ghana, 2008; Sutton and Kpentey, 2012). 
However, neither the concessions nor the outgrower scheme yielded enough oil palm fruit to 
run the mill at full capacity (interview with GOPDC senior manager),9 so GOPDC 
complements its nucleus-estate system with third party purchases from independent farmers.
Focus group discussions revealed that the local people have very mixed feelings about
GOPDC (Gyasi, 1994; Huddleston, 2006; Väth, 2013). On the one hand they complain about
the original expropriations by the military government in the 1970s, low wages, and problems
with daily operations, but on the other they are very grateful for the expansion of the oil palm 
business in the area, the outgrower scheme, infrastructural developments, employment 
creation, and corporate social responsibility (Huddleston, 2006; Huddleston and Tonts, 2007;
Väth, 2013). Thus it cannot yet be claimed that there is a stable relationship between the 
investor and the local population.
3.2. Oil Palm Production Around the Large-Scale Investment
Besides a few large-scale producers, oil palm is typically grown by small- and medium-scale 
farmers in Ghana. Investment costs for oil palm cultivation are high, and it is only a rational
choice for those who hold secure land use rights (property rights or long-term sharecropping 
agreements), as the break-even point is not reached until the seventh year after planting (Poku 
and Asante, 2008). Consequently, the poorest are excluded from any form of commercial oil 
palm farming and we can conclude that all those farmers who cultivate oil palm hold secure 
land use rights.
8 Semi-structured expert interviews were conducted in the Kwaebibirem District or Accra between October and 
November 2011 to enrich the quantitative database. To guarantee the anonymity of the interviewees, we reveal 
their (rough) position and organization but not their names. All interviewees were informed about the purpose of 
the study. Due to their reservation and the sensitiveness of the topic, interviews were not recorded.
9 For more details on GOPDC, please refer to Väth (2013).
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There are two ways that the roughly 10,000 smallholder farmers in our research area can 
cultivate oil palms: either independently or under contract. Roughly 3,000 households grow 
them as fully independent farmers. They can choose whether to sell their produce to the local 
market or to GOPDC (interview with Ministry of Food and Agriculture official). In contrast, 
at the time of data collection, 7,279 outgrowers were obliged to deliver the fruit from a
contracted oil palm plot to GOPDC. Households typically cultivate more than one plot; hence 
a farmer can be an outgrower on one plot and also grow oil palm or other crops as an 
independent farmer on another non-contracted plot. In our sample more than 90% of 
households holding an outgrower contract on one plot are at the same time growing oil palm 
independently on other plots.
GOPDC and the local economy compete in their demand for oil palm fruit (Poku and Asante,
2008). GOPDC’s pricing, for both outgrowers and independent farmers, is based on 
developments in the world market price for crude palm oil (GOPDC, n.d.; interviews with 
GOPDC senior manager and outgrower association executives; focus group discussion with 
farmers). GOPDC offers higher prices than the local market in the domestic peak season as 
the Ghanaian supply is too small to have an impact on the world market. In contrast, the local 
market pays more in the lean season when oil palm fruit is scarce and domestic demand is 
high. In a weak institutional setting paired with high monitoring costs, outgrowers could
breach contracts and sell to local markets (Fold, 2008; Fold and Whitfield, 2012) without fear
of legal consequences.10 The competitive demand setting is therefore more advantageous for 
oil palm farmers than a situation where monopolistic structures weaken the smallholders’ 
bargaining power. Output markets for GOPDC and small-scale processors are discrete.
Whereas the red cooking oil for local demand can technically be produced only by the small
mills, GOPDC produces the crude palm oil used by various industries (Osei-Amponsah et al.,
2012). 
3.3. Contractual Treatment as Quasi-Natural Experiment
When it introduced the outgrower scheme, GOPDC did not follow a systematic strategy for 
location and scope. Uneven performance and changing attitudes of different managements 
created the framework for various expansion waves and their particular locations over the 
years (interviews with GOPDC senior managers and outgrower association executives). To 
10 To prevent side-selling, GOPDC improves its relations with the local population by enhancing its corporate 
social responsibility activities or increasing its prices. Since legal processes are expensive and slow in Ghana,
legal action against breach of contract is not a workable solution to the problem (interviews with GOPDC senior 
managers).
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minimize the transaction costs of extension activities and fruit collection, each phase of 
expansion was bound to a strictly demarcated area with a one-shot offer to accept the contract 
(interviews with GOPDC senior managers). Thus farmers were unable to predict the pace, 
scope or sites of these expansions. Consequently, self-selection by strategic migration was 
impossible in our research setting.
When GOPDC decided at a specific date to expand the scheme at a specific location, it 
offered at short notice a 25-years contract for a specific plot to all farmers who were currently 
holding a “ready-to-cultivate plot” with ownership rights (interviews with GOPDC senior 
manager and outgrower association executives).11 Recognizing the domestic role of 
sharecropping, at the same time GOPDC introduced a tripartite outgrower contract for 
sharecroppers with 25-years land use rights.12 Apart from the fact that the landlord has to sign 
the outgrower agreement, such tripartite contracts are indistinguishable from contracts with 
farmers holding property rights to land (GOPDC, n.d.). Outgrowers receive extension 
services, inputs and credit from the investor (GOPDC, n.d.). Corroborating the findings by
Huddleston (2006) and Fold (2008) that farmers were eager to enter into contracts to access 
credit and technology our interviews with the executives of the outgrower association and 
focus group discussions with farmers revealed that to the best of their knowledge nobody had 
ever rejected an offer.13
To prove ownership rights in rural Ghana is challenging as land administration is cumbersome 
(Amanor, 1999). At the time of data collection, titles verifying property rights to land were 
not available in the catchment area and deed registration was poor (interview with Lands 
Commission senior official). But the predominantly customary land tenure system of the 
Akyem proved to be dynamic as it invented a kind of “informal deed” (Gyasi, 1994; Amanor,
1999). Clan heads and chiefs began to document customary ownership rights for a small fee 
and enabled land-owning farmers to participate in the scheme (interview with outgrower 
11 A ready-to-cultivate plot is a cleared plot which is not cultivated with other food or cash crops, but ready to be 
newly planted. In our research area farmers typically cultivate various plots with food (maize, plantain, cocoyam, 
cassava, etc.) and cash crops (cacao, citrus, and oil palm) which can be partly intercropped (interview with 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture official). Given the different crop cycles over multiple farms as well as fallow 
periods, rural households commonly have ready-to-cultivate plots.
12 From the late 19th century, long-term sharecropping arrangements became more common than customary 
ownership rights in Akyem (Gyasi, 1994; Amanor, 1999; Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). This was the result of
increasing land pressure through population growth and the migration associated to the cocoa boom (Gyasi, 
1994). Thus, as a flexible instrument to enhance the allocation efficiency of land and labour resources, 
sharecropping spread (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001; Amanor, 2010).
13 To enrich the quantitative data, focus group discussions were conducted between September and November 
2011 with independent farmers and outgrowers. Each group consisted of 7 to 15 participants of similar wealth 
level. They were held in the local languages Twi and Fante, and recorded and transcribed into English.
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association executives; Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001). But even though the outgrower 
scheme was established as a World Bank supported development project and contract farmers 
received inputs and credit to cope with high investment costs, the poorest farmers are still 
excluded from the oil palm business as they cannot provide the required land use rights (see 
also Watts, 1994).
De facto, as many eligible farmers as possible were recruited for the project (Huddleston 
2006; interview with GOPDC senior manager) since the investor strove to make full use of
the mill and the World Bank aimed to integrate the local population. Given the high cost and 
the intention of expanding the scheme quickly, agronomic characteristics such as soil fertility 
or rainfall patterns were not measured on the plots under consideration (interviews with 
GOPDC senior managers). GOPDC’s staff only verified that plots were on low-lying land. 
This assessment was rather pro-forma, as it is common knowledge in rural Ghana that low 
land is more suitable than high land for oil palm cultivation (Gyasi, 1994; Amanor and 
Diderutuah, 2001) and farmers do not cultivate oil palm on unsuitable land but rather enter 
into sharecropping arrangements to balance their needs for low and high lands (Amanor and 
Diderutuah, 2001). Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, GOPDC assessed neither 
personal attitudes nor socio-economic characteristics. 
De jure, additional criteria were introduced in the contract. Firstly, outgrower plots had to be 
within 400 metres of an accessible road (GOPDC, n.d.). Recognizing that the road system in 
the area was underdeveloped, either all farms had to be accessible or none, hence this 
requirement was de facto not applicable (interviews with GOPDC senior managers and
outgrower association executives). Secondly, the outgrower contract called for participants 
aged 18 to 45, but Huddleston’s data set (2006) shows that this criterion was not implemented 
(which is also in line with statements made in interviews with GOPDC senior managers and
outgrower association executives).
To sum up: For oil palm farmers, both outgrowers and independent, secure land use rights
(i.e. property rights or long-term sharecropping arrangements) are indispensable and therefore 
different performance cannot be the result of unequal access to documented land use rights. 
Moreover, neither our treatment nor our control group (i.e. outgrower or independent farmers)
includes the poorest farmers, since high investment costs and difficult access to long-term 
land use rights prevents them from cultivating oil palms commercially. Most importantly, it 
was impossible to anticipate the location and scope of the scheme or the date when it would 
be introduced, and no farmers rejected the scheme. Within the chosen area, both GOPDC and 
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the World Bank wanted to offer the contract to as many farmers as possible and de facto no 
pre-selection of participating farmers took place. Hence, we treat the outgrower contracts as a 
quasi-natural experiment.
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1. The Empirical Model, Variables, and Estimation Strategy
We estimate the effect of the contractual treatment on subjective well-being using the 
following general model:
ݕ௜ = ߙ଴ + ࢼᇱ࢞࢏ + ࢽᇱ࢒࢏ + ࢾᇱࢉ࢏ + ߝ௜
yi stands for the dependent variable, xi is a vector of explanatory variables, including socio-
demographic variables of the respondents, li represents land related variables, most 
importantly our measure of contract farming and property rights for land, ci includes 
geographic information for the village and area, and ߝ௜ refers to the error term. ࢼᇱ, ࢽᇱ and ࢾᇱ
are parameter vectors relating to the corresponding individual variables, land related variables 
and geographic information respectively.
Our indicator for subjective well-being is overall life satisfaction, which runs from 0,
representing very low subjective well-being, to 10, representing very high subjective well-
being. We use ordinary least square estimations throughout our paper, following Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters (2004), who have shown that ordinal and cardinal treatment of the 
dependent variables leads to similar results. Ordered logistic regressions are estimated as a 
robustness check and can be found in Appendix B.
Our aim is to identify the causal effect of contract farming on subjective well-being in the 
context of a large-scale land investment. We use two alternative measures for contract 
farming. First, we include a dummy variable which takes on a value of one if a household has 
an outgrower contract on any of its agricultural plots. Second, we replace the dummy by the 
logarithm of land size under outgrower contract. The majority of households in our sample 
cultivate several plots. Therefore, outgrowers may have some plots under contract and others 
used independently. Using the dummy variable, we assume that contract farming has a 
uniform effect on households independently of the size of land under contract. With our 
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second measure we relax this assumption by testing size effects assuming that a percentage 
increase in the size of land under contract has a constant effect.
As having a contract may influence not only subjective well-being but also other household 
characteristics such as income or aggregated assets, we start by estimating the net effect of 
contract farming on subjective well-being by including only our measures for participation in 
the outgrower scheme and exogenous socio-demographic characteristics (model 1 in Table 4 
includes the dummy variable and model 2 in Table 4 the logarithm of land size under 
outgrower contract). 
In a second step, we include further land related controls in model 3 in Table 4, most 
importantly the percentages of land with secure property rights, as well as additional socio-
demographic and wealth-related controls. We distinguish between two bundles of property 
rights, to take into account the fact that customary land rights can vary in quality with regard 
to disposal and mortgage. The first bundle comprises both the right to use the land as 
collateral and the right to sell the land, whereas the second contains only the right to use the 
land as collateral. Recalling that households typically cultivate more than one plot, we include 
land with secure bundles of property rights as the percentages of the total amount of land 
owned (running from 0 to 1). These are proxies for landownership at the household level 
which allow us to capture different property rights regimes of different plots.
In model 4 we also include an interaction term between the bundles of property rights and the 
outgrower dummy to identify heterogeneous effects for the treatment and the control group.
Even though we cannot know if the bundles of property rights to land are exogenous, the 
interaction might give us a hint about the transmission channels of contract farming. In all 
estimations we cluster the standard errors on the village level.
The socio-demographic control variables included in models 1 and 2 in Table 4 are age of the 
head of household and its square, gender of the household head, a dummy variable indicating 
whether the household does not belong to the regional ethnic majority (Akan), and a dummy 
for households which migrated to the region before the start of the outgrower scheme. Many 
studies find a u-shaped relationship between age and subjective well-being (e.g. Blanchflower 
and Oswald, 2008), indicating lower levels of subjective well-being around middle age. 
Studies on gender and subjective well-being find either no significant gender effects (Van 
Landeghem et al., 2013) or higher average subjective well-being for females (Dolan et al.,
2008; MacKerron, 2012). Belonging to an ethnic minority or being a migrant show more 
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consistent results in the literature, with lower subjective well-being reported for these groups 
(Verkuyten, 2008; Safi,  .LUPDQR÷OX DQG %DúOHYHQW, 2013). Whereas some scholars 
argue that the extent of assimilation to the host environment provides some explanation (Neto,
1995), others find that it is driven rather by perceived discrimination (Verkuyten, 2008; Safi,
2010). 
Models 3 and 4 in Table 4 add additional controls. These include a dummy for marital status 
of the respondent, because married people are believed to be more satisfied with life (Stack 
and Eshleman, 1998; Diener et al., 2000),14 years of education, which are often found to be 
correlated to subjective well-being, with results differing in terms of strength and direction 
(Dolan et al., 2008), and a health variable (illness within the household during the previous
two weeks), because healthier people show higher subjective well-being (Dolan et al.,
2008).15
Income as a determinant of subjective well-being is the focus of a sizable number of research 
papers. In general, they find a positive but diminishing correlation of income and subjective 
well-being. However, reverse causality and further endogeneity problems, caused for example 
by latent personality traits or uncontrolled health effects, make direct interpretation often 
problematic. This is shown for example by Graham et al. (2004), using panel data from
Russia, who find that more satisfied people tend to have higher incomes. Therefore, some 
studies instrument income with expenditure data (e.g. Kingdon and Knight, 2007; Asadullah 
and Chaudhury, 2012; Van Landeghem et al., 2013). We decided to use data on household’s 
self-rated surplus income, which we consider more relevant in the context of subjective 
measures.16 This has the advantage of controlling at least partly for possible measurement 
errors if we assume that measurement errors are correlated with each other over different 
subjective measures. People’s understanding of what the levels on a scale mean can vary 
considerably (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998; Van Landeghem et al., 2013). For 
example, a choice of 3 on a scale of 1 to 5 could indicate either a fairly high or a fairly low 
level of well-being, depending on personal judgment. Moreover, people can show the same 
14 Including marital status as a right-hand side variable raises issues of reverse causality. See for example Frey 
and Stutzer (2005) for a discussion. 
15 Oswald and Powdthavee (2008), in their longitudinal study, find partial hedonic adaptation to becoming 
disabled. In line with this argument, Diener et al. (1999) argue for the use of subjective health measures. 
However, our results hold, as we include subjective health as an additional explanatory variable.
16 Question: Which of the following is true? The current income of the household: 1= Allows you to build your 
savings, 2= Allows you to save just a little, 3= Only just meets your expenses, 4= Is not sufficient, so you need 
to use your savings to meet expenses, 5= Is really not sufficient, so you need to borrow to meet your expenses. In 
addition we control for household size. We assume that sharecropping is captured by our control for household 
income. Nonetheless, our results hold as we include a sharecropping dummy.
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average well-being levels despite different variance in well-being over time (Ravallion and 
Lokshin, 2001).
We also use this proxy to construct a relative income variable. People tend to compare 
themselves with their peer group, with two opposing effects at work (see Van Landeghem et 
al., 2013, for the subsequent discussion). On the one hand, higher income of one’s peers can 
be seen as a positive sign for overall development, hinting at future improvement of one’s 
own situation, or it can lead to positive externalities, again improving one’s own situation; on 
the other hand, having a higher income than one’s peers may lead to higher status, 
incorporating material and social benefits and a better chance of survival in times of crisis. 
Empirical research mostly finds the latter effect more pronounced, with negative correlation 
between average peer’s income and subjective well-being (e.g. Dedehouanou et al., 2013, for
Senegal; Addai et al., 2013 for Ghana). We construct our measure of relative income of 
household i as the average self-rated surplus income of all households living in the same 
traditional area, excluding household i itself. Our data set includes households from three 
traditional areas, Abuakwa, Kotoku, and Bosome. Anecdotal evidence supports our 
assumption that people identify with their traditional group; however, results hold if we use 
the village as the group identifier. In addition, we include an asset index as a stock variable 
for household’s wealth. This variable can of course also be subject to endogeneity, further, it 
might be correlated to household’s income. However, results hold for alternate use as well as 
for including both variables and the variance inflation factor does not point to serious 
multicollinearity.
Land related controls are the size of own and neighbours’ average agricultural land, the size 
of the land under cultivation, and the duration of the outgrower contract. Again 
multicollinearity is not a problem and results hold for alternative specifications. The effect of 
landownership and secure access to land is seriously under-researched in the subjective well-
being literature even though land plays a key role in agrarian societies. In a study of a land 
reform in Moldova, Van Landeghem et al., (2013) find that own landholdings have a positive 
effect on subjective well-being but that neighbours’ average landholdings have a negative 
effect. Gobien (2014) has corroborated these findings in the context of a land distribution 
project in Cambodia. 
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4.2. Data and Descriptive Analysis
Our survey was conducted between October and December 2010 within a 30 km radius of
GOPDC’s oil palm mill. In total 824 household heads were interviewed – 436 outgrowers and 
388 independent farmers. GOPDC permitted us to draw a random sample out of a total 
outgrower population of 7,279. Choosing the 95% confidence level with a confidence interval 
of 5, we ended up with 436 outgrowers spread over 47 different villages in the catchment area 
(see Table 1). 
In addition, we interviewed 388 independent farmers out of an estimated population of 3,000 
households in a two-stage selection process (see Table 1). In a first step, we selected 25 
villages out of these 47 villages by using village size (small, medium, large) as the stratum for 
proportional sampling. In the small villages (< 1,000 inhabitants) we sampled all the 
independent oil palm farmers, but we applied a second-stage cluster sampling for medium 
(>1,000–5,000 inhabitants) and large (>5,000 inhabitants) villages. To avoid biases through 
migration effects, we excluded from our survey migrant households which had been in the 
catchment area less than 24 years since the introduction of the outgrower scheme.
Table 1. Populations and sampling
Contractual arrangement Population size Sample size
Outgrowers (OG) 7,279 436
Independent Farmers (IF) XQNQRZQ§ 388
Observations § 824
Note: OG are based on random sampling. IF are based on a two-stage sampling with community size as stratum and 
clustering at village level.
Tables 2 and 3 and Figure 1 offer some descriptive statistics for our sample. Table 2 shows 
that mean life satisfaction for outgrowers (6.853) is significantly higher than for independent 
farmers (5.345).
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of outcome variable
Outcome variable Observations                   Means (sd) Diff. in means
Outgrowers Independent farmers
Overall life satisfaction 824 6.853 (1.651) 5.345(1.702) ***
Note: Significance levels at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, difference in means according to Wilcoxon rank sum test.
A more detailed look at the histogram in Figure 1 shows that the modus for independent 
farmers is at a satisfaction level of 4, reported by roughly 30%, whereas for the outgrowers it 
is at a level of 8, reported by roughly 27%. Hence, descriptive analysis provides some initial
evidence that life satisfaction is higher for contract than independent farmers.
Figure 1. Histogram of overall life satisfaction (0–10) for independent farmers and outgrowers
In line with this finding, Väth (2013) concludes that focus group discussions with contract 
farmers in our research area reveal that GOPDC’s outgrower scheme is perceived quite 
positively, especially with regard to security-related aspects. Benefits mentioned were
reduced market uncertainties, infrastructural improvements, training in agricultural techniques 
and technologies promoted by GOPDC, such as plant spacing, fertilizer application and the 
use of chainsaws. Topping the list of things these farmers appreciated were improved market 
participation through the introduction of commercial oil palm farming in the area, and access 
to inputs, credits and training, which allowed them to set up businesses and earn cash. These 
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benefits enabled them to enrol their children in school, and enabled some to save enough 
money to send their children to university.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of independent variables (means)
Means (sd) Diff. in 
CATEGORIES VARIABLES Outgrowers Independent farmers Means
(436) (388)
Land-related Land under contract (in acres) 9.914 (7.625) -
characteristics Own land (in acres) 6.202 (12.81) 4.821 (5.519) **
Land under cultivation (in acre) 17.27 (10.47) 9.410 (5.794) ***
% of land with rights to sell and use 
as collateral (0–1)
0.251 (0.364) 0.453 (0.460) ***
% of land with rights to use as 
collateral
0.0520 (0.186) 0.0880 (0.245) *
Socio- Education of household head 
(years) 
8.25 (5.120) 6.938 (4.602) ***
demographic Gender of household head (1= 
female) 
0.222 (0.416) 0.186 (0.389)
characteristics Age of household head 52.110 (11.243) 47.007 (12.56) ***
Not Akan (different ethnicity) 0.374 (0.484) 0.353 (0.478)
Migrant 0.314 (0.465) 0.139 (0.347) ***
Household head is married 0.827 (0.380) 0.814 (0.389)
Household member ill (last 2 w.) 0.408 (0.492) 0.183 (0.387) ***
Household size 6.041 (2.844) 4.054 (2.09) ***
Wealth Subjective income 3.278 (1.218) 3.317 (0.994)
characteristics HH aggregated assets (in GH Cedi)+ 1,126 (24,274) 732 (3,673) ***
Village level Large village (>5,000) 0.255 (0.436) 0.232 (0.423)
characteristics Small village(>1,000) 0.294 (0.456) 0.289 (0.454)
Traditional area: Bosome 0.0229 (0.150) 0.0387 (0.193)
Traditional area: Kotoku 0.463 (0.499) 0.407 (0.492)
Note: Significance levels at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; for dummies: yes = 1, no = 0; subjective income: 1= very high, 
5= very low; two sample tests of proportions for dummies, otherwise Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are applied. +As assets are 
strongly skewed to the right, medians are more informative than means. The exchange rate for Ghana is at 1 October 2010: 1 
GHS = 0.70 USD.
If we compare the independent variables in Table 3 we see that the two groups have quite 
similar time-invariant socio-demographic and village level characteristics. However, asset 
accumulation seems more prevalent for outgrowers than for independent farmers. Contractual 
arrangements could have led the two groups on different development paths over the years. In 
particular, contractors own more land and have more land under cultivation than the 
independent farmers, and their aggregated assets are roughly one third higher. Independent 
farmers depend more heavily on cash income for investment during the planting season and 
have more need to accumulate savings to mitigate shocks than contract farmers do, since the 
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latter access inputs and credit through GOPDC. It seems likely that outgrowers use their cash 
income to access and cultivate additional land and improve their livelihood by purchasing
new assets. In line with this idea, descriptive analysis reveals that outgrowers obtained 
roughly 75% of their independently farmed food or cash crop plots after they entered into 
contract farming. Thus, the “land gap” between outgrowers and independent farmers accrued 
after contractual treatment.
4.3. Regression Analyses
As Table 4 shows, we find that holding an outgrower contract has a highly significant positive 
effect in all four models. Confirming our hypothesis, the outgrower dummy has a strong 
effect, increasing overall life satisfaction by roughly 1.5 points on a scale of 0 to 10 (models
1, 3 and 4). The size of the land under outgrower contract, however, has only a small effect.
The coefficient of 0.175 for the logarithm of contracted land in model 2 implies that a farmer
would need an increase in land under contract of over 30,000% to achieve a one point 
increase in overall life satisfaction. It therefore seems likely that spillover effects of plots 
under contract enhance life satisfaction for contract famers independently of the size of the 
land under contract and that size-independent effects, like increased security or improved 
access to credit, account for the major part of the effect. Consequently, we concentrate on the 
dummy variable in the subsequent regressions. The outgrower dummy remains significant and 
similar in size when we only control for exogenous socio-demographic and village level 
characteristics (model 1) and also when we add further socio-demographic-, land- and wealth-
related controls (model 3 and 4).
The adjusted r-squared for the models with additional controls (models 3 and 4), 0.336 and 
0.354 respectively, is higher than for the net effects models, where it is only just above 0.2 
(models 1 and 2). Among other things, this is caused by a significant positive effect of 
property rights on overall life satisfaction. While a 100% increase in land with the property 
rights to use it as collateral adds 1.8 points on the life satisfaction scale (model 3), a 100% 
increase in land with the property rights to use it as collateral and to sell adds 2.2 points 
(model 3). Thus, the difference between the two bundles is rather small. Interestingly, the 
absolute size of own land as well as the size of average land owned by neighbours turns out
insignificant.17 The size of own land holdings thus does not seem to matter, whereas having a
higher share of one’s land with secure rights adds positively to subjective well-being. This is 
17 Land owned does also not turn significant if we exclude land under cultivation.
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fully in line with our hypothesis that secure property rights matter for overall life satisfaction. 
Moreover, the size of the land under cultivation makes a positively significant contribution to 
overall life satisfaction (models 3 and 4). Although the effect is rather small, a doubling of the
acreage of land under cultivation adds 0.43 points on the life satisfaction scale (model 3). 
Table 4. Estimations of overall life satisfaction
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Outgrower dummy 1.418*** 1.438*** 1.591***
(0.305) (0.330) (0.337)
Acres of land under outgrower contract (log) 0.175***
(0.0360)
Years under outgrower contract 0.00687 -0.000602 -0.00247 -7.60e-05
(0.0194) (0.0212) (0.0206) (0.0208)
Own land in acres (log) -0.00547 -0.000753
(0.0145) (0.0151)
Average own land of others (log) 7.987 8.490
(7.444) (6.545)
Cultivated land in acres (log) 0.436*** 0.442***
(0.120) (0.116)
% of land with property rights to sell and to use as 
collateral (0-1)
2.207*** 2.811***
(0.433) (0.420)
% of land with property rights to use as collateral 
(0-1)
1.814*** 2.659***
(0.373) (0.289)
Outgrower dummy * % of land with property rights 
to sell and to use as collateral
-2.962***
(0.777)
Outgrower dummy * % of land with property rights 
to use as collateral
-2.143***
(0.568)
Socio-demographic & village level controls Yes yes yes Yes
Wealth-related controls No no yes Yes
Observations 824 824 824 824
R-squared 0.209 0.215 0.357 0.376
R-squared adjusted 0.198 0.204 0.336 0.354
Test of joint significance F(11, 46) =  
16.31***
F(11, 46) =  
19.26***
F(26, 46) =  
54.56***
F(28, 46) = 
112.40***
Standard error of regression 1.6441 1.6382 1.4963 1.476
Schwarz information criterion 3226.31 3220.305 3156.415 3145.261
Note: The estimator is OLS. Clustered standard errors at village level in parentheses; significance levels at: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1; full estimations are reported in Appendix A.
Holding an outgrower contract and possessing bundles of property rights to land (to use as 
collateral, or to use both as collateral and to sell) are ways to gain security. Thus, we want to 
know whether these two effects are in an additive or substitutive relationship. Introducing two 
interaction terms with the outgrower dummy reveals that both bundles of property rights no 
longer have an effect on outgrowers’ subjective well-being as both terms turn out negatively
significant. According to t-test statistics, coefficients of the property rights bundles (2.8 and 
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2.7) and the interaction terms (-2.9 and -2.1) add up to zero (p-value= 0.00 for model 4). 
Consequently, this hints at a substitutive effect.
A plausible explanation is this: while independent farmers rely on property rights to reach a 
level of security which has a positive effect on their subjective well-being, outgrowers access 
security via the contract and do not gain additional overall life satisfaction from secure 
property rights. A comparison of different model selection criteria between models 3 and 4 
shows a higher adjusted r-squared (0.336 vs 0.354), a higher F-value in the test for joint 
significance (54.56 vs 112.40), a smaller standard error of regression (1.4963 vs 1.476), and a 
smaller Schwarz information criterion (3156.415 vs 3145.261) for model 4, hinting at a better 
fit of this model.
Furthermore, our regression analyses corroborate earlier research by showing positive 
significant effects for the first and second highest subjective income quintiles, whereas 
increasing household size and belonging to an ethnic minority have significant negative 
effects on overall life satisfaction (models 3 and 4 in Table 5 in Appendix A). Aggregated 
assets have a significant positive effect, whereas being female is, in contrast to findings in the 
literature, weakly negatively significant in model 3 but turns insignificant in model 4 
(Appendix A).
Our results hold for all model specifications when we replace the outgrower dummy with the 
logarithm of land size under contract (assuming that a percentage increase in the size of land 
under contract has a constant effect) and when we include the outgrower dummy together 
with the size of land under contract (correcting for the spike at a value of zero).18 Using the 
logarithm of absolute land size with different bundles of property rights instead of percentages
produces also similar results. The same holds true for replacing average own land of 
neighbours with average cultivated land of neighbours and for replacing subjective income 
with actual household income or agricultural expenditure. Moreover, our results remain robust 
if we reduce the scale of our dependent variable to seven (by collapsing categories 0, 1, 2 and 
3 and categories 9 and 10) as well as to five (by collapsing categories 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4 and 
categories 8, 9 and 10), which are also commonly used in the literature.19
Table 6 in Appendix B presents further robustness tests based on the specification of model 4 
in Table 4. First, we estimate an ordered logit model to test for the effect of the estimation 
18 The outgrower dummy remains highly significant and the size of land under contract becomes insignificant in 
this specification. Thus, it confirms the on-off-effect of contract farming. 
19 Results are available upon request.
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procedure (model 1). The logistic estimator confirms our findings from the OLS regression. In 
the second model specification we exclude ‘extreme’ landowners (more than 30 acres) from 
our sample to avoid possible bias (model 2). The coefficients of the outgrower dummy, the 
two property rights variables, and their interactions are all highly significant and keep the 
same direction. Finally, we estimate overall life satisfaction separately for landowners (model 
3) and for landless farmers (model 4). Again, the outgrower effect is positive and significant 
in both models. Bundles of property rights show a significant positive sign and their 
interaction with the outgrower dummy shows a significant negative sign in the model for 
landowners. Hence, various robustness checks reveal that results hold for different model 
specifications and different estimation techniques.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper we use a setting where outgrower contracts were allocated in a quasi-natural 
experiment to analyse the causal effect of contract farming on subjective well-being in the 
sphere of a large-scale investment in land in Ghana. Studies which try to identify the causal 
effect of contract farming are rare, and hampered by methodological difficulties: those using 
instrumental variables often face problems caused by weak instruments and those using panel 
data can only control for time-invariant unobserved factors. To the best of our knowledge this 
is the first documented setting where contractual treatment took place as a quasi-natural 
experiment. 
Corroborating the findings of the panel data analysis by Dedehouanou et al. (2013), we find 
that contract farming has a positively significant effect on subjective well-being. Using a life 
satisfaction scale of 0 to 10, we find that subjective well-being is on average roughly 1.5 
points higher for contract than for independent farmers. This effect is not limited to monetary 
aspects but also comprises non-monetary benefits. In particular, we believe that contracts help 
smallholder farmers to overcome market imperfections and reduce their vulnerability to 
shocks by mitigating production and marketing risks. Thus, holding an outgrower contract 
contributes to satisfaction in the security domain encompassed in multi-dimensional concepts 
of overall life satisfaction (e.g. Cummins, 1996).
Further supporting this view is our finding that secure property rights to land enhance overall 
life satisfaction for non-contract farmers but cannot increase it for outgrowers. In rural areas 
secure property rights to land fulfil an important security function and therefore also influence 
overall life satisfaction through the security domain. Rojas (2006) finds that additional gains 
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in life satisfaction from increases in one domain, such as security, tend to perish with 
enhanced satisfaction in this domain. This is in line with our finding that holding a contract 
and gaining security through property rights show a substitutive relationship: outgrowers can 
satisfy their security needs through a well-defined contract whereas non-contract farmers lack 
this source of security and thus rely on property rights for their security. Moreover, in an 
environment where clearly documented land use rights are rare, the outgrower contract might 
by itself serve as a document recording land use rights.
In the context of large-scale land acquisitions, well-designed outgrower contracts are believed 
to benefit both local farmers and the investor. Our research supports this idea. However, our 
results must be treated with caution and may be only applicable to similar settings. In our 
setting, farmers’ bargaining position is strong due to excess demand for the contracted crop, 
high monitoring costs for side selling, and the lack of specified quality standards. In addition,
we cannot ensure that property rights are exogenous in our setting. Moreover, we do not claim
that outgrower contracts can replace secure property rights to land; we rather claim that 
contract farming can increase subjective well-being, especially through security gains in a 
setting where existing local land rights are respected. Nevertheless, in order to promote 
sustainable development, accompanying measures will be necessary to include the poorest
population groups.
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APPENDIX A: ESTIMATIONS OF OVERALL LIFE SATISFACTION
Table 5. Full estimations of overall life satisfaction from Table 4.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Outgrower dummy 1.418*** 1.438*** 1.591***
(0.305) (0.330) (0.337)
Size of land under outgrower contract (log) 0.175***
(0.0360)
Years under outgrower contract 0.00687 -0.000602 -0.00247 -7.60e-05
(0.0194) (0.0212) (0.0206) (0.0208)
Own land in acres (log) -0.00547 -0.000753
(0.0145) (0.0151)
Average own land of others (log) 7.987 8.490
(7.444) (6.545)
Cultivated land in acres (log) 0.436*** 0.442***
(0.120) (0.116)
% of land with property rights to sell and to use as 
collateral (0-1)
2.207*** 2.811***
(0.433) (0.420)
% of land with property rights to use as collateral 
(0-1)
1.814*** 2.659***
(0.373) (0.289)
Outgrower dummy * % of land with property rights 
to sell and to use as collateral
-2.962***
(0.777)
Outgrower dummy * % of land with property rights 
to use as collateral
-2.143***
(0.568)
Years of schooling -0.00221 -0.00289
(0.0131) (0.0123)
Gender (1= female) -0.308* -0.279* -0.283* -0.252
(0.167) (0.165) (0.158) (0.156)
Age 0.0129 0.0106 0.0355 0.0297
(0.0317) (0.0323) (0.0300) (0.0285)
Age squared -9.06e-05 -7.15e-05 -0.000393 -0.000344
(0.000311) (0.000319) (0.000295) (0.000284)
Ethnic minority -0.415*** -0.411*** -0.232** -0.235**
(0.116) (0.113) (0.110) (0.109)
Migrant -0.191 -0.203 -0.146 -0.143
(0.147) (0.142) (0.127) (0.130)
Married -0.0539 -0.0581
(0.156) (0.159)
Ill in last 2 weeks 0.152 0.152
(0.107) (0.109)
Household size -0.0777*** -0.0773***
(0.0272) (0.0269)
Big village (> 5,000) 0.148 0.149 0.0533 0.0664
(0.120) (0.128) (0.141) (0.142)
Small village (< 1,000) -0.158 -0.173 -0.127 -0.118
(0.143) (0.144) (0.145) (0.144)
Bosome (trad. area) 0.810*** 0.814*** 3.896 4.418
(0.210) (0.205) (3.850) (3.340)
Kotoku (trad. area) 0.223** 0.219* 0.0275 0.109
(0.106) (0.112) (0.175) (0.171)
1. subjective income quintile 0.985*** 0.975***
(0.255) (0.253)
2. subjective income quintile 0.655** 0.559**
(0.259) (0.258)
3. subjective income quintile 0.103 0.0436
38
(0.192) (0.194)
4. subjective income quintile 0.104 0.113
(0.173) (0.177)
Average subjective income of others 5.194 6.325
(6.253) (5.473)
Aggregated assets (log) 0.139* 0.129*
(0.0717) (0.0684)
Constant 5.071*** 6.337*** -28.05 -32.53
(0.759) (0.814) (33.24) (29.08)
Observations 824 824 824 824
R-squared 0.209 0.215 0.357 0.376
Note: The estimator is OLS. Clustered standard errors at village level in parentheses; significance levels at:*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1; reference categories: main ethnicity: Akan, traditional area: Abuakwa, village: small, subjective income: 
poorest quintile. 
APPENDIX B. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Table 6. Further estimations of overall life satisfaction
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ordered OLS OLS OLS
logit 
full sample
excluding extreme 
landowners
landowners 
only
land less 
only
Outgrower dummy 1.857*** 1.565*** 1.201*** 2.025***
(0.452) (0.346) (0.425) (0.508)
Years under outgrower contract 0.00118 0.00315 0.0255 -0.0243
(0.0267) (0.0213) (0.0231) (0.0283)
Own land in acres (log) 0.00113 -0.00191 -0.103
(0.0162) (0.0154) (0.0709)
Average own land of others (log) 8.769 9.057 7.033
(9.678) (7.412) (7.150)
Cultivated land in acres (log) 0.479*** 0.445*** 0.507*** 0.439**
(0.145) (0.114) (0.118) (0.191)
% of land with property rights to sell and to 
use as collateral(0-1)
3.193*** 2.850*** 2.877***
(0.494) (0.413) (0.445)
% of land with property rights to use as 
collateral (0-1)
2.922*** 2.689*** 2.743***
(0.399) (0.282) (0.318)
Outgrower dummy * % of land with property 
rights to sell and collateral
-3.820*** -2.924*** -3.337***
(0.812) (0.753) (0.745)
Outgrower dummy * % of land with property 
rights to use as collateral
-2.155*** -2.083*** -2.174***
(0.827) (0.623) (0.624)
Years of schooling -0.00257 -0.00187 -0.00689 0.00533
(0.0163) (0.0125) (0.0161) (0.0172)
Gender (1= female) -0.277 -0.289* -0.0361 -0.689**
(0.196) (0.162) (0.212) (0.256)
Age 0.0341 0.0357 0.0304 0.0588
(0.0387) (0.0320) (0.0295) (0.0562)
Age squared -0.000395 -0.000412 -0.000343 -0.000661
(0.000389) (0.000321) (0.000293) (0.000575)
Ethnic minority -0.240* -0.227** -0.204 -0.171
(0.132) (0.112) (0.169) (0.192)
Migrant -0.116 -0.173 -0.0136 -0.377**
(0.161) (0.134) (0.181) (0.186)
39
Married -0.0430 -0.0576 -0.0648 -0.00421
(0.184) (0.164) (0.217) (0.266)
Ill in last 2 weeks 0.103 0.140 0.252* -0.0104
(0.134) (0.112) (0.143) (0.167)
Household size -0.0831** -0.0846*** -0.0844** -0.0747*
(0.0367) (0.0260) (0.0342) (0.0386)
Big village (> 5,000) 0.0754 0.0440 0.0653 0.0680
(0.184) (0.144) (0.173) (0.238)
Small village (< 1,000) -0.0903 -0.133 -0.0633 -0.301
(0.187) (0.146) (0.210) (0.194)
Bosome (trad. area) 4.743 4.631 4.329 -0.0541
(4.934) (3.708) (3.332) (1.378)
Kotoku (trad. area) 0.209 0.0820 0.219 -0.0132
(0.213) (0.183) (0.225) (0.481)
1. subjective income quintile 1.297*** 0.904*** 1.366*** 0.176
(0.330) (0.256) (0.234) (0.449)
2. subjective income quintile 0.753** 0.536** 0.671** 0.514
(0.332) (0.263) (0.270) (0.347)
3. subjective income quintile 0.0426 0.0128 0.171 -0.0418
(0.238) (0.190) (0.267) (0.237)
4. subjective income quintile 0.242 0.0960 0.238 0.0664
(0.229) (0.179) (0.210) (0.314)
Average subjective income of others 7.171 6.600 6.530 -2.082
(7.905) (6.057) (5.187) (3.477)
Aggregated assets (log) 0.160* 0.118* 0.136* 0.146
(0.0835) (0.0693) (0.0789) (0.0986)
Constant 37.08 -34.41 -31.01 9.351
(42.42) (32.50) (28.94) (11.21)
Observations 824 809 483 341
R-squared 0.374 0.457 0.300
Note: Clustered standard errors at village level in parentheses; significance levels at: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
reference categories: main ethnicity: Akan, traditional area: Abuakwa, village: small, subjective income: poorest quintile. In
model (2) extreme landowners with own land > 30 acres are excluded. In model (3) landless farmers are excluded, whereas 
model (4) excludes landowners.
